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THE PRACTICES AND 
INFRASTRUCTURES OF 
COMPARISON
Joe Deville, Michael Guggenheim, Zuzana Hrdlicˇková
Two Compar i sons
let us produce a coMparison.
The first entity in this comparison comprises the opening lines from Reinhard 
Bendix’s relatively early attempt to justify the comparative method within 
sociological research:
Like the concepts of other disciplines, sociological concepts should be 
universally applicable. The concept ‘division of labor’, for instance, refers to 
the fact that the labor performed in a collectivity is specialized; the concept 
is universal because we know of no collectivity without such specialization. 
Where reference is made to a principle of the division of labor over time – 
irrespective of the particular individuals performing the labor and of the 
way labor is subdivided (whether by sex, age, skill or whatever) – we arrive 
at one meaning of the term ‘social organization’. We know of no society that 
lacks such a principle; furthermore, we can compare and contrast the social 




The second is an extract from a chapter published just over twenty years later in 
the influential Writing Culture (1986a) collection, edited by James Clifford and 
George E. Marcus. This collection is often seen as capturing a major shift that 
was occurring within anthropology at the time. This approach highlighted the 
inevitable partiality of ethnographic truth and the way in which ethnographic 
accounts needed to be seen as irredeemably textual, rhetorical productions, 
through which cultures become ‘invented’ and not represented (see Clifford 
1986). In this section the author, Stephen Tyler, takes on what he identifies 
as a dominant mode of ethnographic prose, rooted in ‘easy realism of natural 
history’, born out of an urge to ‘conform to the canons of scientific rhetoric’. Its 
problem, he writes, is
a failure of the whole visualist ideology of referential discourse, with its 
rhetoric of ‘describing’, ‘comparing’, ‘classifying’, and ‘generalizing’ and its 
presumption of representational signification. In ethnography there are no 
‘things’ there to be the objects of a description, the original appearances that 
the language of description ‘re-presents’ as indexical objects for comparison, 
classification, and generalization; there is rather a discourse, and that too, 
no thing (Tyler 1986: 130–31).
This comparison provides just a glimpse into the way in which the authority 
of comparison itself has changed and been challenged over the course of the 
relatively recent history of sociology and anthropology. It locates comparison 
against two radically different positions: what we might call methodological 
positivism, in Bendix’s case, and methodological relativism in Tyler’s (see 
Steinmetz 2004). The comparison, thus, highlights two ends of comparative 
(and anti-comparative) epistemology.
Let us produce another comparison (Fig. 1.1).
The chart uses Google’s database of scanned books, narrowed down to 
include only those that refer to either sociology or anthropology, and looks at 
the changes in how often comparison is referred to in these books. The chart 
suggests that in both disciplines interest in comparison has increased since the 
beginning of the 1950s, and then peaked in anthropology in around 1960, and 
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in sociology roughly a decade later to decline and later stabilise on a much lower 
level.2 Both disciplines experience a similar rise and fall of interest in comparison.
One way we can use these comparisons is to bring them together: we can 
see that the first two statements map onto the historic rise and fall of compari-
son in the social sciences, with Bendix’s enthusiasm appearing at a time when 
comparison was a hot topic and Tyler’s radical critique coming at a point when 
comparison was on the way out.
In this volume we propose to re-engage the debates about comparison by 
learning from the close observation of (social) scientific practice. Rather than 
considering the problems of comparison as those of epistemology – for instance, 
whether we are for (Radhakrishnan 2013) or against (Friedman 2013) compari-
son, or whether certain forms of comparison are ethical and legitimate (Longxi 
2013) – we start by treating comparisons as objects of analysis and which we 
and the other authors in this collection see as involving a range of actors (human 
and non-human), practices, and tools. To take the above two comparisons as a 
comparative example, one involves us, the authors, selecting and juxtaposing 
two texts, while the other involves a tool that draws on a database of millions 
Fig. 1.1 Relative frequency of the terms ‘comparative sociology’ or ‘comparative 















of scanned books. As we will discuss, many comparisons are at least as complex 
and collaborative as the latter, involving hybrid combinations of teams, funders, 
fieldtrips, and different media which in turn are wrapped up in distinct cultures, 
histories, and power relations.
E p i s t emolog ica l  I n f ra s tructur e s
Our attention is therefore on the situated practice of comparison – an approach 
that if not rendering the various epistemological debates around comparison 
irrelevant, then at least cutting them down to size. That is to say, the epistemologi-
cal challenges to comparison that have arisen over the course of the latter half 
of the twentieth century become understood as just one part of the changing 
infrastructures of comparison, infrastructures that have at various points and 
in various different ways, rendered certain forms of comparison more or less 
credible.
Given that the challenges to comparison have been well documented and 
are touched on in a number of contributions to this volume, we will not dwell 
on them for too long in this introduction. The story, however, goes something 
like this. For a long time, comparison was seen as a crucial tool for identifying 
the universal forces that shaped social groupings, allowing analysts like Bendix 
to make the leap from the empirical to the conceptual and from the particular 
to the general. From the start this was itself guided by a contrast between the 
practices of social and natural sciences. For the social sciences, the attractions 
of the comparisons being produced by the natural sciences were manifold. First 
and foremost, scientists had proved themselves expert at using comparison to 
detect patterns of similarity and difference. Comparison also underpinned ideals 
of scientific rigour. Without it, neither principles of experimental replication, nor 
hypothesis testing, nor tests of statistical significance, would function. Within 
the social sciences, therefore, the hope was that by transferring a comparative 
method, its researchers might be able to emulate their natural scientific cousins 
and divide the world into fixed properties. This would allow them to identify 
not the natural laws of life, but its social laws.
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However, a series of developments threatened this ambition, some of the 
effects of which we could try to tentatively map onto the above graph. The most 
major of these developments seemed, at first at least, to pertain to one discipline 
more than any other: anthropology. Anthropology seemed particularly want-
ing in the context of the major geopolitical shifts of the time. The 1960s and 
1970s saw significant questions raised about its potential complicity with the 
European colonial project, whose damaging effects were becoming increasingly 
hard to ignore (see Gingrich and Fox 2002: 2). Comparison had moved from 
being an epistemological practice to being a political one. Seen from the per-
spective of this volume, this was not only a conceptual shift, but one in which 
the infrastructure of comparison had become newly problematic. Comparison 
was seen as an extension of colonialism, in which the infrastructure of colonial-
ism served as a carrier for an epistemic project of subjecting other forms of life. 
The emergent issue centred on the fact that the people who embarked on the 
doing of comparison did so by means which were seen as compromising the 
very epistemological basis of their work.
The 1980s saw what might have seemed as narrow disciplinary-specific 
concerns flood into a number of other areas within the social sciences. First, the 
kinds of issues that had been raised within anthropology were shown to be as 
relevant to other disciplines. This became connected to a further set of attacks. 
A series of intellectual challenges, including Nietzschean perspectivism, post-
structuralist deconstruction, postcolonial and feminist critiques, and research 
within science and technology studies (STS), shook many of the pillars upon 
which social science had been resting (see Dickens and Fontana 1994; Keane 
2005). These threatened to destabilise the claim of the methods and writing 
practices of social research to be able to truthfully represent social life. They 
also threatened the idea, captured in the extract by Bendix above, that analytical 
concepts could be simply ‘extracted’ from empirical settings and made to circulate 
independently. In part this was because of the argument that different settings, 
different encounters between researcher and researched, possessed an inher-
ent incommensurability (see Jensen 2011; Steinmetz 2004; Strathern 1988); 
in other words, they simply could not be compared in a meaningful way. And 
in part this was because of a suspicion of the very plausibility of concepts that 
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could be ‘transcendent’. Attention also turned towards researchers themselves. 
A range of work revealed research practice as always situated and never inno-
cent from the values and biases of the researcher (see Haraway 1989; Harding 
1986). Rather than the ships and practices of the colonials, the heads and bodies 
of researchers became the focus for the critique of comparison. Such conclu-
sions also threatened the standard against which social science had previously 
measured itself: the natural sciences. As STS researchers showed, biases could 
readily be found here too (Latour 1988). Some of this critique is inflected in 
both Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus 1986b) and Tyler’s extract above.
Here, then, we can observe a shift from what we might call the colonial 
critique. In the colonial critique it was the global infrastructures of colonialism 
that were seen as fundamental obstacles to forms of meaningful comparison. The 
reflexive and epistemological critique, by contrast, while recognising key aspects 
of this argument, shifts attention from global practices and power relations to 
the individual. It is a critique that looks at comparisons as problematic effects of 
writing, which are seen to do violence to the uniqueness of the circumstances 
of the research subjects.
As we move closer to the present, we see that many if not all of these ques-
tions have lost little of their relevance.3 While many social scientists may have 
rowed back from more strident anti-realist stances that characterised some of 
the postmodernist academic discourse in the 1980s and into the 1990s, there 
is little sense of a desire to return to the kind of methodological positivism 
that preceded these challenges. Feminist and postcolonial research and STS, 
meanwhile, in their moves towards a more constructivist understanding of the 
composition of the social and material world, continue to challenge the assumed 
neutrality of research and its claims towards objectivity.
With the increased normalisation of constructivism, however, we can find 
one further important but often quite implicitly articulated recent reappraisal 
of the status of comparison. While the postmodernist critique of comparison 
was that meaningful comparison is impossible because of the damage done to 
the entities under comparison, the constructivist critique adopts the seemingly 
opposite point of view: comparison, it is argued, is ubiquitous, as can be seen in 
the often cited words of Evans Pritchard that ‘there is only one method […] the 
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comparative method. And that [method] is impossible’ (used as an epigraph in 
both Peacock (2002) and Jensen (2011)). Comparison thus becomes meaning-
less, but for quite different reasons: what becomes challenged is the idea that 
social science could deploy a comparative practice that is distinct from the 
comparative practices inherent to the world. As with the reflexivist critique, this 
view also tends to suggest that comparison is a purely epistemic practice. From 
such a point of view, there is indeed nothing special about comparison. As we 
will proceed to outline, however, what such a view ignores are the particularities 
and the practices through which social science does comparison.
Given these continuing epistemological concerns about comparison, the 
changes in academic practice that our chart at the start of this chapter indicated 
should not be surprising. Within many academic departments, the challenges 
documented above have markedly improved the status and authority of non-
comparative, small scale, case-study oriented, qualitative and ethnographic 
research. New seemingly non-comparative methods have also taken hold: 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT), for instance, and the more loose assembly 
of research practices which it has influenced, has exhibited a suspicion of the 
imposition of transcendent categories into the research situation (see Law 
and Hassard 1999; Latour 2005). As Bruno Latour famously put it, ‘nothing 
is, by itself, either reducible or irreducible to anything else’ (1988: 158). This 
principle is at the heart of ANT, in which the researcher does not assume an a 
priori separation between social and material in the conduct of research. The 
researcher’s main job in this situation is to identify the breaks that allow the 
production of continuity (e.g. the continuity of scientific practice), rather than 
introducing these breaks him or herself by leaping to a different comparative 
setting (see Latour 2013: 33).
Comparat i v e  O p en ing s ?
There are, then, a considerable number of actors exerting a potentially strong 
pull against the use of comparative approaches. Despite this, and against the 
odds perhaps, we may be seeing the door to comparative social scientific 
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practice opening a little wider than it has done for some time. A number 
of books and journal collections have begun to reinvestigate questions of 
comparison. These have taken on important unresolved questions of epis-
temology – for instance, examining whether poles as seemingly opposed as 
comparison and relativism can, in fact, be placed into productive dialogue 
(see Jensen (2011) and others in the Comparative Relativisim Special Issue). 
They have also begun, with some overlaps with the concerns of this book, to 
unpick some of the challenges that face those interested in developing dif-
ferent, potentially more productive and potentially more reflexive forms of 
comparative practice. This includes asking how comparison might become 
‘thicker’ (Scheffer and Niewöhner 2010), more relational (Ward 2010; Cook 
and Ward 2012), and/or more modest, postcolonial and attentive to modalities 
of difference (McFarlane and Robinson 2012; Robinson 2011; and others in 
the Comparative Urbanism Special Issue).
There has been a very visible push by funders for researchers to adopt 
comparative methods (see in this volume, Akrich and Rabeharisoa, Deville et 
al., Stöckelová). For instance, the stated rationale accompanying the regula-
tory foundation for the EU’s funding programme for the 2014 to 2020 period 
(known as Horizon 2020) points to the need for comparison given the increas-
ing ‘complexity’ of the challenges facing Europe. These are challenges that ‘go 
beyond national borders and thus call for more complex comparative analyses 
to develop a base upon which national and European policies can be better 
understood’ (European Union 2013: 162).
There is another actor that has the potential to pull comparison in a different 
direction, and that is STS. This might be surprising, given that it is one of the 
subdisciplines that has both opened up the contingencies of knowledge produc-
tion, while also developing what seems to be a non-comparative methodology. 
However, STS appears to be offering important practical pointers towards what 
the development of a new, less hamstrung comparative practice might look like.
First, STS is doing comparison. Bruno Latour’s recent major work, An Enquiry 
into Modes of Existence, quite explicitly puts comparison to work. Its ambition 
is to examine the productivity of putting, side by side, 15 different ‘modes’ 
through which existence is produced. Latour talks about comparison as a ‘test’, 
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the criteria for which are implied in the following questions (if the answers to 
each are negative, then comparison can be considered to have failed its test):
Do we gain in quality by crossing several ontological templates in order to 
evaluate, little by little, what is distinctive about each one? And, an even more 
daunting subtest: do we gain in verisimilitude by treating all the modes at 
once in such a move of envelopment? (Latour 2013: 478)
We are back, then, to questions of similarity and difference. And to the ability 
of comparison to make a difference. What’s more, ‘irreduction’ is revealed in the 
book not as the principle that should underpin all investigations of social life, but 
rather a particular way (albeit a crucially important one in the history of STS) to 
follow one of the fifteen ‘modes’: the ‘network’ mode. By virtue of its capacity to 
differentiate, comparison inevitably engages in activities of reduction. However, 
this should not be seen as necessarily problematic: reduction is productive not 
of ‘less’ in any simple way but rather difference (see Robinson, this volume). 
As such, it is an operation as indispensible to analysis as it is to life (see Bryant 
2013; Halewood 2011).4 In Latour’s recent book, the role of comparison can be 
seen as assisting us in distinguishing between (productive) reductions.
The fact that – whether for pragmatic or intellectual reasons – comparative 
research is being done by STS researchers offers an opportunity. Here we have a 
body of researchers trained in the very art of detecting how scientific techniques 
and technologies affect the production of knowledge, using a method which 
has been so often criticised for how it does just that. Undertaking an analysis of 
their own research (as many in this book have done) and not just the research 
practices of others, may help us determine in practice what the dangers and 
opportunities of comparison actually are for social science (see Deville et al.; 
Stöckelová; and Akrich & Rabharisoa in this volume).
This leads to the second point. And that is that STS is, or at least it could be, 
well placed to hesitate, to slow down and recognise the power and potential of 
its own comparative practices before making assumptions about comparison. 
Many critics of comparative practice make rapid leaps between ‘comparison’, 
‘classification’, ‘generalisation’, and the production of knowledge understood 
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as ‘scientific’ and/or ‘objective’. This obscures the translations and mediations 
that need to occur for each of these terms to have the power to define the 
other. Webb Keane has opened up some of these moves by demonstrating how 
in some social scientific settings the suspicion of comparison can be traced 
back to a very particular ethical project constructed in direct opposition to 
what he calls a ‘hypostasized version of science’ (Keane 2005: 85). This is 
important. As Stengers reminds us, ‘[e]xperimental sciences are not objective 
because they would rely on measurement alone. In their case, objectivity is 
not the name for a method but for an achievement’ (Stengers 2011: 50). It is 
a very particular type of achievement to tie comparison to the production of 
the very particular kinds of knowledge that scientific methodologies seek to 
produce. It is perfectly possible for comparison to be directed towards quite 
different ends.
The  U s e s  o f  Compar i son
To help us understand exactly how and why comparison is neither inherently 
innocent nor guilty of the various charges that have been levelled against it, we 
seek in this volume to accomplish two goals. Some of the articles focus on either 
one of these twin aspects, some on both. First, we seek to analyse how compari-
son is done, and second, we seek more productive ways of doing comparison, 
in part by challenging conventional comparative practices. To accomplish these 
goals it is important to accept the two points made above: first, that comparison 
indeed is a particular research practice, rather than merely a ubiquitous cognitive 
operation; second, that comparison as a research practice is necessarily reductive, 
and this is not in itself problematic.
Rather than dwelling on the epistemological concerns outlined above, 
then, it makes sense to look in more detail into the different uses of compari-
son and to begin to be able to ask critical questions about where and in what 
ways we practise comparison and with what ambitions in mind. We maintain 
here, as do the authors in this collection in various ways, that comparison can 
and should have uses that move far away from how it has been understood 
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previously. We also maintain that focusing on the uses of comparison can 
help to free us from many of the attendant epistemological worries (see also 
Krause on this issue).
Thus rather than insisting on the problems associated with previous com-
parative research, and making an exception for non-comparative qualitative 
research in the mistaken assumption that it is automatically less reductionist, 
we insist that research is in itself a risky and necessarily reductive practice. This 
means that we should therefore ask where and when we want to reduce and 
with what goals in mind.5
Competition, for instance, is a particularly radical and often harmful form of 
comparison, as for example when it puts entities into a contest without having 
a theory of what guides the outcomes (for example, in the case of measuring 
academic productivity (see de Rijcke et al.)). Or there is comparison as critique 
(see Krause): it shares with competition the idea that we can use another object 
to assess the object in front of us; to understand what is good or bad about this 
object, or if we need another object that is different from, and better or worse 
than, whatever we are interested in. A number of writers have also noted how 
comparison may be pedagogic and creative: it allows the person or entity doing 
the comparison to learn from having objects, arguments, statements, and empiri-
cal phenomena contrasted with each other and, as a result of this contrast, for 
each to potentially emerge more clearly defined than before (see Schmidt 2008: 
339; Stengers 2011: 62).
Compar i son  a s  Cr eat i v i t y
With this starting point established, it now becomes possible to compare dif-
ferent ways in which entities are constructed through comparison. The focus 
can thus move from criticising the construction of categories per se and the 
brutality with which objects are forced into categories through comparison, to 
analysing various forms of category creation. The construction of entities, and 
the reduction of the world in accordance with such entities, becomes visible as a 
process that is difficult, certainly, but also adventurous and creative. Throughout 
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this volume, we can observe a number of such strategies. They all confidently 
establish categories, yet do so in a reflective and sometimes playful way.
The first strategy is to undermine the seeming self-evidence of the categories 
being used in a particular comparative undertaking, as can be seen in the articles 
by Akrich and Rabeharisoa, and Deville et al. In both studies, the self-evident 
category appears to be the state, yet in each case the authors dismantle the idea 
of a state as either homogeneous or consistent in different settings; instead the 
category of the state divides into various subsets, containing a varied and unpre-
dictable selection of entities. In both, then, it turns out that states are above all 
convenient starting places for research, for the simple reason that they provide 
distinct legal and organisational contexts in which the research objects (patient 
groups and disaster management) operate.
A second version compares comparisons between social scientists and the 
field (see, to varying degrees, Akrich and Rabeharisoa, Deville et al., Gad and 
Jensen, Lutz, and Meyer). The idea here is based on the ubiquity of comparison 
in a context distinct from social science. This is a reflexive move which follows 
many other forms of constructive reflexivity in the social sciences. For exam-
ple, Boltanksi and Thévenot’s theory of justification is built on the observation 
that critique is not only in the hands of social scientists but also part of lay dis-
course, and that critical theory thus needs to turn into a theory of how critique 
is practised (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991). The reflexive comparisons in this 
volume similarly start with the observation of pre-existing comparisons in the 
field and use these to rethink the comparative practices of social science. The 
conclusions that stem from such a rethinking differ, however: some authors 
argue that social science should follow the comparisons in the field (Gad and 
Jensen, Lutz), while others maintain that there is something distinct about 
an explicitly directed social scientific approach to comparison (Akrich and 
Rabeharisoa, Deville et al., Meyer).
A third version creates different entities by turning towards asymmetrical 
comparison. Comparative asymmetries often follow from the need to discover 
the tertium comparationis. While normally the tertium comparationis is assumed 
to dictate the category of objects being compared (a state being compared with 
other states, etc.), it may help to embrace forms of analysis that shift across 
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multiple comparative registers, with no desire to produce cleanly balanced 
comparisons. Categories of object might be compared with each other, with 
then further comparisons brought into play by shifting across different planes – 
across not just space but also time, for instance (see the discussion of Faria’s 
chapter below).
The Comparator and the Practis ing of Comparison
To claim that comparison is always grounded in infrastructure forces us to 
analyse the relationship between such infrastructures and the practices of 
comparison. This volume is thus also concerned with the ‘nitty-gritty’ or the 
practical level of comparative practices as they are deployed across various social 
scientific comparative projects, the often unseen and unremarked dimensions 
of comparison upon which research practice nonetheless utterly depends. 
Akrich and Rabeharisoa, Deville et al., and Stöckelová each conduct types 
of auto-ethnography to show the diverse ways in which comparisons can be 
done. These contributions clearly show that comparative research hinges on a 
multiplicity of factors ranging from a particular zeitgeist (or research fashion), 
to the project structure and proposals made to funders, to the inner workings 
of the entity conducting the comparison. The latter is an entity we call the 
‘comparator’ (Deville et al., this volume).
Let us take, first, the influence of funders. The priorities laid down for 
researchers by funding agencies influence the choice of the field to be studied 
and the planning and conduct of the individual steps of the project. The pro-
ject has to make sense to the funders in order to be able to come into existence. 
And here is the paradox: some funders, particularly the EU under the various 
Framework Programmes, now prefer projects that have an element of interna-
tional collaboration looking at the same topic. Therefore numerous academic 
teams based in multiple countries come together and ‘do’ comparisons. Very 
often, these comparisons are between nations (or more loosely, between prac-
tices situated in different places), but the sheer scale of EU funds often renders 
projects comparative on other axes as well. The availability of large-scale funding 
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thus spurs a new kind of comparison which very often does not have its main 
purpose grounded in research problems. At least as often, such comparisons 
are driven by the political need of the EU to make sense of the EU as a ‘union’ 
of cultural practices and their internal differences. They are also driven by the 
fact that for large-scale research projects in the social sciences, ‘comparison’ 
is a convenient way of distributing and accounting for work. And finally, it 
is a way of making sense of individual subprojects of large-scale projects and 
claiming some kind of unifying theme of the work. It is unclear and has been 
barely analysed how such new forms of comparison relate to older formats. 
And, while earlier comparative practices, particularly in anthropology, tried to 
make sense of the ‘periphery’, the new EU funding regime looks at comparison 
to understand differences within the centre or to understand the relationship 
of centre and periphery.6 This has also brought a new form of relationship 
between centre and periphery: this new model of comparative research does 
not centralise comparative practice, but rather assigns each field site its own 
usually ‘local’ research team. In other words, we can observe a move from an 
anthropological comparative strategy, in which researchers are strangers, to a 
sociological one (see Stöckelová).
Second, comparative work hinges on the set-up and running of the compara-
tor – the human and non-human entity that jointly produces comparison (see 
Deville et al.). Humans combine their sensory and organisational apparatuses 
with those of tools and machines. Comparators are unique too, and vary between 
each project. They are assembled in part in accordance with the funding proposal, 
which details the number of their human and nonhuman parts and outlines 
modality of their work, while their shape and specific formatting also changes 
as the projects progress.
It seems that the im/balance between humans and nonhumans within a com-
parator profoundly impacts the modus operandi of work and its results. This is 
most tangible when comparing (again!) the work of single human researchers 
to that undertaken by teams. The advantage of comparators including a single 
person is that much of the comparator is located in one person, and thus many 
of its decisions do not need to be made explicit during the research process. 
One person’s own intuition and preferences shape what is being researched and 
31
introduction
what lines of enquiry are being pursued. It is only when the comparator runs 
into problems, or when comparative research practice needs to be explained 
(as in academic texts), that the underlying assumptions of the comparator are 
made explicit.
Comparators that contain several persons face different kinds of opportuni-
ties and challenges. Most importantly, collaborative work tends to depend on 
making things explicit, and specifying and homogenising the comparator in 
far more detail. Therefore, assembling the comparator is a crucial element of 
comparison. Teams also choose different strategies for calibrating their compara-
tors – allowing people, technologies, and other actors to adjust to each other 
and achieve ‘compatible’ ways of seeing and digesting data. This can include 
reading seminars, workshops, joint fieldwork, and so on. The scalar challenges 
of cross-national comparative projects, particularly favoured by large funding 
bodies, also increase the difficulties of making a comparator work (see Akrich 
and Rabeharisoa; Lutz; and Stöckelová, this volume). So too do the non-human 
parts of a comparator. All researchers also rely on a range of infrastructural tools 
to enable the conduct of their research. Luhmann was lost without his filing cabi-
net; ethnographic researchers would be lost without their notebook. Although 
tending to focus more on the natural sciences, STS has shown us repeatedly 
how such socio-material infrastructure can shape the conduct and outcomes of 
research. The fields themselves (and their various actors) also become part of 
the comparator and influence and shift our notion of comparison. This volume 
is full of accounts of how people and objects in the field change the course of 
comparative practice. And finally, the objects under examination possess dif-
ferent qualities to the researcher that make them comparable in different ways 
(see Faria, this volume).
If we think of the ways in which comparison is used, together with the vari-
ous elements involved in practically doing comparison – beginning with the 
role of research funders, the internal set-up of the comparator and finally the 
role of the field itself – we can immediately see that the question of what is at 
stake when practising comparison cannot, and could never have been, whether 
comparison is good or bad, or whether it should be avoided. The question is 
rather which comparisons and which comparative infrastructures we want to 
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implicate ourselves in, what we seek to understand with them, how we set up 
our comparator, and how we want it to relate to the field. There is no single, 
correct procedure for doing comparison, no correct answer to the question of 
what a good comparison is or should be. What the contributions to this book 
can do instead is to highlight some of their comparative decisions and selections, 
and some of the problems and conflicts that contributed towards comparisons 
being performed as they were.
Overv i ew  of  th e  Book
The book is divided into three sections. The first, Logics, deals with how scholars 
of different disciplines conceive the rules of doing comparison. It offers an analy-
sis of different objections and/or challenges to these rules, including situations 
where assumptions about comparison become a barrier to comparison itself.
When we speak about practising comparison, it is too easily forgotten that 
how we do comparison is guided to a great extent by books on method, meth-
odological fashions, and previous comparative examples. A struggle common 
to all the contributions to the book is the very restricted ideas of comparison 
that exist amongst the imagery, methods, texts, and implicit rules of various 
disciplines.
The first two chapters take issue with such rules and constraints in very 
different ways. Monika Krause, in ‘Comparative Research: Beyond Linear-
causal Explanation’, sets out to liberate comparison from its theory. She raises 
a charge: that comparative practice has suffered from an overly restrictive idea 
of comparison, one based on forms of ‘like with like comparisons’ drawn from 
ideas about linear causal explanation, with yet deeper roots in the randomised 
control trial. Measured against such standards, most comparisons of the social 
sciences fall short. Yet Krause maintains that social scientific comparison very 
often has quite different aims and that these should be conceived of according 
to different conceptual terms. She suggests that social scientific comparison 
instead often aims at better description, concept development, and critique, 
while providing explanations distinct from those of other disciplines. Such goals, 
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then, imply the use of different kinds of comparison, ranging from what she calls 
‘like with unlike comparisons’, to ‘asymmetrical comparisons’, to ‘hypothetical 
comparisons’, or to ‘undigested comparisons’.
Alice Santiago Faria takes a different route, trying to find a new logic of 
comparison from within a particular case. In her chapter, ‘Cross Comparison: 
Comparisons across Architectural Displays of Colonial Power’, she begins by 
analysing the logic of comparison in architectural history and theory. This logic, 
she maintains, is focused on comparing either buildings from the same building 
type, the same epoch, or the same style (typical ‘like with like comparisons’, 
in Krause’s parlance). Yet, drawing on her research on colonial architecture in 
Goa (India), she shows that focusing on the categories that guide architectural 
history does not illuminate the logic of colonial architecture. According to Faria, 
colonial architecture can be characterised as the display of power through the 
most prominent building type of a given epoch. This leads her to compare a 
Goan cathedral from the sixteenth century with a British-Indian train station 
from the nineteenth century. These buildings are radically different in terms of 
the traditional logic of architectural history: they come from different times, 
are built in different styles, and are different building types. Yet this apparent 
incommensurability comes to provide the very basis for a set of novel compara-
tive movements.
The second section, titled Collaborations, deals with the various organisa-
tional, interactional, and political problems arising within collaborative research 
projects which are often strongly promoted by political donor entities, such as 
the EU. Project teams admit that collaboration can be laborious, as it brings 
unexpected challenges and twists when the imagined research ideas come to 
life and deal with incongruent realities of the field and diverse research practices 
across different academic traditions. It appears that the way the comparator 
(i.e. the entity that carries out the comparative work) is assembled and put to 
work determines what is and is not studied and put into mutual relation. In 
other words, collaborations shape the object of comparison just as the object 
shapes collaborations. This process involves endless adjustments or processes of 
calibration, through negotiations where hierarchies, personal relations, politics, 
and pragmatism co-produce the final end product – the outcome of research 
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projects. Comparison is thus often not a singular act but a continual collabora-
tive process undertaken throughout projects, from their inception as proposals 
to the process of analysis and writing.
In their chapter, ‘Same, Same but Different: Provoking Relations, Assembling 
the Comparator’, Deville, Guggenheim, and Hrdličková give a new meaning 
to the term comparator, as has already been described. Their chapter calls for 
more attention to be paid to the contingent practices in which the comparator 
becomes assembled, fed, and calibrated, as it determines how objects of study are 
approached, and continually interacted with. Such mutual interaction can pro-
voke further comparisons and realign the comparator. Their auto-ethnographic 
narrative, about carrying out a seemingly conventional comparison of disaster 
preparedness practices across three countries (the UK, Switzerland, and India), 
tells how various unanticipated factors, such as varied levels of access, absences 
or presences of certain phenomena, made the comparator devise coping strate-
gies and realign the whole outlook of the project. This leads to some interesting 
findings which would not have come to light had the conventional rules of 
comparing ‘like with like’ been strictly applied.
Madeleine Akrich and Vololona Rabeharisoa in ‘Pulling Oneself Out of the 
Traps of Comparison: An Autoethnography of a European Project’ recount 
the proceedings of their EU-funded project looking at patient organisations 
dealing with four different health conditions in four European countries. They 
concede that pragmatism was a guiding principle for the duration of the project. 
In the application stage, their research proposal was a strategic compromise 
between their intellectual interest in knowledge practices and the funder’s 
demands for an international/comparative/collaborative dimension. They 
thus deployed categories, narratives, and forms of reasoning which were not 
necessarily close to their interests, but that were crucial for obtaining the 
funding. Their comparative work thus did not result in typologies, as their 
research proposal might have suggested, but rather in multi-sited observations. 
Along the way they were producing and constantly calibrating comparators 
that would allow them to grasp singularities and commonalities, achieving a 




Reflecting on two of her research projects in the late 2000s – following 
women in science in five EU countries and the introduction of excellence 
frameworks in academia in the Czech Republic – Tereza Stöckelová’s chapter 
‘Frame Against the Grain: Asymmetries, Interference, and the Politics of EU 
Comparison’ raises the important issue of the conventions and forms of poli-
tics that permeate contemporary comparative practices in the social sciences 
in Europe (and, likely, elsewhere). Drawing on her own experience, she finds 
that research designs often correspond and speak to the (pre)existing political 
realities, infrastructures, and imaginations that are defined by funders, invoking 
unhelpful categories and comparative practices; further, that this imagination 
is reinforced through the multiple, recurring executions of projects reproduc-
ing these specific frames, units, and asymmetries. In making a case for a more 
critical form of collaborative comparison, she argues for social scientists and 
funders to go against the grain and to commit to creating investigative frictions 
by not allowing prevailing notions to dominate.
The third section is Relations. As we have alluded to above, comparison 
inevitably involves the forging of new connections between objects, persons, 
and many other entities besides (e.g. concepts, discourses, feelings, places, 
cities, states, and so on and so forth). The contributions to this section each in 
their various ways explore the consequences of this comparative relationality. In 
particular, they examine the forms of relation within which researchers become 
implicated in and through the particularities of fieldwork, with an attention 
to how comparative practice becomes shaped by the objects of comparison, 
including by the sometimes explicit, sometimes more implicit, comparisons 
that these objects perform.
Christopher Gad and Casper Bruun Jensen’s paper on ‘Lateral Comparisons’ 
shifts authority for the production of comparison away from the social scientist 
to the field itself. Given that the field is densely populated with comparison, 
something a number of other contributors also note, they invite social scientists 
to allow themselves to travel on a journey with this existing and multifarious 
comparative endeavour in order to begin a process of ‘inventing around’ these 
practices. In outlining how this might be achieved, they focus on the compari-
sons that take place in and around a particular site: a Danish fishery inspection 
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vessel. This involves paying attention to comparative relations that are put into 
play by both humans – notably the crew and fishing fleet inspectors – and a 
variety of non-humans, ranging from navigational aids to technologies that bring 
ships into direct comparative relation through monitoring activities. Practising 
comparison as a social scientist, then, is an act somewhere between a letting-go 
and a more active effort to resist the imposition of a layer of comparison on top 
of, and beyond, the various other, and often powerful, comparisons that are to 
be found once s/he starts looking.
This theme is taken up by Peter Lutz in ‘Comparative Tinkering with Care 
Moves’. Like Gad and Bruun Jensen, Lutz draws attention to the significance 
of comparative relations that already exist in the sites we study. In his case, this 
is senior home care and its movements and acts of transformation. A key point 
of difference between the two papers (one inevitably emerging from compari-
son!) is that Lutz also examines how such ‘found comparisons’, as one could 
call them, might (or might not) enter into productive relation with what might 
seem to be the more arbitrary comparisons that a social scientist might want to 
perform (and indeed ‘impose’). For Lutz, this is the attempt to bring together 
two sites that are spatially disconnected and organisationally and culturally 
quite distinct – senior home care in Sweden and the United States. Through 
a process that at once is reflexive about his own previous practice as a social 
scientist and takes the relations of comparison within field settings seriously, 
Lutz comes to advocate a process of comparative ‘tinkering’. This involves rec-
ognising the relational composition of comparison in-between the researcher 
and the researched and the ongoing adjustments that are required, as well as 
frictions that emerge, in the construction (and recognition) of comparison. One 
consequence of the tinkered comparison, he suggests, is to disturb some of the 
more conventional, standardised categories of comparison that are often rolled 
out uncritically within the social sciences.
In the next chapter, by Sarah de Rijcke, Iris Wallenburg, Paul Wouters, 
and Roland Bal (‘Comparing Comparisons: On Rankings and Accounting 
in Hospitals and Universities’), it becomes quite clear just what is at stake 
when some of these conventional categories of comparison begin to become 
deployed against the outputs of workers, including academic workers. Many 
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readers of this book will already be experiencing the effects on their everyday 
practices of the increasing metricisation of academic outputs and, as a direct 
consequence, the rise of the comparative and competitive ranking of universi-
ties. By comparing ranking systems within Dutch universities to those used 
within hospitals, the paper examines just how such systems come into being, 
some of their performative effects, as well as, in a final ‘jump’ with parallels to 
Lutz’s approach, reflecting on how this particular comparative technology sits 
against their own comparative practice. This helps reveal how uncomfortable it 
can be to at once be situated as an object of comparison and an analyst of this 
objectification, as well as the centrality of commensuration to all comparative 
practices. As the authors suggest, such acts of commensuration can come into 
tension with a researcher’s desire (one common to STS researchers) to attend 
to empirical phenomena symmetrically.
Morgan Meyer, in the book’s final empirical chapter (‘Steve Jobs, Terrorists, 
Gentlemen, and Punks: Tracing the Strange Comparisons of Biohackers’), 
further pursues the tack of reflexively analysing his own comparative practices 
against those of his respondents, here ‘biohackers’. These are individuals, inspired 
by the ethics of hacking and open source, who seek to mess with biology in a 
wide variety of ways. Including in his own previous work, Meyer finds that, 
in trying to pin down just what biohacking is and what it aims to achieve, it is 
something of a trope to place its practices into comparative relation, whether it 
be to terrorists, Steve Jobs, or seventeenth-century gentleman amateurs (or to 
many others besides). The task Meyer takes on is to uncover exactly what these 
various comparisons do to biohacking and biohackers. What he uncovers are 
a series of frames that shape how ‘we’, as scholars, and ‘they’, as practitioners, 
understand those ‘yet-to-be-named transformative individuals working in biol-
ogy’, as Meyer at points calls them (given that the very term biohacking operates 
in a particular comparative register). Comparison is shown to be a deeply value-
laden operation, one routinely involved in the construction of social identities. 
At the same time, Meyer suggests that such problematics of comparison cannot 
simply be solved by better, denser, ‘thicker’ description. Instead, comparativ-
ists – if that’s what we (whether we like it or not) are – should be content to leave 
comparison as they find it, to allow it to exist in all its multiplicity and muddle.
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The book ends with an Afterword by Jennifer Robinson, titled ‘Spaces of 
Comparison and Conceptualisation’. In it, she responds to some of the questions 
the essays raise. In navigating her way through these contributions, Robinson 
is drawn to asking after the spatialities of comparison, as part of an ambition 
to forge a revitalised comparative imagination. On the one hand, she argues, 
comparison is often thought/imagined/done in such a way as to reduce the 
spatial contingencies composition of that which is being compared (the case, 
the local, the city, the global, for instance). On the other, attending to spatial 
specificity (indeed, singularity) and to the way that such specificity can, in 
both theory and practice, enter into relation with an effectively infinite range 
of other entities, opens the door to comparative multiplicity. Here determin-
ing the ‘shared’ and ‘different’ registers of life and experience demands not a 
comparative universalism, but an approach to comparison that is modest and 
open to revision.
This suggests that practising comparison involves not a definitive fixing of 
the qualities of the world but a ‘holding steady’ just long enough for questions 
of difference and similarity to come into view. This requires considerable 
work to bring logics, collaborations, and relations together with compara-
tive infrastructures, field sites, research teams, objects, and technologies, 
as well as the power dynamics that inevitably cross-cut them. Analysing 
exactly what is at stake in this endeavour is what we hope this volume will 
begin to achieve.
Note s
1 Using Google Ngram viewer. Percentage obtained by dividing total occurrence of terms 
(case insensitive) by the corresponding total occurrence of either the terms sociology/
sociological or anthropology/anthropological (in order to control for an overall increase or 
decrease in the latter). 2008 is the most recently available data. A smoothing of 3 applied, 
using Ngram’s smoothing function. See original analysis at http://tinyurl.com/orgo9cs. 
2 A similar analysis with IBISS, a database with journal articles, returns similar curves 
of ascendancy and fall, but with peaks for both disciplines roughly a decade later. Given 
the critiques around the authoritative production of knowledge we explore below, we are 
particularly keen to point out that we see these more as rough indicators of tendencies 
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more than any definitive representation of trends. Far more work would need to be done 
to establish these tendencies firmly and authoritatively.
3 Concerns about comparison are of course not distributed evenly. Some countries’ 
anthropological and sociological traditions move forwards to a greater or less degree 
unconcerned by such attacks. George Steinmetz, for instance, argues that much US 
sociology ‘still seems to be operating according to a basically positivist framework, perhaps 
even a crypto-positivist one’ (Steinmetz 2005: 276). Beyond sociology and anthropology, 
the extent to which these challenges have been taken seriously within the social sciences 
varies considerably. Within cultural studies, cultural geography, and politics, particularly in 
parts of Europe, you may well find a similar situation. Venture, however, into economics, 
psychology, or – as Faria (this volume) explores – architecture departments, and the 
picture will be very different.
4 We might see forms of reduction as ‘abstractions’, in the terms outlined by the 
philosopher Alfred North Whitehead. 
5 Research is also always the opposite, namely expansive, in the sense that each research 
project, each piece of writing, adds something to the world that wasn’t there before. 
Research inevitably does both: reducing the world to a selection of relevant terms and 
observations and expanding the world by adding to the existing set of ideas. Even the 
most ‘reductionist’ theory works against itself, since with its publication the world is not 
reduced but enlarged. 
6 An overview of the latest round of FP7 (Framework Programme 7) research projects 
can be found here <http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ssh/project_en.html>, and those 
funded by the European Research Council can be found here <http://erc.europa.eu/
erc-funded-projects>.
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theoretical conversations aBout coMparison in the social sciences 
have been dominated by a relatively restrictive view as to what comparisons are 
good for, and what kinds of comparisons are legitimate. This view takes vari-
ous forms in different research contexts, and we should not oversimplify when 
we engage with it. Nevertheless, it can be briefly characterised as based on the 
premise that comparison can be avoided; that one must compare ‘like with like’; 
that comparison aims at causal explanation; and, one should add, that it aims 
at a very specific type of causal explanation.
The practice of comparison in the social and human sciences has, of course, 
always been more diverse. Comparison is an aspect of any kind of practice 
that invokes knowledge in the sense that all information implies some ver-
sion of comparison to other possible realities; comparison of a formal and 
relatively more self-conscious kind has always been used to various ends in 
academic practice. However, the diverse practices of comparison have rarely 
found their way into textbooks on methodology – if comparisons have made 
it into textbooks at all.
In this context, this paper aims to free the academic practice of comparison 
from its theory. Or rather, the aim is to free the theory of comparison from itself 
so that it can better do its job of providing reflection on existing practices of 
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thinking and research, and perhaps improve them. Recently, there have been 
efforts to rediscover diverse forms of comparison in different disciplines (Fox 
and Gingrich 2002; Dear 2005; Pickvance 2001; Brubaker 2003; Robinson 2004; 
Jensen 2011; Scheffer and Niewöhner 2010; McFarlane and Robinson 2012). 
This work provides thoughtful reflection and exemplary pieces of research, and 
I am building on it here.
Nevertheless, more work can be done: building on these efforts can move 
broadly in three directions. Firstly, we can work towards a more differentiated 
understanding of the ‘old’. Both textbooks and critical accounts have tended to 
overstate the homogeneity of traditional practices of comparison. We can benefit 
from examining the assumptions that have been associated with comparison 
in the past in more detail, and, in particular, from examining the diverse mate-
rial research practices that have been involved. Secondly, and relatedly, we can 
develop a better sense of how diverse practices of comparison have always been 
in the history of different disciplines. This can provide us with exemplars of good 
research and help us direct our energies beyond overstated claims of newness 
in ongoing work. And thirdly, we can work on reflecting on (and perhaps shed-
ding) some of the normative baggage of the debate. Traditional discourses of 
comparison have tended to put the weight of ‘science’, ‘reason’, and ‘progress’ on 
choosing the right kinds of comparisons. In some of the newer work, this baggage 
is sometimes simply reversed: the aim is to avoid ‘traditional’ or ‘hegemonic’ 
practice at all cost. In some of the rhetoric around alternative ways of doing 
comparison, every research project has to bear at least the weight of innova-
tion – if not resistance or transcendence – in a way that is not realistic or helpful.
This paper discusses comparison based on attention to research practices 
and on their different ends. It asks what comparisons can be useful for, and in 
what ways. I begin with the observation that comparison has been identified 
with one specific aim: that of causal explanation, and in particular that of linear-
causal explanation. It is commonly said that ‘one cannot compare apples and 
oranges’. This sentence only becomes intelligible in the context of linear-causal 
explanations, and I will suggest it only becomes intelligible in the context of 
the hold clinical trials have had on the methodological imagination of the 
social sciences. I will then discuss a few other ends that comparisons can be 
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useful for, such as description, concept development, critique, and different 
kinds of explanation. Lastly, I will discuss a few forms of comparison that can 
be recognised as being useful once we broaden the ends that comparison can 
legitimately be used towards.
Compar i son  and  L in ear -Cau sa l  Ex p lanat ion
There are many different ways in which ‘old’ understandings of comparison 
can be described and named. The way one labels what one is departing from 
of course has implications for how one frames the limitations of previous 
research, and for the kind of alternatives that can be imagined. Some textbooks 
have equated comparative research with cross-national comparisons, and some 
critical reflections also associate traditional comparisons with specific units of 
analysis such as ‘cross-national’ or ‘cross-cultural’ comparison (see Brubaker 
2003). Others take a broader view: alongside the obviously polemical labelling 
of common assumptions concerning comparisons as ‘hegemonic’, ‘mainstream’, 
or ‘orthodox’, we find seemingly more theorised notions such as ‘generalising’, 
‘deductive’, ‘positivist’, or ‘universalist’.
In what follows, I explore the benefits of one specific way of analysing what 
may unite some traditional ways of talking about comparisons. I will argue that 
in the theory of comparisons, comparisons have long been associated with one 
specific end: they were thought to serve causal explanation, and, more specifi-
cally, the kind of causal explanation associated with general linear reality (Abbott 
1988; Abbott 2005). What is characteristic of this vision is not so much a deeply 
held positivist (or universalist) conviction – whatever that would mean – but a 
set of implicit assumptions which privileges a clear separation between cause 
and the outcome, conceived as things and a linear model of causality. In addi-
tion, it is usually thought to be important to establish how important variables 
are in relation to other variables.
We can characterise the tradition in terms of a specific philosophy of science; 
a vision of scholarly work that draws on the model of mechanical physics that 
has shaped representations in the traditional history of science and philosophy 
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of science, in other disciplines, and the public.1 But rather than address the issue 
on the level of ideology, I am interested in work that identifies specific practices 
and research problems that are at the origin of different regimes of doing com-
parison. Looking at practices has two advantages: 1) it allows us to investigate 
regimes of legitimising comparisons in their diversity, and 2) it allows us to take 
into account the original usefulness of specific assumptions about comparisons.
Isabelle Stengers (2011) does a brilliant job of analysing the preconditions 
of comparability in experimental physics, but another practice which has 
perhaps been even more important for the social sciences is the clinical trial. 
The aim of clinical trials has been to establish the efficacy of different kinds of 
treatment. For example, Iain Chalmers quotes a seventeenth-century physician 
who issues the following challenge to his ‘competitors’:
If ye speak truth, Oh ye Schools, that ye can cure any kind of Fevers […] 
come down to the contest ye Humorists: Let us take out of the hospitals, 
out of the Camps, or from elsewhere, 200 or 500 poor People that have 
Fevers, Pleurisies, etc. Let us divide them in halves, let us cast lots, that one 
half of them may fall to my share and the other to yours; I will cure them 
without blood-letting […] but you do as ye know […] we shall see how 
many Funerals both of us shall have: But let the reward of the contention or 
wager be 300 Florens deposited, on both sides (2001: 1157).
In this vision, a comparison is like a race between two horses. Or rather, if the 
treatments are the horses, the comparison is the racetrack. The comparison is 
thus the staging ground of a competition, and the concern is for the competi-
tion to be fair. For this reason, the two groups (which are compared) need to 
be as similar as possible, except in regard to the treatment.
It would be interesting and important to sketch in detail the history of dif-
ferent research practices associated with comparison, and their impact across 
the social sciences. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper. I would 
hypothesise a process whereby specific research problems serve as ‘model 
systems’ (Creager, Lunbeck, and Wise 2007; Howlett and Morgan 2011) that 
have an impact on how research is imagined beyond their original application. 
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In sociology (like in other disciplines) certain cases have served as privileged 
reference points for certain objects or areas of research, and have shaped per-
ceptions in unacknowledged ways (Guggenheim and Krause 2012). Similar 
processes may be at work with regard to research methods.
The clinical trial seems to be a prime example for such a privileged reference 
point for social science methods: it is on the one hand a very specific practice 
responding to a very specific research problem – the testing of medicines – 
with very specific units of analysis and elements such as individuals, diseases, 
and medical interventions. On the other hand, it has become central to how 
causality, and, by implication, explanation, is understood much more broadly.
The hold of the clinical trial on the social scientific imagination has, at times, 
been very explicit. Glenn Firebaugh, for example, writes in The Seven Rules of 
Social Research: ‘[t]he trick in causal analysis is to create those conditions by 
comparing like with like – through investigator-produced random assignment 
(as in controlled experiments), through naturally occurring random assignment 
or through some other means of matching’ (2008: 163). Regression analyses, 
but also fixed-effect models and sibling models, are all attempts to simulate 
clinical trials for observed – as opposed to more self-consciously created – data 
(see Firebaugh 2008).
These types of comparison inherit the notion of causation as a form of 
competition among treatments. They imagine all types of causes as a form of 
‘treatment’ and seek to establish their impact independently of all other factors. 
Regression analysis is used with individuals as units of analysis, but it is also 
used in quantitative forms of cross-national research in political science, and in 
cross-cultural comparisons such as those published in Cross-cultural Research 
based on the Human Area Relations File (see, for example, Deaner and Smith 
2012; Martínez and Khalil 2012).
Echoes of the clinical trial are also audible in more qualitative work, if only 
in the form of a kind of defensiveness with regard to the trial-inspired notion 
of causality. More specifically, one hears echoes of the clinical trial whenever 
causality is conceived of as an analogy to the impact a ‘treatment’ might have, 
and whenever the causal effect of some phenomenon needs to be established 
in competition with all other factors.
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These tendencies have been influential in American comparative-historical 
sociology, for example. This has shaped, for instance, the way the state has been 
conceptualised in American sociology (Skocpol 1979; 1985). In its attempts to 
prove the causal impact of its structures, the state had to be conceptualised as 
a separate ‘thing’ in a way that excluded cultural aspects; it also had to be con-
structed as entirely separate from economic forces and class interests. Attempts to 
prove the causal impact of culture in this particular way have similarly led to a def-
inition of culture that makes it hard to understand how culture and other aspects 
of social practice intertwine (see, for example, Alexander and Smith 2001).
Compar i son  and  B e tt e r  D e scr i p t ion
I have argued that there is a widespread assumption that comparisons aim to 
establish linear-causal relationships. This assumption has obscured other ends 
of social analysis in general, and of comparison in particular. To the extent that 
linear-causal analysis is the aim, description and category-construction are 
only considered as a means towards an end. In clinical trials, description of the 
disease itself is only a preliminary step – though other medical research may 
explore symptoms in more detail and the definition of a disease may of course 
be problematic, especially in hindsight (see Bowker and Leigh Starr 1999). 
In regression analysis too, description or measurement is a preliminary step, 
important only as a means towards establishing correlation among observed 
values (Marradi 1990). By subordinating description and category construc-
tion to linear-causal explanation, the concern with linear-causal explanation 
has proliferated trivial forms of description and category construction, while 
precluding some of the yields that might result were these aspects of social sci-
ence research considered as ends in themselves.
For pragmatic reasons (and because only explanation is really considered 
valuable) research has often focused on descriptions that can be easily collected 
about a large number of cases, and it has focused on descriptions that can be 
quantified. But description is important, and this is not just about ‘getting 
the facts right’, as is sometimes acknowledged in the quantitative tradition. 
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Description also situates a case with regard to sensitising concepts. Questions 
such as: ‘What is it like? What are its properties? How does it work? What kind 
of pattern can we observe? How is something changing?’ are descriptive and 
important, and comparisons are useful for answering them.
Some in the interpretative tradition emphasise the value of understanding 
the case in its particularity in opposition to the practice of comparison.2 The 
trope that comparison hinders understanding keeps recurring: Estrid Sorensen, 
for example, notes that ‘[s]pecificities are likely to become invisible through 
comparison’ (2008: 312). However, it has also repeatedly been pointed out 
from within interpretative traditions that even understanding a particular case 
is a comparative task (see Barnes 1973: 190; Kuper 2002: 146; see also Skocpol 
and Somers 1980).
All scholarly description involves selective forms of contextualisation and 
decontextualisation, and there are costs and benefits to different strategies. But 
we need to reflect on these costs and benefits in the context of concrete research 
projects, and we need to do so without implying two extreme positions which are 
misleading. Firstly, we need to avoid implying that description without compari-
son is possible. Any object becomes an object in relation to other objects – even 
an object considered holistically becomes a whole in relation to other wholes. 
A good repertoire of comparative cases also allows us to precisely characterise 
a phenomenon in its uniqueness and particularity. Secondly, we need to avoid 
implying that the only available form of comparison in the scholarly tradition is 
cross-national comparison, large-n linear-causal comparison, or cross-cultural 
comparison in the service of linear-causal explanation. The trade-offs do not 
seem to be in choosing between description and comparative practice, but 
between different kinds of comparative practices, and between different kinds 
of comparative practices maximised for different ends.
Compar i son  and  Conce pt  D ev e lopment
Like description, concepts are a means to an end in the linear-causal tradition. 
In clinical trials, the unit of ‘patient’ and the categories ‘ill’ and ‘healthy’ are the 
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starting point of the analysis: the real interest lies in exactly how to randomise, 
and which treatment has better results. In the social sciences, this has led to a 
lot of work with received categories, and for pragmatic reasons to work with 
categories, in which the data is already coded.
The use of concepts as categories for linear-causal analysis also has follow-on 
costs – in some ways regardless of the quality of the category used: once a unit 
of analysis or a category is ‘baked’ into a linear-causal analysis, the practices 
involved in its construction slip under the surface. It can thus become harder to 
ask questions about the historical conditions of the unit of analysis, and about 
the specific ways in which description was achieved.
Linear-causal analysis also casts its shadow backwards into the way non-causal 
use of categories and comparative description is read. That is, if linear-causal 
assumptions are widespread, even a comparison that is purely descriptive can 
invite readings that treat the unit of comparison as an explanatory variable. 
Cross-national comparisons in particular seem to almost automatically be read 
in some corners in a way that turns the category of description into a causal 
hypothesis. If someone studies a social movement in Finland and in Norway, 
it is assumed that something about these countries can explain the observed 
difference. This assumption shapes expectations for EU-funded projects that 
combine field sites in different countries (Akrich and Rabeharisoa, this volume; 
see also Sorensen 2008).
But comparative description using concepts as categories does not have 
to be read as preparing linear-causal explanation (where the category is the 
explanans). It can be a provocation for further research and conceptual devel-
opment. It could raise questions about further variation within the unit of 
analysis, particularly in view of partial data collection: an ethnography, for 
example, has rarely covered the whole unit of analysis; it usually studies a 
culture through a particular village (see Kuper 2002: 143). It could also raise 
questions about further differentiation within the descriptions pertaining to 
the unit of analysis.
What I am suggesting here is that some of the problems associated with 
categories have to do with their specific uses in linear-causal analysis. I want to 
suggest that categories are useful for description, and comparison is useful for 
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improving categories. Indeed, I would argue that developing categories is the 
proper aim of theoretical practice, and in that sense, comparison is essential to 
theoretical practice (Krause 2010).
Some kinds of comparisons are especially useful for developing concepts. 
Comparisons that take their departure from existing units of analysis have 
played an important and useful role: that of comparing common units of analysis 
to their opposite. Rather than just compare individuals, social theorists have 
compared discourses that construct individuals with those that do not, thus 
asking how the individual has become the dominant unit of analysis (Weber 
1964 (1904); Foucault 1978, 1979). Rather than just compare nation-states, 
we can compare them to other social forms such as hordes, the mafia, or city 
states. This has enabled Saskia Sassen (2006), for example, to break the nation-
state down into some of its constituent elements and ask new questions about 
different combinations of territory, authority, and rights. Rather than just do a 
comparison between cities, we can compare the city to its supposed opposite 
in terms of density or size, and ask broader questions about forms of settlement 
(Gans 2009).
Compar i son  and  Cr i t ique
The most fundamental operation of critique is not to say ‘this is bad’, but rather 
to say: ‘It is not necessary. It could be otherwise’ (Calhoun 2001). Critique 
has been practised in different intellectual traditions and I would suggest that 
comparison is central to all of them. At its most modest, critiquing means to 
say ‘this could be looked at in another way’. Unsettling established views of the 
world requires comparison, at least among ways of seeing the world. Critique 
can also use comparison between different cases to show that any given social 
phenomenon is not natural or necessary.
Though comparison is often associated with universalism in contexts where 
that is seen as a bad thing, comparison of course has an important role to play 
in challenging ethnocentric, or otherwise provincial, assumptions. Foucauldian 
(and Nietzschean) genealogy, for example, is a comparative practice: discourse 
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analysis is holistic and imminent, but it also depends on juxtaposition. It asks 
the analyst to go back in time until he or she finds assumptions and practices 
that are significantly different from the present (Foucault 1977, 1978; Baert 
2010).
This denaturalisation can also be an effect of comparisons in more conven-
tional social science. Max Weber’s comparison of the Protestant and Catholic 
work ethic, for example, can be read as an attempt to establish culture as a 
causal variable. But it has also shown that it is not natural for people to want 
to work as much as possible, or even to respond to incentives (Weber 1963 
(1904)).
Critique in a stronger Marxian sense is at its best also not so much a denun-
ciation, but a comparison. In other words, Marxian analysis is a comparison of 
contemporary society to a different social reality that is thought to be better and 
that is analytically specified. The analysis of capitalism as a mode of production 
based on private ownership of the means of production becomes possible only 
in conjunction with its imagined counterpart: a society based on the shared 
ownership of the means of production. This comparison allows Marxism to 
produce unique perspectives on the experience of work in capitalism, as well 
as on housing markets in capitalist cities, and on the state.
Compar i son and D i f f erent K inds  of  Explanat ions
To the extent that comparison is associated with explanation, it is generally 
associated with linear-causal explanation. But there are different approaches to 
explanation, and comparison is also useful for explanations of different kinds. 
Chris Pickvance (2001), for example, has argued that while comparison is 
often used to explain different outcomes, it is also useful for explaining similar 
outcomes with different causes and for functionalist explanation.
Comparison can also be used for explaining a phenomenon by listing its 
conditions of possibility. In this mode of investigation, a particular phenomenon 
is examined in comparison to other phenomena in order to specify its form.3 In 
dialogue with other observations, we can ask: ‘What would have to be different 
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for this to be different from what it is?’ In this version of explanation, analytical 
description and explanation – and critique in the sense discussed above – fall 
together.
One way to make sense of scholarship on the Holocaust, for example, is to 
list a number of conditions that were necessary to make this particular atrocity 
possible. Comparing the genocide to spontaneous, short-lived outbursts of 
violence, we can underscore the modernity of the event and highlight the role of 
bureaucratic organisations (Browning 1993), national boundaries, the nature of 
the modern state (Bauman 1990), indirect domination (Postone 1980, 1993), 
profit-driven organisations (Hayes 2001), and the logic of specialised profes-
sional practice (Benedict 2003). In making comparisons with other nation-states, 
we can mention the German heritage of anti-Semitism (Goldhagen 1996) and 
the complicated relationship with violence in German forms of selfhood (Elias 
1996). Comparing hypotheses about social dynamics on different scales, we can 
single out situational factors such as the tendency to obey authority focused on 
by the Milgram (1974) experiments.
In another example based on research on humanitarian-relief NGOs, I argue 
the form that humanitarian relief takes today can be described as a market for 
projects (Krause 2014). Humanitarian relief agencies provide assistance to 
populations in need, and they do so in the form of projects. Agencies produce 
projects, and they strive to produce good projects . The pursuit of the good 
project develops a logic of its own that shapes the allocation of resources and the 
kind of activities we see independently of external interests, but also relatively 
independently of beneficiaries’ needs and preferences. Agencies produce projects 
for a quasi-market in which donors are consumers. The project is a commodity, 
and with that, those helped become part of a commodity. The pursuit of the 
good project encourages agencies to focus on short-term results for selected 
beneficiaries. The market also puts beneficiaries in a position where they are in 
competition with each other to become part of a project.
We can identify this social form and what makes it possible by comparing 
it to other ways in which needs are produced, and in which populations are, 
or are not, provided with what they need. Historicising attention to distant 
suffering and comparing it to earlier times, we can identify means for learning 
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about suffering and providing relief (Haskell 1985) as a condition of possibility 
of the market for projects. Making comparisons to responses from within the 
local community (which form part of existing political and religious structures), 
we can add the emergence of a specific form of humanitarian authority since 
the late nineteenth century, and especially since the 1970s. Comparisons to 
a situation where no one responds to distant suffering can identify Western 
governments’ and Western publics’ interest in relief of suffering, influence, and 
stability as a contributing factor. Comparisons to traditional welfare states allow 
us to identify competition between providers of different national origins and 
the fact that no organisation has a commitment to a specific population as an 
element of the market for projects. Making comparisons to a situation where all 
human communities would be able to provide for their needs themselves, we 
can identify different phases of primitive accumulation as contributing to the 
current form of humanitarian relief. For instance, the IMF-led restructuring of 
the 1980s and 1990s has contributed to the vulnerability of large populations, 
and is also a precondition for disaster relief.
Explanatory comparisons in the linear-causal tradition can tend to normal-
ise what is common to the cases considered. If we are just asking, for example, 
why among ‘modern’ nations it was the Germans who organised the killing of 
Jews and other minorities on a large scale, the nation-state and other aspects 
of modernity do not come into view as factors contributing to the Holocaust.
Cross-national research can tend to focus on variation among policies that, 
on the world historical scale, are relatively similar. The mode of explanation pre-
sented here allows us to retain the significance of the phenomenon as a whole, 
and explicate it by listing and naming all conditions of possibility, including 
features common across capitalist nation-states, but not universal across social 
forms more broadly.
Naming conditions of possibility does not allow us to assess the relative 
impact of competing factors. The Holocaust emerges both as a particularly 
modern, and a particularly German, phenomenon. However, it gives us an 
overview of differences to other phenomena and possible analytical, as well as 
political, leverage points. This allows us to situate practical proposals within the 
full range of conditions which it might be possible to affect.
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K ind s  o f  Compar i son :  L i k e  w i th  L i k e / L i k e  w i th 
Unl i k e  or  D i f f e r ent  Typ e s  o f  S e r i a l  Compar i son
If all things can be described in terms of both similarities and differences (and 
if a shared category can always be found), the distinction between comparing 
‘like and like’, and comparing ‘like and unlike’, collapses. The admonition to 
compare ‘like with like’ does not, as such, have meaning. It follows that the 
term ‘comparable’ also does not, as such, have meaning – nor does the term 
‘incomparable’ (be it used as a prohibition or in rebellious embrace). Rather, 
we need to investigate how, and in which practical context, the rule to compare 
‘like with like’ has assumed meaning, and what kind of similarity and difference 
have been meant?
There have always been both similarities and differences involved in com-
paring ‘like with like’. The question under discussion has been about how many 
differences a given research project can handle at the same time (see Macfarlane 
and Robinson 2012). We have seen that in a clinical trial, the comparison is a 
competition and the concern is for it to be fair. The two groups included in 
the comparison need to be as similar as possible, except in regards to the treat-
ment. Comparing ‘like for like’, then, means we need to hold all other sources 
of variation constant.
For description, concept development, and critique, it can also be useful to 
compare objects that are expected to be the same in some or most respects. It 
might allow us to better focus in on specific differences that we want to describe 
or conceptualise. If we are comparing men’s and women’s experiences of unem-
ployment and we have limited resources, for example, we might want to construct 
sample groups of men and women that have a similar socio-economic status or 
cultural location. It can also be useful to compare cases with only one similarity 
and as many other differences as possible. If we are studying cities or professions 
or a certain type of organisation, we might construct a sample that contains the 
largest number of differences within it. One may also compare one case to as 
many other cases that are different in as many different ways as possible.
One important difference between comparisons that are maximised for 
linear-causal explanation and comparisons that are maximised for description, 
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concept formation, or analytical explanation is that they envision a different 
kind of seriality in their ambitions. Linear-causal comparison aims at repeating 
the same comparison many times to achieve statistical significance. In other 
words, the comparison between treatment group and control group is designed 
to be the same comparison multiplied by the number of people in the group. 
Whenever we count the number of comparisons involved in a study by the term 
‘n’, we are implying that any additional comparison does not add a qualitatively 
new dimension.
Other aims are better served by many separate comparisons in succession 
with objects that are the same, and different, in various ways. We may want 
to compare a nation-state to an empire, to the Mafia, to an NGO, and so on. 
Serial comparison of this kind can eventually erode some of the undesirable 
consequences of category construction. For example, with the kind of seriality 
that repeats the same comparison multiple times, every additional comparison 
naturalises the unit of comparison and obscures its condition of possibility. In 
contrast, with the kind of seriality that strings together many different kinds 
of comparisons, every additional comparison questions, but also clarifies, the 
unit of analysis.
The  A s ymmetr i ca l  Compar i son
To me, the assumption that seems to most limit current practices of comparison 
in the social sciences is the assumption that all compared cases need to be given 
equal amounts of attention. In writing and assessing explicitly comparative 
research designs, we spend a lot of time thinking about which case(s) should 
be considered. Meanwhile, most qualitative designs still consider only one case, 
and both single-case and explicitly comparative studies spend too little time 
thinking about other relevant cases and literatures (or about the larger diversity 
in the world), which could be considered by drawing from information that is 
widely available, or on research that is less in-depth.
The expectation of symmetry is related to certain assumptions about the 
purpose of comparison. If the concern is for the comparison to be a staging 
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ground for a fair competition, then it seems natural to treat all competitors in the 
same way. The assumption of symmetry also ties in with underlying assumptions 
about the nature of measurement or description. First, symmetry of attention 
appears as the default if measurement has no costs because one is working with 
existing data sets. Second, if measurement is unproblematically assumed to be 
either true or false, it makes sense to exclude data that is very poor.
Most social science research encounters more complicated questions of 
measurement, however, and it encounters trade-offs between different aims of 
the research – among them quality of information and various strategic aims 
of the research. Though we tend to not make them explicit, a lot of different 
kinds of comparisons go into conceptualisation and description – and most 
of them are asymmetrical. Of course, good research has to contribute new 
in-depth knowledge on some case or cases, but such research can be enriched 
with information about other cases from secondary sources (and even by pure 
thinking exercises). Asymmetrical comparison enhances the interpretation of 
findings in any study – whether that study has formally been comparative or not.
The assumption of symmetry leads to the defensiveness of single case designs 
that do not look left or right, and it leaves the potential insights of comparative 
studies as underexploited. This leads to duplication of efforts among research-
ers. The seriality that I outlined above potentially undermines the distinction 
between comparative and non-comparative designs, and between included 
and excluded cases.
Hypothet i ca l  Compar i son
In order to take the asymmetrical comparison to one of its conclusions, com-
parisons can also of course be made with hypothetical cases. Firstly, cases that 
are considered in relation to a specific question need not be real. Secondly, 
information about cases considered for comparison need not necessarily be 
true. Moreover, it is not always essential to know if a case is real, or if our infor-
mation about it is real, if we present our analysis in measured ways as the result 
of a hypothetical comparison.
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Counterfactual imagination has a long tradition in social science work. That 
is, we can ask: ‘What are the kinds of things that could be happening but are 
not? Did they ever happen? What would have to be different for them to be 
happening? How might this phenomenon be different under various analytically 
specified circumstances? How might this be different in the best, or in the worst, 
of worlds?’ Making comparisons with hypothetical cases is an element of all 
theoretical work. We use hypotheses produced by theories, and then test them 
against the data. This has also long been known in quantitative work. Regression 
analysis is based on comparisons of patterns in actual data to different kinds of 
models, based on equations.
One distinction I want to draw here is between hypothetical comparisons 
that aim to find a close match to reality, and those that aim to engage with the 
imagination in order to identify new forms of possible similarities and differ-
ences. Borrowing from Tilly (1984), we might call the latter ‘the variation-finding 
hypothetical comparison’.
In network analysis, for example, comparison to hypothetical cases is used to 
better describe patterns, and to explore the consequences of assumed, observed, 
and other possible patterns. Bearman and colleagues, for instance, analyse 
‘reports of relationships among adolescents in one town […] and compare 
the structural characteristics of the observed network to simulated networks’ 
(2004: 44). They thus compare network structures, but the simulations also 
allow them to map the implications of different network-structures for the 
spread of sexually transmitted diseases.
This type of work stands out in the degree to which the language for captur-
ing variation between and among different social worlds (real and simulated) 
is formalised. However, more qualitatively-oriented work can also draw more 
broadly on fiction, history, and anthropology for cases of comparison. It may 
be hard to be fully knowledgeable about historical and geographically distant 
cases. Getting the facts right is important in social science research, but so is 
challenging parochial taken-for-granted assumptions through comparison. 
According the status ‘hypothetical’ to comparisons with cases outside the 
researchers’ first-hand expertise may encourage the social scientific imagina-
tion of diversity. Qualitative social scientists have been reluctant to create their 
61
coMparative research
own fictions, though these could be created with analytical goals in mind (see 
Guggenheim 2009).
The  Und ig e s t ed  Compar i son
Lastly, I would like to mention the undigested comparison. A digested com-
parison, with either a different case or a competing analysis, is one where a 
comparison has been thought through in a way that fits the goals of the project: 
the relevant similarities and differences have been identified; the observed 
similarities and differences have been used to at least discover the shared or 
non-shared category; and the conceptual framework has been thought through 
in response to the comparison (see Lazarsfeld and Barton 1951). If explanation 
is an aim, perhaps the implications of the comparison for relevant relationships 
among phenomena under investigation have been thought through.
A different form of comparison is one usually introduced by ‘but see’ in 
footnotes. This can either point to an empirically different case, an empirical 
parallel, or a difference in interpretation. The ‘but see’ can indicate that the 
comparison has not been fully assimilated into the author’s conceptual frame-
work; perhaps if it were fully assimilated, a major point might not result. While 
in general it might be good advice to try to improve academic writing by trying 
to fully incorporate the material from the footnotes into the main text, it is up 
to discussion whether any given work contains the right amount of digestion 
to warrant publication or sharing.
Celebrating the undigested comparison that owns up to being such also 
means looking at the undigested comparisons hiding in all types of other analyti-
cal operations. It is certainly preferable to have an openness towards undigested 
comparison, rather than practise the ‘bitchy footnote’ – if we follow Grafton 
(1999), this is the very origin of the footnote – where footnotes are used to 
dismiss competing interpretations in a way that suggests more digestion than 
has actually been accomplished.
Another example of an undigested comparison that is not acknowledged 
as such is metaphorical re-description, where one case serves as a metaphor 
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for others without actual comparison. This is often what happens when cases 
become theories and are applied to other cases, instead of being compared. 
Foucauldian scholars, for example, can tend to apply Foucault’s account of the 
prison, the school, and the hospital to all other types of setting that they then 
identify as forms of ‘governmentality’. Perhaps no school-in-formation is exempt 
from this tendency. In recent years, for example, it has become popular with 
the growth of science and technology studies to call all kinds of practices and 
settings ‘laboratories’ without much attempt to consider differences, as well as 
similarities, between the different cases (see Guggenheim 2012).
Conclu s ion
The project to free the theory of comparison from itself has become the project 
to free it from the theory of clinical trials. There are, of course, epistemic and 
political stakes to debates about comparison in particular – and to debates about 
methods in general; but we should pay just as much attention to the mundane 
constraints of research practice.
These constraints matter as much, and they matter in ways that are not always 
articulated. Methods seem to draw on specific research problems as their models. 
Assumptions that make sense in one context get transferred from one research 
context to another. What makes sense as a practice for comparing treatments 
may bring some strange assumptions to the examination of national histories.
Reflection on the ends of comparison can have several advantages: it brings 
us back to specific people and specific practices. It can also remind us of the 
kinds of things an academic paper can and cannot achieve. That is, it suggests a 
sort of balancing act among different ends and limited resources, rather than a 
clear path with rivers full of crocodiles on both sides. The theory of comparison 
in the service of linear-causal explanation has clearly instilled a fear of ‘getting 
it wrong’, which still shapes the debate on different sides.
It can be uncomfortable to discuss the quality of research beyond ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’, and beyond the content of intellectual positions. Nonetheless, it might 
be that on top of epistemological and practical research differences, there is 
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a joint enemy to the different sides in the debate about comparison – which 
we might simply call ‘intellectual laziness’. We all encounter different kinds of 
laziness and our frustrations may be shaping interventions in implicit ways, 
and they may also produce misunderstandings. There is, on the one hand, the 
laziness of work that uses un-reflected units or categories of comparison (often 
shaped by available data in unacknowledged ways). There is, on the other hand, 
the laziness of works that are descriptive in a way that merely illustrates existing 
‘theory’ – in a context where this sometimes just means ‘well-known arguments 
by authors who happened to have become famous’. There is also the laziness 
of comparisons that are not suited for linear-causal analysis, and do not clearly 
articulate how they add value on any other dimension.
I do not think we are looking for one new ‘right’ way of doing comparison, 
but we might want to have a conversation about desirable directions as we indi-
vidually and collectively try to do the best work possible. I would suggest that 
every piece of information has to be, in principle, ‘accountable’ to all possible 
comparisons that could be made. We can use comparisons to constantly question 
and improve our categories of analysis and description. With the kind of serial 
comparison I am proposing, this can include asymmetrical and hypothetical 
comparisons, while considering one or more cases through original research.
We can, of course, not make the demand that every piece of information 
should be accountable to any comparison to any given talk or paper. All papers, 
talks, and books are preliminary results and legitimately works in progress. Some 
contributions add a lot to the conversation among scholars in other ways by 
showing material connections between cases: for example, those that can form 
the basis of constructing new units for comparative analysis. However, we can 
make this demand of intellectual ambitions and of shared standards of conversa-
tion. ‘Accountable’ here means ‘in principle answerable to’. The answer to ‘what 
do you make of a possible comparison to x’, should never be ‘I did not include x 
in my research’. It has to be, at least: ‘that might be interesting because…’
We have historically disproportionally demanded this type of account-
ability of ‘non-typical’ cases, which has meant in the current environment 
that non-US and non-UK cases have had to be justified in English-speaking 
journals, whereas UK and US cases have at times been analysed as though their 
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interest was self-evident and as though other countries and research on other 
countries do not exist (see Stöckelová, this volume). Nonetheless, I think the 
appropriate answer is not to refuse to engage in comparisons, but to insist that 
everyone makes the particularities of their assumptions and cases explicit as 
much as possible.
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1 See Mayr (1982) for a provincialisation from a biologist’s perspective.
2 See Steinmetz (2004) for an extended discussion on the origins of these arguments.
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When i First Began to research nineteenth-century colonial state 
architecture in Goa, comparing the architecture of Portuguese and British 
India was part of my original work plan.1 Currently (as in the nineteenth cen-
tury), Goan people frequently make comparisons between Estado da India 
[Portuguese India] and the British Raj, and undoubtedly this is one reason I 
decided to consider this comparison. However, soon after starting my work, I 
concluded that a systematic traditional comparison of the state architecture of 
Portuguese and British India was not feasible. There were several reasons for 
this. Fundamental differences existed between the two colonial administra-
tive systems, meaning that their respective public buildings were different in 
nature. Furthermore, the relationship between architecture and power in these 
two empires during the nineteenth century also seemed too different to allow 
for any form of proper architectural comparison. The main reason for this was 
that Portugal and Britain were in two different imperial cycles: whereas Estado 
da India had been in decline for some time, in British India this was the period 
when the Raj became firmly established.
Some time later, while reflecting on this during a talk at Goldsmiths 
(University of London), I stated that I had arrived at a hypothesis that would 
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allow a comparison of the architectures of Portuguese and British India involving 
comparison across time, using a realigned timeline to match periods when the 
relationship between architecture and colonial power was similar. In other words, 
this meant times when architecture was used to affirm and establish colonial 
power, and when specific types of buildings became symbolic representations 
of the empires that had built them. Which buildings would therefore best rep-
resent the Portuguese and British empires in India and their power relations?
The Portuguese empire hinged on trade and profit, but was inseparable from 
religion. Religion and religious conversion were essential to Portugal’s control 
over Estado da India. Even today, churches are the key architectural reference 
when it comes to discussing the Portuguese presence in India, or the Portuguese 
presence in the world. Established first as a diocese, Goa became an archdiocese 
in the mid-sixteenth century, with a jurisdiction that stretched from the east coast 
of Africa to China and Japan. The cathedral in the city of Goa was the home of 
the archbishop of all Catholics in the Orient, and therefore the most important 
and representative building of the Portuguese empire in that part of the world.
The British Raj was based on trade and profit, but was also inseparable from 
technology – especially the railway, as this was fundamental to Britain’s ability 
to control the Indian subcontinent. Eventually, every Indian was more or less 
forcibly ‘converted’ to technology – the religion of the nineteenth century. It is 
not by chance that one of the main ideological pillars of Gandhi’s movement 
was the return to manufacturing and pre-British rural life, or that he protested 
against British technology.
Bombay (Mumbai) was not the capital of British India, but was one of 
the most important presidencies, along with Calcutta (Kolkata), and Madras 
(Chennai). However, the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) established Bombay 
as the main point of entry to India. By 1872, rail links to the hinterland and the 
major cities in the territory confirmed the status of Bombay as the centre of 
modern India, even if it was not its political heart. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
the Victoria Terminus (VT, or Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus as it is now known) 
is considered by many as ‘the central building of the entire British Empire – the 
building which expresses most properly the meaning of an imperial climax’ 
(Morris and Winchester 2005: 133).
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Consequently, if these two buildings – the Cathedral in the old city of Goa 
(the sixteenth-century capital of the Estado da India) and the Victoria Terminus 
in Bombay – were the buildings most representative of the imperial powers that 
had built them, comparison appeared feasible. However, in practice, would 
such a comparison reveal that both had a similar aim – of displaying imperial 
power – and that both were designed to fulfil that same purpose? Would it reveal 
common ground in terms of the relationship between architecture and power 
in the two empires by displaying similar characteristics?
Challenged to think about the practical problems arising from this compari-
son, this chapter represents my personal path through the paradox described by 
Fox and Gingrich in the introduction to Anthropology, by Comparison:
A familiar paradox currently haunts attitudes towards comparison […] If 
considered from afar, comparison seems to be the fundamental research 
tool it always has been, so self-evident that some scholars may not regard it 
as worthy of closer examination. But when comparison is exposed to close 
examination, a contradictory intellectual reaction often comes into play, and 
comparison appears not simple and self-evident but rather as a topic and a 
method impossible to think about, dissolving into dozens of other issues, 
pieces and fragments (2002:1).
This chapter begins by analysing how the comparative method has been used in 
architectural history, reviewing key authors in its historiography. The second part 
returns to India to explain my hypothesis and choices for establishing a compari-
son between two things I had thought could not be compared. Subsequently, 
the buildings are compared in order to analyse the various contexts in which 
similarities can be identified, and to explore the difficulties of the comparative 
act in practice.
In examining and exploring the process of comparison, I aim to show that 
although comparison is a widely used practice in architectural history, its full 
potential is not exploited as much as it could be if more time were spent reflect-
ing on such practices and engaging with them more creatively. In addition, this 
chapter aims to contribute towards understanding the role of architecture in 
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establishing empires, showing that its importance and characteristics are simi-
lar in distinctive empires in time and history, such as in the Portuguese and 
the British empires. It suggests that the role of architecture in history (and in 
particular in the history of empires) could be better understood by comparing 
across building types, empires, countries, or communities, and across time. 
‘Comparing across’ shows that architecture, societies, cultures, and powers are 
entangled, and can reveal some of the many different effects. While intending 
to reveal another perspective on the comparative act, it also emphasises that 
overall, there is nothing simple, linear, or banal about the practical making of 
comparisons.
Th e  ‘ Comparat i v e  M e thod ’  i n  A rch i t ectura l 
H i s tory
Comparison is a method common to the interconnected fields of architecture, 
art history, and architectural history. Although it is assumed to be a fundamental 
research tool, in practice architectural historians do not, nowadays, seem very 
interested in reflecting on it. Comparison thus seems to be both everywhere 
and nowhere, ranging from systematic comparisons to visual descriptions, 
and it is unsurprising that, as in other disciplines, a multitude of practices 
have emerged. This section aims to provide a brief overview of the history of 
comparison in architectural history: as it will demonstrate, the main purpose 
of using comparison in this field has been to compare buildings that have simi-
lar formal, stylistic, or typological characteristics. In addition, it will examine 
how architectural history deals with the problem of time, especially since this 
was one of the first questions that emerged when I began to think about the 
comparison I was working with.
The comparative method in architectural history has its roots in the restruc-
turing of the French schools at the end of the eighteenth century, when it shifted 
towards a more technical approach to teaching that was more rational and less 
attached to the Beaux-Arts.2 Jean-Nicholas-Louis Durand (1760–1834) – teacher 
from 1795 and later director of the architecture course at the Polytechnic School 
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in Paris – was one of the most important figures in this movement. Durand’s 
search for a systematic approach to architecture is best seen in his Summary of 
Architecture Lessons Given to the Royal Polytechnic School (1802).3 However, he 
had already applied this systematic method to history in his Survey and Parallel of 
all Buildings, Ancient and Modern, Remarkable for their Beauty, Size, or Singularity, 
Drawn on the Same Scale (Durand 1799).4
Prior to Durand, Fischer von Erlach,5 in A Plan of Civil and Historical 
Architecture (1725), had already used images where different buildings of the 
same type were visually compared.6 Von Erlach’s book is considered by many 
to be the first book on architecture to use the comparative approach. However, 
his goal was to produce a survey of monuments rather than a comparative study 
(von Erlach 1725: Preface). Although he does display images side by side, he 
does not explicitly compare them in the accompanying text. He uses building 
types (e.g. Roman triumphal arches, Roman temples, Chinese bridges, and 
Greek temples) or building elements from a specific period or region (e.g. doors 
from temples in Syria). Similarly, J.D. Leroy in The Ruins of the Most Beautiful 
Monuments of Greece (1770)7 juxtaposes plans of temples drawn on the same 
scale.8 Although this process of creating visual parallels (i.e. juxtaposing build-
ings or parts of buildings of the same kind – used by both Leroy and Fisher 
Von Erlach) was much closer to the process of classification used in the natural 
sciences than a systematic practice of comparison (Madrazo 1994: 12–13), they 
were nevertheless important predecessors to Durand’s works.
Durand’s comparative purpose is clearly expressed in the title of his book, 
Survey and Parallel of All Buildings of All Types, and was reinforced in a letter 
reproduced in the first volume of the 1799 edition. In the letter, Durand states 
that he had found a way of deepening his knowledge by comparing, which 
meant comparing buildings of the same kind and drawing them on the same 
scale. For him, this was the easiest and most useful form of comparison. He 
describes a systematic typological method which involves using buildings of 
the same ‘kind’ and drawing them in ‘parallèle’ (i.e. in parallel or side by side on 
the same scale).10 Comprising two volumes (the first containing the text and 
the second the drawings), Durand uses comparison in both, albeit sometimes 
different, ways. For example, in the comparative visual tables (examples of which 
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are shown above), Greek and Roman architecture is usually separated, while in 
the text, Greek and Roman temples are compared. Moreover, in the compara-
tive drawings, Greek constructions are presented side by side with those of 
the Egyptians, Indians, and Turks (in a table of tombs, for example). Again, in 
the introductory text to the volume of drawings, Durand reiterates his view on 
how comparisons should be made by selecting the same kind of buildings and 
drawing them on the same scale – adding that they were juxtaposed according 
to their degree of similarity.
The practice of defining buildings as ‘the same kind’ might be debatable, 
and it is difficult nowadays to understand the use of ‘public building’ as a type 
as Durand does11 when he presents town halls and courts side by side (Table 
17), or hospices, lazarettos, caravanserais,12 and cemeteries (Table 30). In the 
first example, Durand explained in the text that for him, town halls and courts 
are used for the same purpose, meaning they have the same function – public 
service (1799: 23). In the second example, Durand establishes the relationship 
between the buildings in terms of form (1799: 38). Likewise, the definition 
of a ‘global history’ of architecture used by Durand and the way in which he 
Fig. 3.1 Triumphal Arches (comparing by building type), J.N.L. Durand, 17999
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separates East and West is controversial today, to say the least. Nevertheless, 
the point here is that Durand compares buildings where he can find common 
grounds for comparison based on form, function, or both, even if the relation-
ship is not always finely balanced. It is in this way that this comparative practice 
relates to my hypothesis.
As Madrazo points out, throughout the ninety comparative tables Durand 
ascertains the role of design in architectural history, or what would nowadays 
be called ‘research by design’ (1994: 12). Following Durand’s work, compar-
ing buildings of the same type by juxtaposing them on the same scale became 
established as the systematic undisputed method of comparison (which is well 
recognised within the discipline, but used without serious reflection).
However, it was only at the end of the nineteenth century and in the early 
years of the twentieth century that the comparative method appeared as a 
recognisable and explicit methodological approach. It was also when architec-
tural history emerged as a modern discipline. The History of Architecture on the 
Comparative Method by Banister Fletcher and Banister F. Fletcher (first published 
in 1896) was the key reference in the English-speaking world and is still the 
book that immediately comes to mind today when referring to the comparative 
method in the history of architecture.13 Like Durand’s work, the Fletchers’ book 
is an attempt to produce a global architectural history. Although its reception 
has varied greatly over the years, the book has been revised twenty times and 
has expanded considerably since it was first published.
The Fletchers’ comparative method gradually moved away from textual 
explanations to more visual comparisons, and illustrations became more impor-
tant and occupied more space in the later editions. The principles of the first 
editions were maintained: analysing and contrasting the most basic elements of 
buildings – plans, walls, openings, roofs, columns, decorations, and so on – both 
textually and according to their design, by drawing the different elements side 
by side. Although drawings were not always presented on the same scale, the 
presence of a graphic scale still ensured that systematic comparison by design 
was possible.
In the fourth edition (published in 1901), the book was divided into his-
torical (Western) and non-historical (non-Western) architecture, although 
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no direct comparisons were made. In each section, comparisons were made 
between buildings of the same type and style from the same country. In the 
non-Western section, comparisons were also made between the basic construc-
tive components of the buildings with ornament, and in particular were com-
pared with respect to design, including comparisons of Chinese and Japanese 
ornament (or the form of arches). Sometimes the focus was narrowed down 
to comparisons between different works by the same author (as in the case of 
the Renaissance examples by Palladio), where the building types were mixed – 
presenting drawings of the Basilica and the Villa Capra Vicenza14 alongside 
each other. Although this is an exception in the book and Fletcher does not 
compare the buildings or their parts textually, he does provide an insight into 
comparison across building types, establishing authorship as the common 
ground. The extraordinary survival of Fletcher’s book as a key text up to the 
present day is not directly related to its comparative method. Rather, it is, above 
all, related to the attempt to produce a global history of architecture and to the 
quantity and quality of the illustrations, which cover a vast range of buildings. 
Furthermore, the discussions and the controversy surrounding the work of 
the Fletchers (see Çelik 2003; McKean 2006; Nalbantoğlu 1998) hardly ever 
centre on the way in which comparison is used, making it seem as if this does 
not merit serious debate.
Heinrich Wölfflin’s methods and principles were an essential contribution 
towards systematising architectural history and establishing it as a modern 
historical field (Kultermann 1996: 241–246; Leach 2010: 1–2, 23–25, 36–40, 
44–48).15 Wölfflin’s Principles of Art History defined five principles through 
contrast, as seen in the following chapter titles: Linear and Painterly; Plane 
and Recession; Closed and Open Form; Multiplicity and Unity; Clearness and 
Unclearness (1950 (1915)). By contrasting and comparing, and presenting 
images side by side in his lectures and books, he created the basis for formal 
comparison in art history. Despite the fact that over the years architectural 
history and art history have progressively diverged (Payne 1999; Jones 1981; 
Jarzombek 1999), the methodology and formal comparison, in particular, are 
still very evident in architectural history today.
In the age of the Modern Movement, the typological approach to architecture 
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was dismissed. At that time, the history of architecture was concerned with 
key individual buildings, not method. These buildings were unique examples 
of art (Oechslin 1986: 38), and the early historians of the Modern Movement, 
such as Pevsner (1936), Kaufmann (1933), or Hitchcock (1929, 1932, 1958), 
rarely engaged with comparison explicitly. However, since they emerged from 
the German tradition of art history (with the exception of Hitchcock), they 
did use photographs to create more implicit forms of comparison. These were 
presented side by side to show the formal relationships between buildings or 
other constructions.
During the 1950s and 1960s, a new generation of architectural historians (i.e. 
architects-historians) emerged, changing the scene of the discipline into a more 
complex theatre. By 1970, when the great masters of the Modern Movement had 
disappeared, method, typological approach (Madrazo 1994: 23), comparison, 
and global history emerged once again.16
All these examples indicate the enduring presence of comparison in architec-
tural history through a wide range of practices which emphasise the importance 
of visualisation in either formal or more systematic comparison. They also show 
that the use of comparison in the history of architecture (whether it be buildings, 
parts of buildings, or just form) generally signifies comparing ‘like to like’. It is a 
process that rarely involves discussion, since it is considered ‘simple to the point 
of banality’ (Venturi, Izenour, and Brown 2000 (1977): 114).
One important exception to the work of the historians of the Modern 
Movement17 was Giedion’s Space, Time and Architecture (1941).18 Comparison 
is very evident in the book and is assumed to be an essential process for study-
ing architecture (Giedion 1968: xiii). Despite the fact that Giedion considered 
architecture to be a complex organism – emphasising that it is not only a ques-
tion of style, form, or social and economic context, but that architecture has 
an existence of its own – Tournikiotis has stressed that Giedion’s comparisons 
were also based only on visual similarities between constructions which he 
labelled ‘visual descriptions’ (Giedion 1968: 24–25; Tournikiotis 1999: 48). 
For example, in the fifth edition of his book, published in 1967, Giedion com-
pares a Neolithic gravestone with le Corbusier’s Ronchamp Tower (Fig. 3.2), 
presenting photographs of each right next to each other.
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Tournikiotis’ critical comment on this famous comparison is that it
relies solely on a morphological likeness […] There is no other connection, 
either social or technical, capable of linking works so different from one 
another and so distant from one another in time (1999:48).
Tournikiotis does not consider form in isolation to be a crucial aspect of 
comparison, thereby challenging the interest in visual/formal analysis alone 
in architectural history.
Space, Time and Architecture is nonetheless important for the particular way 
it deals with time. Since realigning a timeline means, in practice, to compare 
across time, one of the first questions I had was how architectural history 
Fig. 3.2 Neolithic gravestone vs. Corbusier’s Ronchamp tower, S. Giedion, 196819
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approaches time. A conventional, chronological, or historical account is gener-
ally concerned with the same ‘architectural period’ or ‘style’, which may involve 
relatively short or longer periods of time, but always in reference to clearly 
defined periods. Nevertheless, there are many cases in which time is used dif-
ferently. For example, working with a building type (like Durand) or a specific 
building element (like Fletcher) normally implies much longer periods of time. 
Giedion’s importance to the debate on the theme of time and architecture is 
undisputable. For him, history is dynamic and continuous: ‘The past cannot be 
disentangled either from the present or the future […] [They] are all part of a 
single, irreducible process’ (Tournikiotis 1999: 45). Time is what Giedion calls 
‘the eternal present’ (1968: xix–xx), and this consequently poses no problem 
for making comparisons.
Like Giedion, Spiro Kostof is one of the most important and pioneering 
authors of architectural history.20 Engaging in a cultural history of architec-
ture, Kostof does not compare architecture in different cultural contexts, 
but uses similar items from the same chronological period and cultural 
region. In his opinion, comparison across time is not very useful, and he 
argues that much better results can be achieved by comparing buildings 
built at the same time and across geographies (Kostof 2003 (1959): 9–38). 
However, breaking with the usual historical practice, he displaces architects 
from their ‘chronological time’ in order to maintain the study of a particular 
place (Kostof 2003: 10). This means that the book is mostly organised by 
geography, and not chronologically by authors, which would be a more 
conservative way to do it.
Thus, I soon realised that comparing across time was not a concept alien to 
architectural historians, even when dealing with more conventional accounts 
of time than those of Giedion or Kostof. Even though my hypothesis does not 
displace buildings from their chronological time, it was through Kostof that 
I understood that studying a specific architectural context (such as place or 
power), while comparing across time and moving things from their original 




Compar ing  th e  Uncomparab l e
This section begins by exploring the notion of imperial cycles and their 
relationship to architecture. Exploring this concept will explain why – given 
that this relationship was so different in Portuguese and British India in the 
nineteenth century – I initially concluded that their public architecture was 
‘uncomparable’. Subsequently, it explains how, using the same concept, a 
hypothesis was established for comparing the architecture of these empires 
using two buildings as a case study; it also explains the reasons for choos-
ing them.
It is easy to grasp the idea that empires pass through different stages in his-
tory (Bayly 2004). Although there are differences between ruling periods and 
the ways in which the powers themselves are imposed on others throughout the 
ages, it is possible to identify relatively similar periods of conquest, establish-
ment, and decline in the life cycle of empires.22
The Portuguese arrived in India in 1498 and conquered the city of Goa in 
1510. In just two decades, Goa became the Portuguese capital in the Orient, 
ruling over territory extending from Mozambique to Timor. The sixteenth 
century and the beginning of the seventeenth century were periods seen by 
historiographers of the Portuguese empire as the golden age of the Portuguese 
in India. However, this only lasted for a short period, as the new colonial powers 
(namely the British and the Dutch) were arriving in the area.
From the second half of the seventeenth century onwards, Estado da India 
faced huge difficulties. Its northern territories in India were eventually lost, and 
the country was reduced to Goa, Daman, and Diu. Its territorial configuration 
survived with more or less the same structure from the mid-eighteenth century 
until 1961. Likewise, the political influence of India would also change dramati-
cally in the mid-eighteenth century, with Goa losing its power over Mozambique, 
Macau, and Timor a century later.
The British arrived in India one century after the Portuguese. In 1612, 
the East Indian Company established the first factory in Surat, in the state of 
Gujarat. The company increased its control over the territory in the eras that 
followed, although by the end of the eighteenth century the British government 
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had begun to take over. Nevertheless, it was only after the 1857 rebellions that 
power was completely transferred to the Crown. During this period (known 
as the Raj) India became the jewel in the British Crown, with its supremacy 
almost uncontested until 1918. After the First World War, the situation began 
to change, and independence was granted in 1947.23
Architecture has always been one of the foremost means of establishing, 
representing, and upholding authority in empires. However, the lengthy presence 
of the Portuguese in India transformed this relationship between architecture 
and colonial authority. After three and a half centuries, there were few European 
Portuguese in Goa. The colonies were only of very limited importance to a 
country immersed in a civil war from which stability only emerged in 1853, and 
only for a short period of time. The entire nineteenth century was marked by 
political instability, a financial crisis – with the state having to repeatedly resort 
to external help – and colonial rivalries with other imperial powers, notably 
England. However, in the late nineteenth century, the colonial issue became 
more important to Portuguese society and the Portuguese colonial state tried 
to regain some authority; the truth was that in Portuguese India the colonial 
state was crumbling and was being challenged on a daily basis by the Goan elites. 
Furthermore, each time Lisbon tried to impose its authority, the Goan elites 
would resist. The only real power in Goa was the Catholic Church, which had 
an established authority dating back many centuries.
During the nineteenth century, the public administration and most sectors 
of Goan society (such as the legal system, medicine, engineering, and even the 
Church) were mainly, if not completely, controlled by Goan Catholic elites 
(some of whom were descended from the Portuguese, and others from Hindu 
converts). As elsewhere, the territory was completely transformed, largely in the 
second half of the century. The major strategies for these transformations were 
decided by Lisbon, which, while facing pressure from other colonial powers, 
made half-hearted colonising efforts. During the nineteenth century, almost 
every urban development and building constructed in Goa was planned or 
designed – and built – by people born and educated in the territory who were 




Moreover, the Portuguese state was bankrupt, which meant that many public 
buildings were old residential houses that had been renovated and public admin-
istration departments constantly changed their head offices, sometimes working 
in rented properties. Therefore, it is easy to understand why Portugal did not 
affirm its imperial rhetoric in Goa through architecture during the nineteenth 
century; this had been the role played by religious architecture in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries (Faria 2010), in marked contrast to the imperial vision 
of architecture during the British Raj (Metcalf 2002 (1989); 1995).
This provides a challenge for comparison geared to comparing ‘like with 
like’, as is the usual case in architectural history. The logic of comparing similar 
elements, such as building types, fails in this case. Moreover, it is a challenge 
that relates not only to architectural history, but also to general theories of 
comparison that insist on comparing like with like.
From this perspective, I thus concluded that the architecture of Portuguese 
and British India in the nineteenth century could not be compared, meaning 
that any systematic comparison of buildings of the same type (such as churches 
or train stations) was unfeasible. One of the main reasons was the difference 
between the administrative systems. Public buildings are erected by an institu-
tion (the state) to represent it, and at the same time provide public services 
(functions). Representing the state is an intrinsic part of the function of a public 
building and the relations between architecture and the state are entangled, 
therefore they cannot be ignored (Hise 2008). However, town halls, for example, 
did not have the same function in both systems, even if they shared the same 
name. Consequently, even public buildings from Portuguese and British India 
that shared the same name were not of the same type, since they did not fulfil 
the same functions (see for example, Figs 3.3 and 3.4).
Consequently, I decided not to carry out a systematic or explicit compari-
son, since I thought that in this case neither form nor function would establish 
common ground for comparison. On reflection, however, I came to realise 
that comparison was always present in my work, which probably explains why 
I returned to it.
Since the mid-twentieth century, architectural history – including, as we have 
seen, the work of Giedion, Venturi, and Kostof, among others – has examined 
Fig. 3.4 Central Post Office, Panjim, Goa, designed by PWD, 189325
Fig. 3.3 General Post Office, Calcutta, designed by W. Granville, 1864–186824
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architecture in more diverse ways, moving closer to many other fields in the 
social sciences such as sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies. A shared 
conclusion emerging from the recent literature in a number of these fields is 
that there exists a fundamental ‘capacity to compare everything with everything 
else’ ( Jensen et al. 2011:5). This includes comparing with a specific purpose 
and establishing relationships between the entities being compared.
If the relations between architecture and state are so relevant to the pro-
duction of architecture (or vice versa), where they may hinder comparison in 
a similar architectural context (e.g. architecture used to affirm and establish 
colonial power), it should be possible to compare different ‘architectures of 
power’. However, if Portugal and Great Britain were in different phases of their 
colonial cycles in the nineteenth century, the timeline (i.e. the chronological 
history) would have to be realigned or synchronised in order to do so.
For this case study, this meant synchronising the periods when the relation-
ship between architecture and power did not constrain comparison, namely the 
period in which they had achieved a state of establishment (see Fig. 3.5). This 
was a time when the architecture of both states was produced with a specific 
goal: to convey a message of supremacy and display imperial power. As seen 
at the beginning of the second part of this chapter, in terms of the Portuguese 
empire in India, this period would extend from the early sixteenth century to 
the second half of the seventeenth century, whereas for the British Raj it would 
be the period between 1857 and 1918. As previously argued, in practice this 
meant comparing the cathedral in the city of Old Goa (started in 1562) – the 
home of all Catholics in the Orient – and the Victoria Terminus (started in 
1878) in Bombay. Both buildings date from the period when the respective 
empires were well-established, and as constructed forms were representative of 
Fig. 3.5 Synchronised Timeline (establishment period shown in darker grey)
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the two mainstays of the colonial power that built them: religion and technology. 
Therefore, they were the two perfect case studies to use to compare the empires.
I am not certain when it was first said that railway stations were the cathedrals 
of the nineteenth century, but as Meeks shows (quoting the nineteenth-century 
Building News and Engineering journal), this idea recurs throughout the second 
half of that period. The text specifically states (noting that cathedrals were the 
model for the construction of railway stations): ‘Railway termini and hotels 
are to the nineteenth century what monasteries and cathedrals were to the 
thirteenth century’ (2012 (1956: 90). Gothic cathedrals, in particular, were a 
reference for railway stations since they were seen as an example of technologi-
cal expertise. This shows how people at the time thought about these buildings 
and what was expected of them. It was not a matter of cathedrals and railway 
stations having different functions, but of them having the same significance 
and importance.
(State)  Power + (State)  Architecture :  An Assembler 
o f  R e lat ions
In the third part of this chapter, I intend to re-examine the stages in the actual 
comparison of the cathedral in the old city of Goa and the Victoria Terminus 
in Bombay (Mumbai) in British India. I will show that even though there are 
some constraints, there are nevertheless a variety of contexts within which 
these buildings can be related. What kind of relationships based on similarities 
emerged from the actual comparison?
The relationship between (state) power and (state) architecture is the central 
subject of my work; it is my assembler of relations, or comparator. In this regard, 
I follow Deville, Guggenheim, and Hrdličková, around which a number of pos-
sible frameworks have been assembled (this volume). Each of these contexts 
is a unique component of the assembling device, and in addition, each context 
has its own specificities.
Both similarities and differences can emerge through comparison. Some 
similarities have already been presented, as they were the starting point of this 
Fig. 3.6 Cathedral, Old Goa (sixteenth century)26
Fig. 3.7 Victoria Terminus, Bombay (nineteenth century)27
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work. The objects are both buildings – architectonic bodies – and they were 
both designed with the aim of becoming central features of the empires that 
built them. There were, of course, also differences. When I began my research, 
differences immediately emerged within the historiographical context. There 
were no problems in ascertaining the main facts relating to the Victoria Terminus 
(i.e. the author, the date when it was built, etc.), whereas in the case of the Goa 
Cathedral, the three main authorities on the subject – Rafael Moreira (1995), 
António Nunes Pereira (2005, 2010), and Paulo Varela Gomes (2011) – do not 
always agree on the facts. I decided to follow Varela Gomes, the most recent 
author (although my own concern was not with a detailed discussion of the 
historical facts which are argued and reasoned by him (2011:54–65)).
Since the main aim of this comparison was to identify relations of similarity 
between the Goa Cathedral and the Victoria Terminus, the focus was on the 
similarities found, and on analysing them individually to show how they all 
highlight the interactions between architecture and imperial power.
Urban location
The cathedral is located in a central urban area of Goa which already existed 
when the Portuguese arrived. Although, to the best of my knowledge, it is not 
possible to ascertain what stood in this location in 1562, there is a strong pos-
sibility that it was the site of an existing temple.28 Nevertheless, the location 
(which is near the Inquisition headquarters established in Goa in 1560) was 
a reminder of the presence of the new powers in the city – as Nunes Pereira 
notes (2010: 246). The Victoria Terminus was built in a central area of the city 
of Bombay, in the exact location of a former Portuguese church built in 1570 
that had been already relocated to a different part of the city.
The location of the buildings within the urban systems, therefore, shows that 
both constructions were planned in existing central sites in the cities. There is 
also a strong probability that both buildings replaced existing constructions 





The royal order to build a new cathedral arrived in Goa in 1562, and the con-
struction work began in the same year. The King’s architects probably designed 
the plan in Lisbon (as in the case of the other cathedrals), with an architect 
based in Goa adapting the plan locally. Rafael Moreira proposed the hypothesis 
that Inofre de Carvalho, a Portuguese architect living in Goa from 1551–1568, 
was the author of the cathedral. However, in Gomes’s account, the building of 
the cathedral was suspended from the 1570s to the end of the 1590s because 
of the economic, political, and military crisis in Estado da India. The situation 
only changed in 1597 with the arrival of D. Francisco da Gama, when work 
recommenced (albeit subject to economic restrictions). With him travelled 
Julio Simão, the chief engineer to Estado da India, who was to replace the Italian 
architect who had previously held the position.29 In Gomes’s opinion, Simão 
designed everything in the cathedral except the plan, and was Flemish, German, 
or English, with Italian training. Moreover, at the time of his death, Simão was 
considered the author of the building, as this is inscribed on his headstone and 
can be found inside the cathedral.
The Victoria Terminus was designed by the British architect Frederick 
William Stevens in 1878, and opened in 1887 to celebrate Queen Victoria’s 
Golden Jubilee. Born in Bath, England, in 1848, Stevens became an engineer in 
the Indian Public Works Department in 1867, after five years of work in England. 
After working in Poona for a year, he was transferred to Bombay. Following 
the success of the Victoria Terminus building, he set up his own practice in 
Bombay, where he died in 1900. Stevens’s reputation as the author of several 
buildings in the ‘Bombay Gothic’ style (or Indo-Saracenic, as some authors 
describe it) was already established when he was commissioned to design the 
Victoria Terminus, described as the largest and most extensive architectural 
work in India at the time.
Although there are many uncertainties surrounding the origins and life of 
Simão, it is safe to assume that both men had similar profiles. They were European 
architects from the metropolis who, by the time they were commissioned to 
design the buildings, were employed in the public works department of the 
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imperial state. In addition, both were established experts with a knowledge of 
the place where they were going to work.
Ornament
According to Gomes, Simão was responsible for ‘everything having to do 
with the architectural articulation in the cathedral, every order, every mould-
ing, every ornament’ (2011: 58). In his opinion, all the works attributed to 
Simão were different from anything built in Portugal at the time. Pereira goes 
even further, underlining, on the one hand, the plan’s similarity to that of the 
Cathedral of Portalegre in Portugal, and, on the other, the uniqueness of the 
ornament, stressing that it represents the ‘Goan synthesis of European influ-
ences’ (2010: 246).
Philip Davies, in Splendours of Raj, does an excellent job describing the 
Victoria Terminus:
It is a highly original work albeit one rooted firmly in the tradition of Ruskin, 
Scott and Burges […] It is the supreme example of tropical gothic architec-
ture. With only a subtle hint of Saracenic motifs; a riotous extravaganza of 
polychromatic stone, marble and stained glass (1987: 172).
Even if Davies considers that the ornament and skyline ‘invoke comparison’ 
with St. Pancras Station in London, he explains that most of the ornament 
‘was designed by the Bombay School of Art with Stevens, who conceded that it 
was quite the equal of anything to be found in Europe’ (1985: 172–178, 257).
Comparison of the ornament in the two buildings reveals an unusual (exotic) 
style in both, more evident in the decoration than in the general forms. It was 
an ornament of a kind never before seen in the metropolis, even though it had 
strong links with what was being produced in Europe, reflecting a synthesis or 
fusion that, in both cases, aimed to display a knowledge of local traditions on 
the part of the colonial powers. Since knowledge was power, displaying this 
ornament was therefore a display of power (Metcalf 2002: 5, 24–54).
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Significant similarities thus emerged through the Goa Cathedral and 
Victoria Terminus comparator: European architects, each working for an 
imperial state but established in India for a considerable time, designed both 
buildings. In both cases, they were built at times when expectations for the 
empire were high, and both buildings were intended to be key imperial 
symbols. They were built in central urban locations previously occupied by 
the powers that these empires replaced, and both featured ornaments that 
were unusual for Europe.
Conclusion: On the Advantages of Cross Comparison
The aim of this chapter was to consider the practice of comparison within the 
disciplinary context of architectural history. Key examples were used to dem-
onstrate that comparison is an enduring practice in the field. Although used 
extensively as a methodical tool, there is no serious reflection on its practices, 
resulting in a rather limited exercise instead of a unique ‘event’ that must be 
thought through (Stengers 2011: 49–50).
Attempting to compare things that were, to me, uncomparable, made me 
reason through a series of topics that constantly appeared, ranging from issues 
concerning type, time, style, historiographical and historical aspects, to aspects 
of architecture, architecture, and art history, the history of empires as academic 
disciplines, and the importance of design as a research tool. Thinking and reason-
ing through all these aspects made me see the importance of ‘comparativism as 
a method of learning’ (Stengers 2011: 62) rather than just as a tool.
Architectural historians are judging comparability too fast and without 
questions, mostly because comparison is being done between like with like. 
In this process, comparison and architecture are not looked at using their full 
potential. Still, it is not always considered with the same weight of importance 
when thinking comparatively. Architectural historians should free themselves 
from constraints imposed by disciplinary fields. Is it really not worthy to compare 
the Parthenon in Athens with Chartres Cathedral in France (Kostof 2003: 36)? 
‘Why not?’ should be the first thing one ought to ask.
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Comparisons across time, across empires, and across building types reveal 
that the relationship between architecture and the state (state power) is 
stable and that there are constant indicators of these relations: authorship, 
a central location in urban space, purpose (function), and unusual locally 
inspired ornaments. These are all comparable contexts that confirm common 
aspects of the relationship between architecture and state power during the 
establishment periods of Portuguese and British empires, also confirming 
that the Goa Cathedral and the Victoria Terminus had common ascribed 
meanings. This helps us to better understand not only the buildings them-
selves, but also the people that built them, and attests to the advantages of 
cross comparison in understanding the important role of architecture in 
the history of empires. Furthermore, the conclusions confirm that results 
can be obtained by thinking about comparability and uncomparability in a 
more creative way.
Cross comparison, in any area of study, means comparing things that are 
not identical and thus are not immediately identifiable as comparable using a 
traditional approach. Comparing comparative practices across disciplines (as 
described in this volume) helps us to understand similarities and differences 
and can open up new perspectives on the way in which we engage in research. 
Comparing in these terms amounts to much more than a tool; it is a process 
through which we understand our research subjects better, whatever they may 
be. And so, for me, comparison will never be simple again.
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1 I would like to thank the late Paulo Varela Gomes for his comments and conversations 
on this theme.
2 I follow the views of Benevolo and Middleton concerning the French rationalist 
tradition (Benevolo 1999: 54–64; Middleton and Watkin 2003: 7–34).
3 Précis des leçons d’architecture données à l’École polytechnique.
4 Recueil et Parallèle Des Édifices de Tout Genre Anciens et Modernes, Remarquables Par 
Leur Beauté, Par Leur Grandeur, Ou Par Leur Singularité, et Dessinés Sur Une Même Échelle, 
published in 1799–1800.
5 Johann Bernhard Fischer von Erlach (1656–1723), an Austrian architect, sculptor, 
and historian of architecture. 
6 Entwurffeiner historischen Architectur, dated 1721 but only published in 1725.
7 Julien-David Leroy (1724–1803) was a French architect, professor of architecture at 
the French Académie (until it closed in 1793), and later at the École Spéciale d’ Árchitecture, 
and the Institut de France. 
8 Ruines des lus beaux monument de la Gréce [The Ruins of the Most Beautiful Monuments 
of Greece] was from an edition dating from 1770 (the text was first published in 1758).
9 Durand, Jean-Nicolas-Louis; Legrand, Jacques Guillaume, Recueil et parallèle des édifices 
de tout genre anciens et modernes, remarquables par leur beauté, par leurgrand eur, ou par leur 
singularité, et dessinés sur une même échelle, Paris, 1801, Plate: 21, Sign: C4892 GRO RES, 
Heidelberg University Library.
10 ‘[ J]’ai trouvé que le plus sûr était de rapprocher, pour en faire la comparaison […] 
principalement si je rapprochais, comme je l’ai fait, les uns des autres les Monumens d’une 
même espèce, en les dessinant sur une même échelle. Qu’ainsi, la comparaison en deviendrait 
bien plus facile, beaucoup plus prompte, et serait d’une bien plus grande utilité’ (Durand 
1799: 1–4, Letter to J.G. Legrand, emphasis added). It is arguable whether one should 
translate ‘parallèle’ as parallel or comparison, as there are differences and similarities 
between the two words. Nevertheless, in this context I think Durand uses the words 
synonymously. 
11 I use the word ‘type’ and ‘building type’ in the same sense as Pevsner (1997 (1976)). 
‘Type’ relates to form (materials, styles, organisation, etc.) and function. However, this use 
is not at all consensual. On the concept of type and typology in architecture, see Markus 
1993; Madrazo 1995; Teyssot 2003.
12 Caravanserais or canvansarais were structures on the main trade routes where travellers 
could rest and replenish their supplies. They existed mainly in Persia, but they could also 
be found along the main trade routes between south-east Europe and Asia. 
13 Banister Fletcher (1833–1899) and Sir Banister F. Fletcher (1866–1953), father and 
son, were both historians of architecture. 
14 Usually known as ‘La Rotonda’.
15 Heinrich Wölfflin (1864–1945) was born in Switzerland and was a very influential 
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art historian with a sound reputation in his time. He was a teacher at the University of 
Berlin and the University of Zürich, and had several famous students of art history and 
architectural history.
16 The examples and different approaches are many, and I will just mention a few. It is 
still Pevner’s History of Building Types that somehow resumes Durand’s ‘survey of types’ 
(Pevsner 1997 (1976): 6–7). Two decades later, Thomas Markus’s Buildings & Power 
(1993) was among the best examples of a new typological approach to architecture. 
Comparison is not present in these works as an explicit method. Looking at specific types 
of building, Anthony King’s The Bungalow (1985) studies the social production of the 
buildings and uses comparison in that context. Spiro Kostof (1985), and more recently 
Ching, Jarzombek, and Prakash (2006) are examples of attempts to do a global history 
of architecture in very different ways. Both books use visual and textual comparisons.
17 George Kubler’s The Shape of Time was also significant for art history. For Kubler, the 
comparative method was also the essence of art history, although he mainly used metaphors 
for his comparisons – comparing works of art with examples from nature, mathematics, 
etc. 
18 Sigfried Giedion (1888–1968) was a Swiss art historian and student of Heinrich 
Wölfflin in Munich. He taught in Zurich, Switzerland, and at Harvard in the US. His book 
Space, Time and Architecture is one of the most important books on the history of modern 
architecture, and is still used in architecture schools today, running to five editions. More 
recently, Claude Mignot has also argued for the importance of a continuous timeline in 
architectural history, as opposed to time cuts using ‘centuries, kings, or styles’ (2005:4). 
19 The authors and publishers have made every effort to contact the copyright holders for 
permission to reprint the images shown here. Any copyright holders should contact the 
publisher, who will endeavour to include appropriate acknowledgements and corrections 
in future editions of the book. 
20 Spiro Kostof (1936–1991) was an architectural historian born in Turkey, but he 
moved to the US in 1957. He was a teacher in several universities in the US, including 
Yale, Berkeley, MIT, and Columbia. 
21 A term used by Ching, Jarzombek, and Prakash (2011) to refer to comparison across 
time.
22 The idea of cycles appears in several global historiographies and also in the current 
historiography of Portugal, which divides Portuguese colonial history into three main 
periods: the first is the Oriental empire; the second is when the attention turned to 
Brazil; the third (African empire) was when attention was focused on Africa from the 
independence of Brazil up to 1975. For a general history of Portugal and the Portuguese 
empire in English, see, among others, Disney (2009). For a more comprehensive picture 
of the various stages of the Portuguese empire, see Bethencourt and Chaudhuri (1998); 
Serrão and Marques (1986–2006).
23 The bibliography on British India is vast; for an overview, see the classic work by 
Percival Spears and for more recent views, the New Cambridge History of India. 
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24 Photo by Alice Santiago Faria, 2005. No rights reserved.
25 Photo by Alice Santiago Faria, 2005. No rights reserved.
26 Photo by Alice Santiago Faria, 2005. No rights reserved.
27 Victoria Terminus, G.I.P. Railway. Approximately 1905. Special Collections, University 
of Houston Libraries, University of Houston Digital Library, July 20, 2014 <http://digital.
lib.uh.edu/collection/p15195coll29/item/21>
28 There are several references in the historiography of the Portuguese in India to the 
construction of churches on sites where temples had previously stood. Among others, see 
the various entries on Goan churches in the volume by José Mattoso and Walter Rossa 
(2011) and C. Boshi (1998: 429–455).
29 This may not have been the first time he had worked in India, where he lived until he 
died.
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Joe Deville, Michael Guggenheim, Zuzana Hrdlicˇková
I n troduct ion :  What  I s  a  Comparator ?
our experience oF Working on a coMparative proJect entitled 
‘Organising Disaster: Civil Protection and the Population’, whilst trying to find 
the ‘same, same but different’,1 has directed our attention to the practicalities 
of undertaking social scientific forms of comparison, as well as to some of the 
ethical and political questions that arise from its use.2
Much has been written about the latter question: as we detail in the book’s 
Introduction and touch on again below, comparison has been critiqued within 
social science from a variety of quarters. These concerns range from the unwar-
ranted reduction of complex social and cultural phenomena by researchers 
through the imposition of comparative practice, comparison’s complicity with 
sometimes dubious political and methodological projects (e.g. European coloni-
alism, strident methodological positivism, the creep of market-oriented ranking 
practices), and even the meaninglessness of invoking comparison as a distinct 
practice, given its apparent ubiquity in other settings.
What has received far less attention are the ways in which comparisons of 
all sorts come into being through an entity that we call the ‘comparator’. We 
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respond to this absence by asking and answering two questions: ‘Who, or rather, 
what, is the comparator? And, how does the comparator affect a researcher’s 
relationship with the objects being compared?’
Conventionally, the term ‘comparator’ is understood as a standard against 
which an object is compared. The comparator (in this sense of the word) is 
therefore a static benchmark – and it is the quality of being both fixed and known 
that allows the act of comparison to take place. However, there is also a type of 
microchip called the comparator that is more active and interventionist – it sits 
in electronic circuits and measures incoming voltages from different sources, 
switching on or off as a result of its act of doing comparisons between fixed 
and variable voltages (Fig. 4.1).3 The comparator, in our appropriation of the 
word for social science, is therefore an assemblage that undertakes comparative 
work. As occurs with the comparator chip, social scientific comparison has to 
be assembled from diverse entities according to specific forms of knowledge 
and expertise. In order to produce the comparative output, these assembled 
parts have to actively intervene and provoke relations between previously 
Fig. 4.1 A comparator chip5
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uncompared inputs.4 For obvious reasons, the comparator in social science is 
vastly more complex and heterogeneous than the comparator chip. As we will 
show, it is not a single thing, but an assemblage of researchers, funders, and 
research technologies – including entities such as databases and software, legal 
regulations and theories, and methods. When it is put to work, the comparator 
creates comparison(s) by shaping and being shaped by the world around it.
The creative figure of the comparator is largely absent from literature focused 
on comparison as a specifically qualitative social scientific practice. In recent 
discussions, its place is taken by much debate about the epistemological prob-
lems associated with comparison. It has therefore been observed that although 
comparisons have fallen out of favour, doing social research is always comparative 
(if only in implicit ways), and should be reconsidered (Gingrich and Fox 2002). 
The revived interest has led to renewed discussions of a number of old questions: 
Is it legitimate to compare this with that, or what is the tertium comparationis – 
the quality that the things being compared have in common (Steinmetz 2004; 
Wagner 2011)? What are the issues associated with the apparent undertaking 
of comparison and the construction of binary oppositions (Strathern 2011a)? 
What are the specific assumptions about relationality that inform Western ideas 
about comparison as contrasted to those from other areas of the world (Battaglia 
2011; Candea 2011; de Castro 2011; Strathern 2011a; Strathern 2011b)? How 
might comparison, with its universalist historical baggage, be squared with 
contrasting approaches that have in some quarters been accused of relativism 
(see the various discussions in the special issue on comparative relativism, in 
particular Lloyd 2011; Holbraad 2011; Jensen 2011; Smith 2011)?
Meanwhile, in what is sometimes referred to as ‘comparative urbanism’, a 
number of authors have stressed that comparison would benefit if it became 
more adventurous and attentive to relational complexity. This might be achieved 
by moving away from the orthodox comparison of only large cities or nation-
states, or towards understanding the rich variety of more complex relations and 
relationality informing a given urban setting (Cook and Ward 2012; Gough 
2012; Jacobs 2012; McFarlane and Robinson 2012; Robinson 2011; Ward 
2010). And, in a recent collection that aims to ‘thicken comparison’ (Scheffer and 
Niewöhner 2010), a range of authors discuss the difficulties of doing comparison, 
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while frequently noting comparison’s creative, transformative, and potentially 
pedagogical effects. However, by and large, the method shows the analytical 
productivity of making different, unusual, or richer comparisons, rather than 
exploring the situated assembly of the comparative social scientific act itself.
Comparison has also been subject to analysis by a number of writers working 
with concepts and methods drawn from Science and Technology Studies (STS). 
This has shown clearly the way in which comparison is inevitably a construc-
tive, creative act, a dynamic bringing together of entities that are otherwise 
potentially either unrelated, or related in some other way. This is what Helen 
Verran (2011) and Isabelle Stengers (2011) variously refer to as ‘comparison 
as participant’. However, despite being so good at looking at the methods and 
procedures of others, STS has often tended to be rather silent when it comes 
to its own practices and politics (see Haraway 1997). Thus, the empirical focus 
has tended to remain on the comparisons done by others, whether by scientists 
(Stengers 2011), medical practitioners (Mol 2002), or indeed non-human enti-
ties as diverse as pigs, neutrinos, and tornadoes (Brown 2011). Again, the figure 
of the social scientific comparator tends to remain invisible and undeclared. This 
is despite the fact that STS (along with much feminist research) has shown that 
ostensibly detached applications of logic can be deeply implicated in a range 
of unarticulated interests and influences. It is thus crucial to study the specific 
assembly of the comparative act as it involves the building of what Annemarie 
Mol (2002) calls the ‘platforms of comparison’. Looking at medical practition-
ers, Mol draws attention to the specific situation that produces the comparison 
(where the comparison is made) and the consequences of putting these entities 
into relation. We are keen to extend this empirical problematisation of com-
parison to social science itself. For if comparisons are indeed omnipresent and 
inevitable (an inevitable ‘matter of fact’, as Stengers (2011) puts it), then what 
are the specific procedures, (human/non-human) situations, and effects that 
produce social scientific comparisons?
We aim to show, first, that achieving comparison is a complex process in 
which a comparator has to be actively assembled. In our case, this comparator 
is a group of people mediated by a number of research technologies. Second, 
we show that this comparator is shaped by (and shapes) the research object in a 
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continual process. Finally, we explore the potential of an approach that explicitly 
seeks to provoke comparison – in which developments within our research result 
precisely from the specific way in which our comparator has been assembled.
We present comparison as we have experienced doing it, seeking it, and 
observing it, mainly within the first half of our four-year research project. This 
is a story of how the creation of a ten-page proposal became a research project 
with a life of its own, shaped by diverse personalities, experiences, knowledges, 
and technologies, as well as our research objects themselves. In doing so, we 
recognise that there is a fine line between navel-gazing and the constructive 
sharing of one’s own experiences. We hope our paper achieves the latter.
The  P ro j ect  Comparator
In our project, titled ‘Organising Disaster’, we are interested in exploring the 
ways in which disaster preparedness is produced. We analyse civil protection 
as a specific form of ordering society, involving modes of knowledge, technolo-
gies, and organisations intended to deal with disaster. We follow an assembly 
of organisations and organising technologies, and examine how they produce 
particular ways of preparing for disaster, and how this, in turn, has effects on the 
way that society is composed. To do so, we look at three national cases: India, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.6 From the very outset, the project has 
been explicitly comparative, with each team member taking responsibility for 
one of the three cases. The venture might thus appear to be conventionally 
comparative – another in the long line of research undertakings that has the 
nation-state as a unit for comparison. However, we are interested in the question 
of comparison precisely because we are uncomfortable with how it tends to be 
generally problematised. Our response in this paper is an ‘eigen-observation’: 
we scrutinise our own organisational practices and modes in which our own 
knowledge is brought to, and shaped through, the objects we study.
The following observations give a sketch of the basic layout of one particular 
comparator. However, we maintain that any account of a comparator would need 
to cover a similar set of elements (see below). For this reason, our description 
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can be taken as a first step towards understanding its generic features. A work-
ing comparator is always a complex assemblage, and never simply a tool, an 
operation, or a method.
In the first part of the paper, we describe the following elements of the 
process: the initial assembling of the comparator and its researcher constituent 
parts, the feeding of the comparator, and finally the calibrating of the comparator. 
Later, we show what happens when the comparator goes to work.
Assembling the Comparator
We, the comparator, consist of three human team members (Michael, Joe, and 
Zuzana) and a number of technologies. Michael, as the project lead, began 
building the comparator by writing a research proposal. The number of human 
actors was pre-defined by his proposal. Once he received the funding, adverts 
were placed, interviews conducted, and CVs assessed. And it is here that the 
project’s initial process of assembling a comparator begins. Through this process 
of searching and weighing both imagined qualities and the potential fit into a 
team, there is a move from the fiction of a project as the outcome of a unified 
author towards the project as a contingent practice, dependent on the mesh-
ing and balancing of similarities and differences within a team. This selection 
procedure also highlights a strange imbalance in the comparisons at stake: the 
comparisons that emerge from the research project are founded on the compari-
son of academic CVs and first impressions in a carefully staged twenty-minute 
play called the ‘job interview’. This process decides research routes taken and not 
taken. By bringing together these diverse individuals (Michael, in his decisions, 
and Zuzana and Joe in their accounts of themselves) who in our case were not 
previously known to each other, our comparator was born.
We can now go back to the proposal and read from it some crucial features 
of the particular comparator that were defined in it. The proposal suggests 
undertaking three case studies in three different countries. In other words, it 
sets up a three-way comparison that is in many ways unbalanced. By naming 
countries as the entities to be subject to comparison, the proposal, on the 
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surface at least, resorts to a tried and trusted method of comparing at the level 
of the nation-state. However, already in the proposal it becomes clear that the 
nation-state is a placeholder for a multiplicity of organisations, practices, and 
places. This becomes even more obvious when we actually work on the project. 
As the project does not merely compare (national) policies, but rather actual 
exercise practices, it lets each case study itself make a variety of selections within 
the mixture of differing national disaster management practices. It is a central 
aim of the project to compare countries with very different frameworks: from 
India, with its highly professionalised approach, to Swiss civil protection, which 
is reliant on a draft system.
This uneasy form of comparison is not only a matter of our research object – 
disaster management – but it is also an outcome of Michael’s particular training 
and exposure to organisational sociology, STS, and European anthropology. 
Combining an ethnography of organisations with an analysis of discourses 
produces the problem of how to relate the local and parochial to a wider set 
of social influences. Doing this in three countries in parallel inevitably brings 
up a multiplicity of specific empirical levels that do not obviously link up with 
each other.
Further, the proposal makes a crucial connection: it assigns one person to 
each case country. It creates a comparator in which persons are aligned with a 
particular level of comparison (the nation-state). However, one could imagine 
the same project with different persons being responsible for different levels 
of analysis. By pre-deciding to match persons with places, a particular kind of 
comparator was already envisaged in which local specialisation would be con-
ceived of as located in persons, thus following a traditional model – at least in 
anthropology – in which knowledge about places and cultures is assumed to 
be located in researchers’ minds and bodies. However, from the start, decisions 
were made that had significant effects on the relationship between researcher 
and place. For Michael, he decided that, despite being Swiss, he would research 
the UK, and not Switzerland. It was his personal way of acquainting himself with 
the country to which he had emigrated. As it happened, the other two project 
members (in typical ‘anthropological’ fashion) would also not conduct research 
in their native countries. While Zuzana (a Czech anthropologist specialising 
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in South Asia) has had experience with conducting research in India, for the 
British economic and STS sociologist Joe, Switzerland was quite unfamiliar. 
The comparator then is very much one that deals with distributing the sensory 
apparatus of researchers over the world, and brings it back together to exchange 
what was gathered.
Feeding the Comparator: Cohesion and Autonomy
Once the comparator is assembled, its life can assume different forms and the 
comparison it produces hinges on the comparator having a certain cohesion. 
This is an often overlooked feature of comparison. Comparing is a practice of 
bringing material together and putting it in conversation, and not simply an 
assembly of empirical data with different characteristics. Only a comparator – 
able to hold the three in view simultaneously in a practice of commensuration – 
may eventually produce comparison. Before bodies can go into the field, they 
first have to be made part of the comparator.
Some models for achieving this kind of cohesion include: research and 
writing procedures involving constant struggles over theoretical or disciplinary 
hegemony; a very loose assemblage of individual author-subjects, each with their 
own voice and research practices that exist next to one another; and a hierarchical 
model in which some parts of the comparator are ‘research assistants’ that do 
what the team leader tells them, and in which their primary function is to act 
as extensions of his or her author-subject. Each of these approaches obviously 
has its own advantages and disadvantages. Our approach has been a mixture of 
these. We have a broadly flat structure, but one that is characterised by hierar-
chical ‘moments’ when Michael assumes the role of final decision maker. One 
such decision was to specify three parallel research projects associated with 
three different places, which inevitably reduced the autonomy of the other two 
team members. ‘Hierarchy’, then, is not so much a matter of an organigram, but 
an outcome of the fact that one person wrote the research proposal, and that, 
in implementing the proposal, Michael also decided to stick (broadly) to his 
original plans.
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Our approach also involves two modes of doing research. The first is an 
autonomous mode, one more familiar to social scientists: this is the pursuit 
of individual research interests in relation to a particular object. Here, insight 
stems from the individual’s personal relationship to that object, in which they 
feel able to bring their own particular set of skills and interests to bear. Based 
on our own experiences, we are confident that this mode is a crucial precondi-
tion for an individual researcher’s ability to engage with an object creatively (an 
extreme opposite case would be the over-determined research setting where a 
researcher slavishly does the bidding of another). But we also see this autono-
mous, individual mode as one way of feeding the comparator. We will provide 
more examples of this below. For now, it can be summarised as a process of 
pedagogical and creative development: we are continually trying to make this 
heterogeneous, but at least partially unified entity, better able to compare than it 
could previously: individual insights about one case have the potential to allow 
the comparator to both learn (i.e. to compare better than it could before) and 
grow (i.e. to extend its reach), and to be able to comparatively connect research 
entities that it was not able to connect before. However, in order to be able to 
do so, the comparator has to be trained through a second, less familiar mode 
of engagement: calibration.
Calibrating the Comparator
The artist John Stezaker splices together portraits of men and women to form 
what he calls ‘marriages’. In a recent interview, Stezaker said:
I am often asked why I don’t just get two people, pose them for photo-
graphs and splice the shots more accurately, but that misses the point. It’s 
the imperfect match, the failure of unity, that makes us identify with these 
beings (Phillips 2012).
The image below (Fig. 4.2) of our team – and Zotero – as comparator is an 
homage to Stezaker’s ‘marriages’. What holds for his images also holds for the 
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comparator: it is the imperfect match created by attempting unity that creates a 
functioning comparator. Without the attempt at unity, there is no comparator. 
Further, and more importantly, even if a perfect match were possible, to strive 
after it would be to overlook the possibilities for creative tension generated by 
an imperfect unification.
Calibration is one way of deliberately moving towards this imperfect unity. 
It can be understood as an ongoing mutual adjustment – of each, to each other, 
as well as to our technologies, and our research objects. The first route we took 
was to calibrate some of our thinking through weekly reading seminars. This not 
only helped us read some of the more pertinent literature for our study, but it also 
helped to calibrate our ideas of what we are looking for and how we are think-
ing about what we are doing. Reading is in many ways a comparative practice 
which inevitably shapes how we see our cases, even if the topic is unrelated. It is 
very much the collective act of discussing the reading, in which pre-knowledge, 
or even guesswork about empirical material, is inserted and tested with regard 
to its comparative promise(s). The reading seminars also highlighted the very 
Fig. 4.2 The assembled comparator
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different ways in which we, the human parts of the comparator, are each influ-
enced by our training and differently conceive of both ethnographic fieldwork 
and issues of comparison.
Another crucially important calibratory practice of ours is how we file what 
we have read. We process all our materials through another component of our 
comparator – Zotero, a piece of bibliographic software that makes referencing 
much simpler. Zotero is one part of the technological mix that feeds and cali-
brates our comparator (other crucial tools are shared qualitative data analysis 
tools (NVivo), shared online storage facilities, and communication tools that 
enable multi-way, remote communication – e.g. Skype conference calling). But 
more than its bibliographic function, it is Zotero’s ability to become a shared 
database that is particularly powerful for us. All our notes, references, and PDFs 
of journal articles are automatically synchronised, with each team member 
having access to the materials that other team members have uploaded, read, 
excerpted, and annotated.
This process is a strange kind of putting what is normally ‘private’ and indi-
vidually memorised into the hands of the research group. A researcher’s unique 
trail of readings, similar to their engagement with ethnographic data, is usually 
assumed to be embodied. The conventionally conceived author-subject is in 
many ways understood as nothing else than a machine (albeit a nontrivial one) 
that rejigs past readings and combines these with ‘ideas’. In its very design and 
promise, bibliographic software, as a recombination and sorting device, already 
implies a re-ordering of the author-subject (Krajewski 2012).7 The resulting 
databases potentially become electronic filing cabinets with the (unacknowl-
edged) status of a co-author. As Niklas Luhmann put it in his account of working 
with his own unique sorting system, ‘The following is a piece of empirical social 
research. It is about me and another: my filing cabinet’ (1981: 222).
However, using an ever-expanding bibliographic database as a group adds 
a further dimension to this aspect of research practice: texts appear, with little 
sense of the logic that accompanied their insertion. At its most practical, this 
means that some of the more mundane work of the comparator can be distrib-
uted across multiple parties: key relevant sections can be excerpted for others 
to use, and key facts and figures are highlighted. Further, since Zotero does not 
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show (unless manually inserted)8 who authored a note on a text, these notes 
could be written by any team member. Especially if some time has passed since 
the text was noted, this can generate a strange sense of self-misrecognition as 
the reader wonders: ‘Did I write this?’ Often, it is not possible to be sure, and 
thought processes and ideas start to blur. This is another step away from a unified 
author-subject and towards a distributed but cohesive comparator.
Moreover, Zotero itself materialises the comparator as a cohesive unity. As a 
unified entity, comparators need to perform processes of differentiation in order 
to make comparison possible. In a bibliographic database, any item or note could 
potentially be a unit of comparison with any other. The result is that, to keep 
comparison stable, the database ends up mirroring and reinforcing the project 
structure. In our own case, this happens in two-ways. First, as we created folders 
for primary and secondary source materials for each of the three countries being 
researched, Zotero reproduced the national case study structure. All references 
relating to India are in a folder titled ‘India’, and so forth. But, second, we also 
created folders for each person, and these were meant to contain any material 
deemed important by him/her. This dual structure then shows that, through its 
operations, the comparator, understood as dependent for its success on forms 
of communication between team members (and between team members and 
Zotero), produces a multiplicity of possible alignments: people come to be 
aligned with places and certain references, but this happens precisely because 
Zotero is in principle neutral and non-aligned. In practice, it is perfectly pos-
sible for Zuzana or Joe to check material contained in a folder called ‘Michael’.
Further mutual calibration occurs in the writing process, although differ-
ent types of writing generate different comparative modes. Collective papers 
explicitly provoke comparison, as the writing of this article has revealed to us. 
This text only partially reveals the numerous (sometimes difficult) processes 
of calibration we have undertaken as we have tried to adjust to the ambitions, 
ideas, and writing styles of others – with each category having the potential 
to be compared according to values which can be understood very differently 
between authors. This is one of the most explicit sites where negotiation 
emerges as an important calibratory tool. In our struggles for a coherent (but 
not unified) voice, as articulated through texts – as well as in our meetings and 
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conversations – comparison becomes contingent on the success of ongoing 
processes of comparative negotiation.
Autonomous, individual papers can also quickly be pulled towards com-
parison. We decided from an early stage that any member of the team could use 
another’s data as required. We have even written down this sharing principle as 
a kind of contract. The need for this arose from various issues we discussed at 
the start of the project related to the possibility of people leaving the project. On 
the face of it, this was not related to the comparator; however, it automatically 
contributed to the particular form that the comparator took. The agreement 
stipulated that in the case of a team member leaving, all of his or her materials 
would remain with the project, but they could also be used by the person who 
was departing. The remaining team could further use this material for publi-
cations, but that would make the leaving member an author on publications 
substantially based on these materials.
We have also each given conference presentations where one of us has used 
another’s materials for their own comparative purposes. We have frequently 
found comparing our national cases helpful, often as an explanatory device. Of 
course, this implies a high degree of leniency on the part of the producers of the 
material. It also reveals to us (as well as sometimes to others) that the comparator 
is something assembled. The assumption in a conference is that what is said is 
backed by the embodied experience of the speaker. But our creative ‘borrow-
ings’ from others are not ‘citations’: they do not draw on material produced and 
claimed by another author as settled facts. Instead, our new author – now an 
independent (socio-technically distributed) comparator in its own right – lays 
claim to ‘data’ without being able to fully qualify its use. This becomes most 
obvious when (during conference presentations) one is required to answer 
questions on the other, less familiar cases.
We aim to reach productive (im)balances through our comparisons, where, 
on the one hand, they hold the potential to make team members think, but, on 
the other, are neither so strange and different as to repel, or simply baffle. To be 
only able to draw on partially shared understandings of what it means to do what 
we do has the extremely challenging effect that, before and while we compare, 
we also compare our modes of working. When working as a team, comparison 
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does not therefore automatically emerge, as it needs to be actively calibrated, 
with materials being constantly reframed through different theoretical and 
methodological lenses.
There is one further actor that plays a crucial role in changing the composition 
of the comparator, which we have so far only touched on briefly: our research 
objects themselves. What then happens when we take the comparator and its 
calibratory apparatus into the field and into dialogue with the people and things 
we encounter there?
A comparator is not only calibrated in relation to the persons that compose 
it, but also in relation to the settings and objects it attempts to compare. Much 
has been written about the way that comparison changes the outcomes of both 
qualitative and quantitative research. Less attention has been paid to the inverse 
relationship between the research object and comparison itself. In examining 
this, we follow three ways in which the comparator is shifted by the entities it 
encounters. The first concerns access – that is, how and when we were able to 
obtain entry to our respective field sites. In order to provide a sharp contrast, 
we will focus on just two of our three cases in this instance: Switzerland and 
India. These can be said to represent opposing poles in the varying trajectories 
of access we have observed over the course of our project. The second shift 
concerns those moments when a particular set of objects in one site shifts com-
parative attention in another. Here we begin to draw all three of our cases into 
dialogue. We continue in this vein to examine the third and final set of shifts. 
These are enacted not in relation to a particular set of objects, but in relation to 
practices – comparative practices, in fact. We examine what we can learn from 
the comparisons of others, as well as how we might compare these to our own 
social scientific comparisons.
Access Shifts the Comparator
As noted, most discussions of comparison conceive of it as if it were a smooth 
and transparent practice in which the comparator is in full control. This is 
equally true of those who critique comparison as being oppressive for forcing 
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entities together. This overstates the power of social research and (particularly 
for ethnographic research) is often far from the case: the comparator is depend-
ent on what is usually called access to the field. In our project, each researcher 
ideally needs to gain access to at least some parts of each country’s civil protec-
tion organisation. Given the conception of the comparator we have outlined, 
we might rather call it not access, but ‘the extension of the comparator to our 
interlocutors’ (for reasons of practicality we do, however, use the former in 
what follows). These extensions are based on innumerable contingencies that 
in turn, shape the comparison. While in non-comparative research these simply 
change the course of the project, for a comparative project each contingency 
has repercussions for the whole comparator. Each field note in one site raises a 
potential question about the respective field note in the other site(s), and each 
movement of the research trajectory in one site adds tension to the overall direc-
tion of the comparator. To assume that the comparator has the power to force 
ethnographic sites into one comparative framework would ignore the fact that 
each negotiation with a field site has its own trajectory that can only partly be 
influenced by the needs of the comparator.
Of our three cases, Switzerland provided the quickest and smoothest jour-
ney of a researcher into the field. Joe heard a radio interview in which a key 
member of the governmental apparatus that coordinates Swiss civil protection 
was speaking about a major forthcoming exercise. A letter of introduction 
to the person was drafted and Joe received a reply two days later, informing 
him that the request had been forwarded to press relations. A week after that, 
another reply arrived from the head of press relations, informing him that 
after consultation with the head of the exercise, access had been granted. Two 
months later, he was in the field, observing one of the largest command and 
control exercises that had been staged in Switzerland in recent years. There, 
he was able to meet key players and develop contacts that would facilitate 
many additional fieldwork visits over the next year and a half, including to 
meetings surrounding a second major exercise. He was also eventually able 
to obtain schedules detailing when and where all the exercises involving cen-




Gaining access, then, was relatively straightforward. With the benefit of 
hindsight, we can reflect on how this part of the comparator benefitted from 
at least two broad sets of helpful circumstances. The first are the relationships 
between the background of the researcher, the framing of the project, and 
the history of Swiss civil protection. It was Joe’s distinct impression that his 
position as an outsider helped smooth his access. Within Switzerland, there 
is some sensitivity about the role played by civil protection.9 However, being 
a British researcher and thus ostensibly disconnected from these debates, as 
well as being able to frame the research as part of a wider European inter-
est in civil protection (given the project was funded by the EU), may have 
helped allay fears that the research was being conducted with unstated politi-
cal objectives. The second is the particular organisational culture that is a 
feature of Swiss civil protection. Chain of command is rigorously respected, 
perhaps even more so than in some other Swiss organisations, given that a 
significant number of its personnel continue to be involved in Switzerland’s 
militia army.10 There is also a pervading culture of organisational efficiency: 
people are almost never late for meetings; meetings themselves closely follow 
pre-planned agendas; emails rarely go unanswered; events are organised in 
good time and often months in advance – even years, in the case of large 
exercises; the relevant IT infrastructure allows shared access to key docu-
ments; emergency organisational action plans are rigorously worked over 
and scrutinised; and so on and so forth. For the Swiss field site, numerous 
materials existed and were readily available, and access to it was smoothed 
through the very same organisational routines that were part of the research 
object. In other words, the comparator could be fed because the organisation 
itself had certain features that helped to feed it.
Compare this to the labour involved in gaining access to the Indian field 
site. This involved at least four sets of challenges. First, a particular bureau-
cratic actor had to be enrolled: the research visa.11 A major consequence of 
this was to delay the entry of the comparator into the Indian field site by 
ten months.
The second challenge was that the frequent transfer of people between differ-
ent parts of the Indian administrative apparatus rendered any negotiated access 
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temporary. In one instance, Zuzana had to liaise with four different heads of the 
same force, all of whom had different opinions about ‘letting her in’. Whenever 
one left, she had to seek new permission from the next. The first two gave an 
oral commitment to support her, while the third ‘head’ even went ahead and 
formally authorised her access. This, however, turned out to be not enough. 
Upon Zuzana’s return to India for a planned six-month stay (now accompanied 
by a full research visa), the new (fourth) organisational head revoked the access 
granted to her by his predecessor and asked that she obtain authorisation from 
the Home Ministry. This involved temporarily enrolling the Czech embassy 
(given Zuzana’s nationality), who were required to issue further supporting 
documents until she finally gained access.
The third issue was the central position of personal and informal relation-
ships with key people that often determined the degree and type of access. 
Many of Zuzana’s initial contacts were brokered by fellow academics either from 
Puducherry or New Delhi. After another promising research lead fell apart due 
to a change in personnel, fellow researchers in Puducherry put her in touch with 
someone near the very top of the local hierarchy.12 This opened a new door to 
a research site perhaps better than that which was now inaccessible. Increasing 
familiarity with Zuzana and the project amongst key figures in the Indian state 
hierarchy also played a role. For instance, towards the end of her stay in India, 
officers (who had initially been adamant about strictly following official hierar-
chical processes) became more willing to exert what agency they could within 
their realm of responsibility to make her research possible. For example, she 
was given tips about upcoming events that did not require official permission, 
allowing her to collect perhaps the most important data of her research so far.
The fourth issue is that disaster management falls under the responsibility of 
the Home Ministry. One consequence of this is that access to disaster response 
bodies is considered a security issue as they are manned by personnel from 
paramilitary forces. To venture into such a highly sensitive field site without 
the correct authorisation in India would be unwise, as it could lead to charges 
of espionage and imprisonment.
Compared to Switzerland, the Indian part of the comparator had to become 
connected to a far more heterogeneous and ever-changing set of actors. Zuzana 
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had to be prepared for the terrain of potential comparison to constantly shift, 
or for a new actor to be integrated into the processes of calibration and stabi-
lisation necessary for comparisons to occur. Of course, this experience may 
itself in due course be integrated into a comparative analysis of organisational 
differences between our respective cases; the question of how we gained access 
is itself part of an ethnography of how these organisations relate to particular 
parts of the public. What will likely be absent from such accounts (because of 
norms of academic self-presentation), however, are the asymmetries involved 
in preparing the ground for such comparative work.
There is a further effect which relates to the temporal and spatial trajectory of 
comparison. This concerns the variations in how access is achieved, and when and 
where it happens. Each can shape the overall comparative career of the project: 
access in one site may open up questions in another before any field research has 
even been possible. Or, a denial of access in another site may prompt a change 
of strategy in yet another, resulting in a move towards a different type of data 
which, in turn, may reflect back on the work planned (or being undertaken) in 
one or more of the other sites.
In the Swiss case, early field research showed, for instance, that there is a 
significant blur between state institutions and the population when it comes to 
civil protection. This is because of the sheer number of people that are enrolled 
into its dedicated, militia-based, state-led13 civil protection force.14 After an ini-
tial two-week training period, participation in this force can last years, even if it 
only involves attending a few days’ worth of refresher courses every year. This 
opened up an opportunity for comparison and a shift in the research strategy in 
India: during the period in which access to state institutions was problematic, 
Zuzana shifted her attention to the localised training of the population, in work 
that is often effectively subcontracted by the state to NGOs. Here too, then, was 
an instance of the population being enrolled into civil protection procedures.
As access to the NGOs was far less challenging, Zuzana could learn about the 
disaster management arrangements within the local administrative structure and 
observe localised disaster preparedness training practices in several communi-
ties. The work being done in these communities exhibits numerous parallels 
with forms of training we have observed in Switzerland, and has generated a 
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range of comparative questions: What relations of similarity and/or difference 
might the comparator be able to establish between these two forms of disaster 
response training? What constitutes the population in these instances? What 
constitutes the organisation of disaster response? Despite the pre-definition 
of the comparison, the comparator’s gaze had thus shifted to take in a more 
diverse range of entities. A process of calibration was exposing different forms 
of organisational delegation and negotiations at the interface between civil 
protection organisations and populations.
Only a Comparator Can Produce Absence
In any research project, certain entities may emerge that come to possess a par-
ticular allure. These are the entities, for instance, that surprise, that are unusual, 
that ‘force’ our thought (see Stengers (2010)). In our project, one such entity, 
which also shifted the comparator’s gaze, has been an object: the shelter – a 
category of building designed to protect its inhabitants from danger. This object 
produced a move that can only be achieved by a comparator, namely rendering 
visible an absence. Not only did shelters become objects to be researched, but 
also their prominence in one site prompted questions as to the reasons for their 
absence in other sites. It is only by moving through a comparator (either ours or 
someone else’s) that presences in one site can trigger an attention to an object 
that does not exist in another. Absence became visible here as data; as something 
that can be positively discussed only because it is relevant somewhere else.
Our interest in shelters initially emerged during documentary research into 
the Swiss case. Switzerland is a country where now, following Cold War govern-
ment policy, there are enough nuclear-proof bomb shelters to house almost 100% 
of the population.15 This marks Switzerland out as a country whose response to 
the threat of the atomic bomb was, and is, unique in at least offering its population 
the possibility of survival after a nuclear attack (what Elaine Scarry (2011) calls 
the ‘right of exit’). Despite the end of the Cold War, the Swiss shelter system is 
an ongoing project: shelters continue to be built and continue to be maintained 
(even if not to the same degree). As we have explored elsewhere, these shelters 
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continue to have a direct impact on the conduct of preparedness practice, in 
part because their sheer material awkwardness means that they will not fit 
cleanly into contemporary civil protection paradigms (Deville, Guggenheim, 
and Hrdličková 2014).
We could have left the object in Switzerland. However, one of the features of 
being in a comparator is that entities in other settings tend to offer themselves 
up for comparison. This initially occurred in the UK. When we (the ‘we’ here 
being mostly Michael’s end of the comparator) looked for shelters in the UK, 
the entity we found was actually not a material presence, but a material absence. 
At a relatively early stage in the Cold War (partly for reasons of cost and partly 
because of their possession of a nuclear deterrent) the UK decided against 
any comprehensive nuclear shelter building programme. Instead, the British 
population were more or less left to their own devices, being only provided with 
instructions on how to improvise shelters in their own homes and gardens.16 
For us, this absence was particularly striking given that, in Switzerland, bomb 
shelters were (and continue to be) something of an overwhelming presence 
(Berger Ziauddin 2010; 2012). We also quickly found that this absence had 
played a role in the sometimes contested history of British civil protection. 
This was, in part, a historical issue – the very lack of shelters for the population 
having arisen as an issue in the anti-war protests of the early 1980s. But it also 
resonated in the present: we argue elsewhere that the very absence of Cold War 
material preparedness practice may have made it easier for the UK to adopt cer-
tain post-Cold War forms of expertise than was the case in Switzerland (Deville 
and Guggenheim, 2015).
A comparison had thus been established and, in the process, the compara-
tor had shifted to incorporate the relationship between these organisations 
and their history of building preparedness – as well as what was absent. This 
points to a more general observation about absences: it is impossible to specify 
absence if one cannot use a comparator to specify the presence of what is absent 
somewhere else in the world (obviously, the ‘somewhere else’ is not necessar-
ily spatial. It could also be temporal, whether historical or utopian, or social 
and cultural). Without a comparator, there are no absences, only presences. 
The comparator, through producing absence, can then also help to produce 
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new presences: what fills any absences (the answer can never be simply ‘noth-
ing’)? This question, in turn, highlighted some of the more general moral and 
political questions that are tied up in all preparedness practice. How should a 
country protect its population? Who is to be included in protective measures, 
and who is excluded?
Our two-way comparator was therefore achieving a measure of stability. But 
again, a comparator can have something of a life of its own and can begin to 
demand questions of us. The existence of a seemingly neat two-way comparison 
begged the question: what about shelters in India? As we started thinking about 
this, our comparator also began to question both the level of comparison and 
the tertium comparationis (see also Sörensen (2008) on this point). What were 
we comparing when we were comparing shelters? Were we comparing material 
structures designed to defend civilians against disasters, or were we compar-
ing the role and meaning of bunkers as a response to the threat of nuclear war? 
If it were the latter, then India shows similarities to the UK: nuclear bunkers 
are similarly absent, although some exist for key government officials.17 What, 
however, if the comparison at stake is something else, namely the way ideas 
about protection against disasters are materialised?
In the course of looking for shelters in India, Zuzana came across the cyclone 
shelter. These shelters are the main purpose-built buildings designed to protect 
the population against cyclones, although people are also encouraged to move 
to other so called ‘life-line’ engineered buildings, seen as strong enough to 
withstand a cyclone, like schools. Fieldwork in Puducherry and Tamil Nadu 
showed that only people who normally live in thatched structures (i.e. they are 
poorer) use cyclone shelters, so hiding in specially designed shelters during a 
cyclone becomes a matter of socio-economic status. The Indian coast is also 
marked with some completely dilapidated shelters that have become the hub 
of what the Indian authorities conceive of as anti-social behaviour and are not 
used by the public in case of disaster. This failure to protect is ascribed in the 
general discourse of NGOs and the authorities to the lacking sense of commu-
nity ownership. Therefore, the more recently built shelters are actually disaster-
resistant buildings that have other primary functions – for example, serving as 
a local community hall or a school.
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Thus, the comparator has shifted from the disaster to be protected from (in 
the case of Switzerland), to the relationship between shelters – as a category of 
purpose-built buildings – and the surrounding lives into which they become 
entwined. In the process, its focus intensified on questions such as what the 
politics of entry and exclusion sheltering implies, and the relationship between 
sheltering and the presence of a threat, including the other life of a shelter when 
it is not being used for protection. The comparator had become interested in 
the way the state administration conceives of its own role, how it understands 
disaster, and how it sees the population and its needs. Some of these interests 
pre-existed the Indian research as under-articulated ideas. However, by fol-
lowing the comparison of an entity that was present in two of the cases to the 
third, the comparator was provided with another powerful lens, both through 
which to consider the relationship between civil protection and the population, 
and to enrich our thinking. As we bounce around our cases, the comparator 
is being fed.
The Field Shifts the Comparator
We – and our devices – are not the only comparator in the research project, 
however. Our comparative project has encountered a world populated by a 
myriad circulating comparators. And these comparators have shifted our own.
It is not a simple case – as has often been observed – that thinking is always 
comparative, and that this thus also includes ordinary members of society. 
When we refer to the circulation of comparators, we refer to the use, by others, 
of explicitly deployed forms of comparison. These are the kinds of comparisons 
undertaken by academics and a range of other interest groups, including part-
activists/part-academics,18 policymakers,19 and our informants.
In India, for instance, Japan is frequently mentioned – an idolised ‘Other’, 
whose disaster preparedness (with its technology, discipline, and civilian aware-
ness of appropriate behaviour in earthquakes) represents practices to aspire 
towards. In Switzerland, Japan is also brought into the comparative frame, 
however, for a precisely opposite set of reasons: the events surrounding the 
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Fukushima nuclear disaster following the earthquake and tsunami (including 
the placement of its reactors in risky locations and the subsequent response 
by disaster response professionals) become a lesson in what not to do. At the 
same time, some respondents have held up the presence of the shelters as a 
legitimation of the Swiss approach to civil preparedness: even if there were a 
nuclear event (the argument goes), the Swiss population would still be able to 
retreat to their shelters.
We are drawn to such ‘field comparators’. They open up potential important 
questions about the people, organisations, and things we are studying. In the 
above examples, for instance, we are able to see how our respondents invoke 
very particular (and quite conflicting) versions of Japanese disaster manage-
ment. Field comparators, then, very often have a transparent political agenda. 
Indian disaster managers would like the population to be as well prepared for 
earthquakes as the Japanese are. With such ambitions, their disaster management 
organisation can continue to grow to reach a wider public. On the other hand, by 
invoking Fukushima, the Swiss want to justify and prolong the existence of their 
bunkers. By pointing at Fukushima, they are suggesting that although the Cold 
War is over, the risk of a nuclear incident, however small, cannot be eliminated. 
Thus, people may well at some point need to use the nuclear shelter. So, the 
comparisons of others further fed our comparator by providing fundamentally 
important insights. Our comparator became, then, quite a greedy thing.
Our attraction to field comparators is also based on the very fact that these 
comparators are so different from our own. First, field comparators are fast 
because they operate with minimal justifications invoking norms of empirical 
proof and theoretical rigour. Ours is cumbersome, as it relies on all the vari-
ous steps we have described in this article in order to make it work and for it 
to conform to ethnographic and academic standards. Field comparators do 
not rely (to anywhere near the same degree) on this sometimes troublesome 
infrastructure. Actors in the field can invoke any comparison they like, often 
without the need to justify it or to calibrate a comparator first. They are likely 
neither to have to read extensive amounts of background literature, nor to justify 
what their tertium comparationis is, nor to write a research proposal that justifies 
why a comparison makes sense.
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Second, our comparator is mainly built as a tool to understand differences. 
As a social scientific comparator, it attempts a degree of symmetry by holding 
one example against another, and accounts for various absences and presences, 
varying value judgements and operations grounded in historical routines. It 
simultaneously adds analysis on either side of the entities being compared, and 
tries to keep each case similarly thick.
The field comparators that we have encountered tend to operate in a more 
asymmetrical way, and are chosen strategically to make a political point. The 
asymmetric comparator proceeds by taking its own case as fully known and 
understood, while the other provides a standard to enable the comparator to 
make a judgement against it – based on a simple set of assessments. Comparison 
here is an evaluation composed of binary values: there is a simple yes or 
no: Japan is good at preparedness; we must strive to become like them; and 
Japanese nuclear power plants break; ours can (or cannot).
One consequence of this is that when we integrate the field comparator 
into our own, it becomes ‘re-symmetrised’ and re-politicised in ways that may 
run counter to its use in the field. Without our own comparator, our field com-
parators’ interventions through comparison would be not much more than the 
invocation of the comparative facts of another situation to make a political point. 
With our comparator, this comparative fact looks rather different: it draws our 
collective attention to the political composition of the comparators it absorbs. 
And, in so doing, it highlights particular aspects of the political composition 
of preparedness: what function does the idolisation of another’s preparedness 
practice serve for the idolisers? Does the continued maintenance of Swiss 
shelters really have anything to do with the very particular kind of disaster that 
befell Japan in 2011?
Conclu s ion
As we have seen, comparison is not simply a practice that is imposed onto the 
field. Comparison proceeds by fits and starts, and it is just as much moved by 
the field as it moves the field. Following our own comparator as it has grown, 
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changed, and shifted its focus, all the while absorbing other technologies of 
comparison and the comparisons of others, we have seen it traverse quite dif-
ferent analytical, political, spatial, and temporal domains.
We have also highlighted some peculiar features of comparison: the compara-
tor is highly contingent on its composition, but the very practice of assembling 
it – ranging from job interviews and applications, internal hierarchies, to the 
technologies that keep it stable – is the part of it which is reflected upon the 
least within conventional comparative practice and never appears in resulting 
research articles. These conclusions are brought into sharper focus by the very 
fact that our comparator is made up of a team of researchers. A single-person 
comparator has the luxury of being able to proceed into the field far less encum-
bered by processes of calibration, and they can come out of the field without 
needing to develop ways to collectively think, analyse, and write. Nevertheless, 
being part of a collective comparator vividly exposes the precise mechanisms 
of comparison.
In this chapter, we have described a comparator that occupies one point on 
the spectrum between highly formalised types of comparative work and non-
comparative ethnographic case studies. Since ours is only an auto-ethnography, 
we cannot compare our social scientific comparator to those of others. But as a 
reader, perhaps you now can, as this chapter now takes its home in a collection 
richly populated with other comparators. We ourselves are left to wonder about 
the comparator we have created and become: has our comparator been assembled 
in the right way? How might a differently composed comparator have produced 
different comparisons? How might we have calibrated differently? What if the 
contingencies of access had pointed us in different directions? What can our 
comparator see that others cannot?
Asking these questions with the comparator as its focus also allows us 
to conclude by reframing ongoing concerns about the ethics and politics of 
comparison, some of which we drew attention to at the start of the chapter 
and which we explore at greater length in the book’s introduction. Much of 
the criticism of the use of comparison in the social sciences has stemmed 
from the observation that by forcing social and cultural phenomena into rela-
tion with one another, their complexity and specificity ends up being lost. 
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The argument, in effect, is that practising comparison is to practise a form 
of ‘injustice’.
One way to respond to this challenge is to observe that the field never 
has comparison done ‘to it’ in any straightforward way. Comparison happens 
through what Isabelle Stengers calls the creation of ‘rapport’ between the 
entities being studied (2011: 49). This act of creation is neither a given, nor is 
this process ever disinterested. Our comparisons happen because of the way 
people, things, and organisations either smooth out or resist our progress and 
offer themselves up to the comparative work that we wish to do with them. 
This is, then, in part about the mundane features of much research practice – 
gaining access for instance – and in part about how entities push themselves 
into contention for comparison. For example, a shelter in one site pushes itself 
into our comparative reckoning, in part because of our desire to find a parallel, 
but also because it renders itself as relevant to be taken into account (through 
various formal similarities to other shelters, similarities of material, and so on). 
Enacting social scientific comparison is also not a matter of the unilateral and 
politically motivated imposition of comparison into the field (to which actors 
might object). Particularly in a field of research like ours, which is populated 
by experts and individuals in positions of considerable power (a typical case 
of ‘studying up’, in other words), many of the actors we study have more than 
enough authority and mechanisms at their disposal to establish their own, often 
highly authoritative, comparisons.
For this reason, another response, one echoed by other contributions to 
this volume (see in particular Gad and Jensen), is to pay more attention to 
comparison as it occurs in the field. However, we may wish to hesitate before 
delegating authority for comparison to these field comparators in its entirety. 
Many of the comparisons undertaken by actors in the field are unconcerned 
with the question of whether or not justice is done to comparative entities. That 
is to say, these are comparisons that are not constrained by the disciplinarily-
specific demands of empirical rigour.
To understand the specificity of (social) scientific comparison as compared 
to the comparisons undertaken by many of the other actors in the world, 
we thus need to understand the differences in the modes through which the 
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comparator operates. Many field comparators are mobile, adaptable, and quick. 
Our comparator, however, is slow and cumbersome. For this reason, it needs 
to do much of its calibration work independently of the field. The problem of 
comparison cannot, therefore, be solved by asking actors (whether organisa-
tion, individual, or non-human) in the field to choose the comparative entities 
on our behalf: not only would this elide the work that would have gone into 
choosing that actor in the first place, it would simply replicate the problem of 
comparison a level further down the line. One of the benefits of allowing social 
scientific comparators the authority to set up the comparison is that at least this 
authority is clearly defined: there already exist a familiar set of conventions and 
techniques for rendering aspects of the contingencies of comparative practice 
transparent. In this chapter, we have pushed this process of rendering transpar-
ent far further than is usually the case. The comparisons of the field, however, 
do not often have such complex comparators.
Comparison is thus never in itself an unjust, colonial, reductive, or violent 
enterprise. It can be; however, in such cases, our energies should be placed 
into demonstrating how, and in what ways, the calibration of the comparator 
was inadequate. We also cannot simply replace inadequate comparators with 
those of the field: there may be occasions when we may want to compare in 
collaboration with actors in the field (as we in many instances have), but there 
may be other occasions when we do not, or when we judge the comparators of 
the field to be an equally inadequate starting point for comparison. Rather, we 
need both to understand our comparators in more depth, and to set them up 
in more productive ways.
In assessing the quality of a comparison, the focus should thus be on the 
operations of the comparator (potentially by comparing it to other compara-
tors) and not on the reactions that the comparison produces. This is not a call 
for each and every ethnographic comparison to dissect its comparator as we 
have, or to see auto-ethnographic reflexivity as providing a ready-made solution 
for the problem of comparison. It is rather a call for attending far more to the 
contingencies of both comparison and the operations of the comparator. The 
question of the ethics and politics of comparison, then, cannot be answered 
by judging what is compared (or not), but rather how comparators operate. It 
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has to be answered by assessing – whether by selecting the particular cases, by 
assembling, calibrating, and feeding the comparator in the way that we have (i.e. 
with care, with integrity and with a sufficient degree of skill). When assessing 
comparison as a social scientific method, we are thus not assessing a unitary 
thing, but rather a diverse and situated set of calibratory steps.
Note s
1 Phrase used in South Asia meaning ‘similar’. 
2 Research for this article has been generously funded by a European Research Council 
(ERC) starting grant (number 263731). 
3 The comparator chip performs two functions: 1) it measures currents coming into it from 
two different sources, and 2) on the basis of this comparison (and according to predefined 
thresholds) it switches either on or off. See: <http://www.brighthubengineering.com/
robotics/60941-the-lm3-voltage-comparator-chip/> [accessed 21 January 2014]
4 It goes without saying in social research that this input-output process should be seen 
as dynamic, and involving a plethora of feedback loops.
5 Photo by Joe Deville. No rights reserved. 
6 Our three cases have been selected because of points of continuity and discontinuity 
in their preparedness practices. For example, both India and Switzerland are, to varying 
degrees, dependent on civil protection mechanisms that are organised from the ‘top down’ 
and are also homogenous, with both having professional civil protection forces on call. 
The UK, by contrast, has no centralised, professional disaster response organisation, but 
is instead dependent on the coordination of diverse actors, ranging from the police, to 
the army, and to the fire service, whose precise deployment depends on the particular 
disaster at hand. Further, in the original proposal, the three cases were tied together by 
a shared disaster object: floods. This was chosen in part because of the fact that this is a 
disaster event relatively common to all three countries.
7 Luhman’s monumental filing cabinet is a more nuts and bolts example – he famously 
said that, with its help, books effectively ‘wrote themselves’ (Luhman 1981). 
8 We decided it was not necessary to insert the author of the excerpt.
9 This is in part because of its connection to the nationwide proliferation of nuclear 
shelters – as explored in the next section. This was accompanied by a dedicated civil 
protection force [Zivilschutz] which was composed mainly of men who were unable to 
serve in the conscript militia army (this situation has now changed – see the following 
footnote). In the 1980s in particular, this project became the object of political protest: 
although ostensibly a ‘defensive’ measure, protesters argued that it was ultimately a 
militaristic project that lent unwarranted legitimacy to the Swiss army (see Albrecht et 
al. 1988). After the end of the Cold War, many saw the maintenance of the shelter system, 
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the Swiss military, and a dedicated civil protection force as expensive and unnecessary.
10 The exact proportion of personnel working within the country’s civil protection system 
(this is an umbrella organisation that includes the army, emergency services, Zivilschutz, 
and other organisations) who either continue to be involved in the Swiss army, or who were 
formerly, is unknown. Experience from the field, however, indicates that the proportion is 
substantial: perhaps as much as 50%, perhaps higher (given compulsory military service 
is restricted to men, this also indicates how male-dominated the organisation is). 
11 Specific administrative regimes apply to foreign researchers, including a lengthy process 
of research visa application and registration.
12 Even here, reciprocal relationships played their part. This new contact was following 
a PhD programme led by the academic who put Zuzana in touch with him.
13 This was state-led despite the fact that the responsibility of leading this work was 
largely delegated to the cantons. Because of Switzerland’s federal structure, these are 
clearly appendages of the state. 
14 This is because of the close relationship between civil protection and the Swiss military. 
This is an organisation with only a very small number of full-time professional personnel. 
The remaining manpower is provided by a militia force that (in the event of a conflict) 
would be called into service. This militia reserve is initially recruited through a process 
by which young men (usually at the age of 18) are given the option of either entering into 
military service, or undertaking a form of voluntary service, or – and this is what concerns 
us here – entering the dedicated civil protection force (Zivilschutz).
15 At the end of 2010, the Federal Office for Civil Protection put the figure at 95% 
(Bundesamt für Zivilschutz 2010).
16 Some nuclear shelters were built; however, they were only done so for key government 
and military officials. See Deville et al. (2014).
17 The Indian case is more extreme than the UK, for in India there is a lack of even the 
pretence of protection for its population, should it be subject to a nuclear attack. These 
cases can be used to make a combined argument: just because there is a nuclear threat, 
it does not follow that a country needs to protect its population. Or, seen from another 
angle, it highlights the paranoiac quality of some aspects of Swiss civil protection. On 
a more general level, it leads to an important theoretical insight: risks do not explain 
preparedness, but preparedness has a logic in its own right that uses risks to legitimate 
its actions.
18 In the case of civil defence research, this can be seen in comparative literature, such as 
Lawrence J. Vale’s (1987) The Limits of Civil Defence in the USA, Switzerland, Britain and 
the Soviet Union: The Evolution of Policies Since 1945, which is both an object of research, 
and academic study for us. Vale – who also did a comparative study – is not simply a 
precursor of ours, but the book is an indicator that, within the field of civil defence, a 
comparative view was very much part of the practice of civil defence.
19 For example, a policy paper on civil defence in India compares civil defence structures 
in the UK, Singapore, and Australia (Singh 2006).
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PULLING ONESELF OUT OF 
THE TRAPS OF COMPARISON: 
AN AUTO-ETHNOGRAPHY OF 
A EUROPEAN PROJECT
Madeleine Akrich and Vololona Rabeharisoa
P rologue
a couple oF Months ago, Madeleine Was invited to an acadeMic 
workshop on patients’ organisations (POs) and health activists’ groups. Her 
talk was based on our three-year EU-funded research project called ‘European 
Patients’ Organisations in Knowledge Society’ (EPOKS). The project examined 
the variety of practices developed by POs to collect experiential knowledge and 
compare it with credentialed knowledge, and reflected on how these practices 
transform the governance of knowledge and the governance of health issues 
these POs deem relevant. In all, we looked at POs concerned with four specific 
conditions (rare diseases,1 Alzheimer’s disease, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD), and childbirth) in four countries (France, the UK, Ireland, 
and Portugal).
After Madeleine’s presentation, one participant raised three interrelated 
questions:
1) To what extent do conditions and/or national contexts determine POs’ 
behaviours and actions?
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2) How can one measure POs’ successes and/or failures to change policies?
3) Are there general lessons to draw from our comparative project?
Madeleine confessed to Vololona that these questions came as a surprise. Indeed, 
she did not present EPOKS as a comparative project and did not mention the 
term ‘comparison’ at any time during her talk. In response to the participant’s 
questions, she emphasised the complex and dynamic interplay between differ-
ent elements such as the characteristics of conditions which are at stake, and 
the nature of credentialed expertise on these conditions in various countries. 
She also added that these should not be considered as mere external factors 
determining POs’ activities, but rather elements which POs problematise 
throughout their activities. Moreover, she stressed the fact that what we were 
primarily interested in was diversity. This included the diversity of knowledge 
that POs engage with, the diversity of their knowledge-related activities, and 
the diversity of the effects of their practices on research and health policies.
Hmmm… It is likely that our colleague was not entirely satisfied with 
Madeleine’s responses. This prompted us to ask ourselves the following ques-
tions: if we did not compare POs across the condition areas and national con-
texts we selected, then what exactly did we do? Why is it that we feel so uneasy 
with this issue of comparison? And how can we tackle this issue, given that it 
relates to the expectation that EU-funded projects should be comparative? To 
address these questions, we decided to revert back to our research practices and 
to the tools we set up for coordinating our project, extending from the writing 
of the research proposal to the drafting of scientific articles we submitted for 
publication. Our hope is that this retrospective auto-ethnography, based on a 
chronological retrieval of how and what we did, will clarify our approach to 
comparison, not only for our colleagues but also for ourselves.
I n troduct ion
Why did we decide to apply to the EU call and to engage in such a multi-sited 
piece of research?2 Our motives stemmed from previous research done on POs, 
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as well as from the ongoing dialogue we have sustained with them for more than 
fifteen years. Firstly, Vololona and Michel Callon investigated why and how 
the French Association against Myopathies (AFM) got involved in biomedical 
research and came to consider research as a privileged route towards the social 
integration of people with neuromuscular diseases (Rabeharisoa and Callon 
1999). They undertook this research at a time when very few STS scholars 
paid attention to patients’ engagement in the production and dissemination 
of biomedical knowledge.3 Vololona and Michel were repeatedly confronted 
by colleagues who emphasised the exceptionality of the AFM, its wealth, and 
the fact that neuromuscular diseases mostly affect children and are thus likely 
to provoke empathy in the general population. However, they intuitively felt 
that this engagement in biomedical research was not the preserve of the AFM, 
and they thus began to investigate other POs concerned with rare diseases. At 
almost the same time, Madeleine and our colleague Cécile Méadel began to study 
patients’ and activists’ electronic discussion lists. In reviewing their exchanges, 
they were able to witness patients’ and activists’ preoccupations with knowledge 
and, most importantly, the variety of knowledge that circulates through these 
lists (Akrich and Méadel 2002; 2007).
Secondly, throughout our research, we soon realised that POs were not happy 
about being passively studied. They put questions to us, raised issues we did 
not initially identify, and manifested their willingness to play an active part in 
our research endeavour. This was not always a comfortable exercise for us, but 
we learnt to translate their concerns into interesting research questions. This 
proved so worthwhile that we organised participatory conferences with them 
on various occasions in order to develop a collective and reflexive work that is 
attentive to our respective standpoints on the dynamics of patients’ and health 
activism (Akrich, Méadel, and Rabeharisoa 2009).
Drawing on our previous research findings and observations, we made the 
decision to apply to the EU call with the following hypothesis: we wanted to 
put to trial the idea that different POs today build epistemic capacities and share 
political concerns about knowledge (both through the species of knowledge 
they engage with and the knowledge-related activities they undertake), with 
the view that the effects of these activities on POs and on their environments 
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are diverse. More specifically, we seized the opportunity presented by the EU 
call to extend our sites of observation in order to confirm or disconfirm that
1) it is not only large and wealthy POs that are interested in knowledge 
(small and poorly endowed POs are too);
2) POs are not exclusively engaged in biomedical research. For instance, 
it is worth noting that some are also engaged in knowledge about medical 
practices or social sciences in less spectacular ways.
To be honest, we were not fully aware of what this decision committed us to. 
Of course, we did know that we would soon be confronted with the issue of 
comparison. However, at no point did we think that our multi-sited approach 
would raise methodological and conceptual difficulties that largely exceed the 
challenge of cross-national coordination. Applying to the EU call sounded like 
a good compromise between our intellectual interests on the one hand, and 
imperatives to ‘internationalise’ research and fund our activities on the other. 
At the risk of appearing naive, we did not anticipate that it would highlight, or 
at least expose us to, the ‘national’ dimension of comparison. Nor did we realise 
that engaging in this kind of comparative work would convoke a whole range of 
research traditions and practices. Eventually, it seemed like ‘comparison’ had an 
agency of its own, popping up like a mischievous spirit throughout the project 
and forcing us to make multiple adjustments.4
This paper is about our multiple encounters with this mischievous spirit 
of comparison. Indeed, while we thought that the research methodology we 
put together enabled us to master the issue of comparison in ways that suited 
us, this issue often reappeared out of the blue at unexpected moments of 
the project, very much like an evil spirit in a fairy tale. Though troublesome, 
this mischievous spirit was not all destructive, as it continuously fuelled our 
reflection on what exactly the issue of comparison entailed, and forced us to 
take our reasoning to its conclusion. In what follows, this paper will attempt 
to put the reader in the situation we had to face, and to recreate the surprises, 
uncertainties, and destabilising events we were confronted with. This is why 
the following text is in narrative form, starting with the drafting of our research 
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proposal, and ending with the completion of academic articles drawing on the 
resulting research.
To  Compar e  or  not  to  Compar e ?  Th e  Wr i t ing 
o f  an  EU  R e s earch  P roposa l
EU project applicants are often confronted with one main injunction: to dem-
onstrate that their project will not simply result in the juxtaposition of a number 
of national case studies, but will bring in something more from their ordered 
confrontation. Indeed, an EU research project is expected to display similarities 
and differences between cases, and to determine explanatory factors for these 
according to the tradition of international comparisons (see for example Ragin 
1981; Hassenteufel 2005; or Stöckelova, this volume). In our proposal, we were 
hardly able to escape this discourse, stating that
[t]he provision of care and the organisation of health services greatly vary 
from one country to another, and sometimes result in divergent claims from 
nation-based organisations which are concerned with similar problems. 
Medical traditions are also diverse […] As a case in point, the prominence 
of psychoanalysis in French psychiatry does make a difference in the way 
mental illnesses have been thought about, and results in specific claims from 
French patient and family organisations. Another important factor pertains 
to how certain issues raised by patient, user, and civil society organisations 
are valued by society at large. Although cultural explanation should be handled 
cautiously, the absence of a Mad Pride movement in France, for instance, as com-
pared to what happens in the UK (Crossley 2006), is a telling example of some 
sort of cultural difference between those two countries. Finally, the maturity of 
civil society organisations, as well as their official recognition as stakeholders 
alongside institutions do matter. [Our emphasis]
In this excerpt, we clearly listed a series of variables usually related to the so-
called ‘national context’ as potential factors which may explain the differences 
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between POs, even though they are concerned with the same condition. One 
may notice, however, our own embarrassment with such an explanation when we 
mentioned the existence of a Mad Pride movement in the UK, and the absence 
of such a thing in France. Besides, out of the seventy-two-page proposal, this 
short paragraph is the only one where we detailed what the ‘national context’ 
is (supposed to be). We did not mention these elements elsewhere, and, most 
importantly, we did not consider them as factors to be searched in the meth-
odology part of our project. Why not?
Undoubtedly it is because we did not intend to compare POs and explain 
similarities and differences between their behaviours and actions. This is in 
light of three particular variables which the literature on POs points towards: 
their organisational features, the nature of the conditions they are concerned 
with, and the national contexts within which they evolve (Huyard 2009; 
Löfgren, de Leeuw, and Leahy 2011). Indeed, prior to our EPOKS project, 
we coordinated an EU-funded specific action called ‘Governance, Health 
and Medicine: Opening Dialogue between Social Scientists and Users’ 
(MEDUSE), which consisted of a participatory workshop on POs’ engage-
ment with knowledge (Akrich et al. 2008). The dialogue with POs led us 
to two main statements:
1) POs, as organised entities, are irreducible to one another – each encoun-
ters its own problems and develops its own form of action to solve its 
problems.
2) Despite massive differences between POs in terms of their size, wealth, 
or proximity to biomedicine, they engage with strikingly similar, yet varied 
practices in regards to knowledge production and dissemination.
We were also struck by the discrepancy we observed between POs’ practices and 
prevailing understandings of their role. The effect of this is that POs’ involve-
ment in knowledge-related activities is often ignored: a clear-cut separation 
between experts and laypeople continues to be maintained. This prompted us 
to publish a non-academic book based on testimonies gathered from a variety 
of organisations (Akrich, Méadel, and Rabeharisoa 2009). The book targeted 
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biomedical practitioners and public health authorities, as well as POs themselves, 
highlighting the POs’ multifaceted engagement with knowledge.
The EPOKS project took on the same conviction and aimed to explore the 
ways POs’ knowledge-related activities emerge out of, and impact on, a complex 
and dynamic interplay between different elements. Some of these elements related 
to patients’ conditions, others to the nature of credentialed expertise on these 
conditions, while some related to the missions POs endow themselves with 
(but whose list we, as social scientists, did not know in advance). The reason 
is that these are a result of POs’ own analysis of which elements are relevant in 
their situations. As we explained in our proposal,
the ways patients’, users’ and civil society organisations and movements 
intervene in the production of knowledge are not only diverse, but depend 
on national contexts, the causes that these organisations and movements 
stand for, as well as the web of expertise and issues in which they participate. 
EPOKS aims at deepening the understanding of this contextualised character 
of lay organisations’ involvement in the co-production of knowledge, and 
its impact on health policy-making.
The way lay organisations are involved with the production and circula-
tion of knowledge depends on the causes they intend to defend. These causes 
depend on the characteristics of their particular conditions, and on the course 
of collective actions that various actors develop and that they decide either 
to join, or react to. [Our emphasis]
Let us expand a bit on the term ‘depends on’ in these excerpts from our 
proposal, as it actually denotes two different meanings. The first points to 
the singularity of every phenomenon, as it is captured by popular expres-
sions such as ‘It all depends’. It puts to the fore the fact that neither the 
actors nor we as social scientists can escape relativism. The second meaning 
is that every phenomenon is made of cascades of relations between hetero-
geneous elements, including those usually seen as exogenous factors, such as 
the provision of care in one given country. However, these relations do not 
predetermine the subsequent story, but rather result from the involvement 
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and action of various actors. As social scientists, we should pay attention to 
the ways these relations are actively unfolded in the situations under study. 
This second meaning of ‘depends on’ points to ‘relat-ionism’, rather than to 
‘relat-ivism’, the idea that ‘anything goes’. The reasoning is that actors always 
situate themselves and act from somewhere, and so do we as social scientists 
(Haraway 1988). Therefore, this dual meaning of ‘depends on’ is exactly what 
the paradoxical expression ‘comparative relativism’ (Common Knowledge 
2011) puts into discussion.
That being said, as we will see in a moment, we continued to talk about 
comparison, national context, and even typology throughout our proposal. 
There were obviously strategic reasons for this: after all, we applied for EU 
funding! The question then is how to work out the tension between this cum-
bersome injunction to proceed to international comparison, and our conviction 
that there is no such thing as a national context ‘out there’ which externally 
determines POs’ behaviours and actions. Ultimately, it was through the design 
of our work plan that we tried to dissolve this tension. As will be shown, our 
work plan helped shift the focus of our analysis from comparison to multi-sited 
ethnography (Marcus 1995).
F rom  Compar i son  to  Mult i - s i t ed  E thnography
Our project not only targeted POs in different countries, it also selected POs 
concerned with different conditions. Our objective was to observe a variety of 
sites and to highlight the fact that diversity does not contradict the existence 
of a phenomenon which crosses over these diverse sites, namely the crucial 
role that knowledge comes to play in POs’ activities. Our approach stood on 
the opposite side of a comparative study of cases which share a number of 
controlled variables (i.e. POs’ organisational characteristics, conditions they 
are concerned with) in order to evaluate the role of exogenous factors (i.e. 
factors other than the controlled variables – for instance, national contexts). 
This is because we did not hypothesise that the horizons of national POs are 
strictly delimited by national borders. In fact, it was quite the contrary, as from 
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the outset we planned to analyse the complex networks of which POs partake, 
especially their transnational dimension. One objective of the project was 
indeed to reflect on ‘Europeanisation from below’ (i.e. the involvement of POs 
in networks of exchange and cooperation with European sister organisations), 
as well as ‘Europeanisation from above’ (i.e. the influence exerted by European 
umbrella organisations on national POs).
The final list of conditions that we decided to investigate was the result of 
discussions with colleagues we wanted to associate with in the research con-
sortium, and all of these conditions intuitively seemed to be different enough 
to nurture the project. As mentioned previously, the list consisted of rare dis-
eases, Alzheimer’s disease, ADHD, and childbirth. We were of course aware 
that reviewers might ask: ‘How did you choose these conditions?’, and that 
‘intuition’ was not an appropriate answer to the question. To borrow from 
Becker’s motto: ‘What is this the case of?’ as recalled in Ragin (1992), we thus 
undertook rationalisation work in order to convince them, as well as ourselves, 
by addressing the question: ‘What were the conditions the cases of ?’ The typol-
ogy we produced contrasted with the POs’ forms of engagement in knowledge 
according to two dimensions:
1) Their proximity/distance to biomedical knowledge and practices;
2) The degree of stabilisation of the network of expertise and issues related 
to their conditions.
We pictured and explained this typology as follows:
+ –
+ cell #1 rare diseases
cell #3
alZheiMer’s disease
– cell #2 childBirth
cell #4  
adhd
Table 5.1 Degree of stabilisation of issues vs. POs’ alignment to the biomedical world
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Preliminary research and discussion among the partners of the present project 
suggest that each of these four organisations or movements may stand as an 
exemplum for each of the four cells charted above. Besides, for each of these 
four organisations, there are similarities as well as important differences from 
one country to another. National contexts do matter for understanding the 
dynamics of these organisations or movements, as well as their framing of 
expertise and issues. This is why we put cross-national comparison at the core 
of the present project.
One can easily sense how ambiguous such a typology is. Our primary inten-
tion was simply to plead for the importance of examining a variety of sites. 
However, the graphical chart we adopted, and the distribution of POs between 
the four cells of the chart, unavoidably suggest a classification. Though we were 
cautious enough in saying that this is a ‘proto-typology’ (our word), which 
may well be modified in light of our observations, typology cannot but suggest 
a kind of metrics for contrasting different situations. Interestingly, as soon as 
we began our fieldwork, we abandoned this proto-typology (see Section 2). 
Retrospectively, we assume that this had to do with our work plan, which left 
no room for such a typology to be actioned.
We designed our work plan as follows. First, we defined four work packages, 
each devoted to one of the four conditions we chose. Each package consisted 
of case studies of POs which were active on the same condition in different 
countries. The cross-national analysis so dear to the heart of EU officials was 
therefore embedded into the design of the four work packages (WPs). The 
four WPs obeyed the same pattern that comprised a detailed description 
of the data collection, including an analysis of the relationships POs might 
have with one another and with transnational coalitions. This delineated the 
process for collectively discussing POs within the same WP, and POs from 
different WPs:
It should be noted that, through their common involvement in common 
work packages, the partners will be constantly linked to each other all over 




As one may expect, comparison was at the core of our work plan; however, it 
took up quite a different flavour here. First because we planned to establish a 
common interpretive framework for our observations, and second because all 
partner teams of the project were involved in different work packages and were 
invited to discuss collectively all case studies. Rather than contrast the different 
sites we studied, we decided to go through all of them and mobilise observations 
made on one site, as lenses through which to discuss what occurred in other sites. 
This is similar to what Henriette Langstrup and Brit Ross Winthereik (2008) 
did in their paper on the making of self-monitoring asthma patients in clinical 
trials and in general practices.
To recap, the writing of an EU research proposal comes with a very specific 
comparative injunction. That is, its aim is to find out similarities and differences 
between national case studies, and to explain how national contexts determine 
these similarities and differences. Unless one plans to proceed with such a 
comparative study, the writing of an EU research proposal rapidly turns into an 
equilibrium exercise. This is exactly what we experienced, as it involved constant 
navigation between the predicaments of comparison and alternative ways of 
looking at different sites. Retrospectively, it is clear, however, that we were not 
pursuing an international comparison which sought to explain differences and 
similarities through national contexts. Rather, we achieved this outcome by way 
of a transnational comparison (Hassenteufel 2005), which crossed various cases 
in order to bring more contrast and sharpness in the description of each, given 
that these cases are not supposed to belong to isolated planets.
P roduc ing  and  T e s t ing  Comparator s
However detailed it may be, a proposal is not sufficient to determine the actual 
conduct of a project. To study our different sites and to circulate amongst them, 
we had to refine constantly and transform our methodology. As Jörg Niewöhner 
and Philipp Scheffer (2008: 275) put it, the challenge was to ‘exceed both the 
single case study and the contrasting of any number of multiple cases’. It was 
then crucial to find a way to create a ‘rapport’ (Stengers 2011) between chosen 
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POs and to look actively across them from a certain perspective. To borrow 
from Strathern (2011), we had to endorse a ‘perspectivist’ approach, which had 
a major practical consequence.5 More specifically, in the habitual meaning of 
‘ethnography’, we did not proceed towards multiple ethnographies in different 
sites. Rather, we set up a series of tools and procedures for cutting across the 
different sites we selected with one perspective: to observe POs’ knowledge-
related activities in light of the others’. To achieve this, we first went in depth 
into a common grid for data-gathering, and then we defined a protocol for 
discussing our observations in ways that each PO we studied (and/or partner 
team who studied it) served as a comparator to the others (Deville, Guggenheim, 
and Hrdličková 2013). Following Deville et al. (2013), we define a ‘compara-
tor’ as the entity that does the work of comparison. In other words, the term 
‘comparator’ designates one researcher, equipped with her/his embodied 
research experience, conceptual approach, and observations from fieldwork, 
and who puts her/his data and analysis to the trial of her/his project partners’. 
The comparator, therefore, is not a standard analyser out there; it emerges out 
of the comparative work it performs. In the following sections, we display the 
procedures we set up for turning not only each individual researcher, but also 
the project consortium itself, into a comparator.
The  Mak ing  o f  a  Common Gaze
How should we look at different sites to eventually produce a common interpre-
tive framework? This was the purpose of the first meeting of the consortium 
(also called the ‘kick-off meeting’ in EU jargon), in February 2009. Though 
several partner teams had either an STS background or were sensitive to STS 
approaches, some also came from other disciplines, namely feminist studies, 
communication studies, and geography. Over the course of the meeting, however, 
we pragmatically put aside potential theoretical divergences. Our concern at 
this point was to define a shared protocol for data-gathering in ways that would 
permit us to look at the ‘same sorts of things’. As coordinators of the project, 
we suggested a common grid for fieldwork which comprised three parts: 1) 
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historical backgrounds of POs; 2) knowledge-related activities of POs; and 3) 
specific examples. Each of these were divided into a description of the objec-
tives and a description of the methods. As an illustration, we reproduce the 
second part below:
• Knowledge-related activities of POs
• Describe the PO/Civil Society Organisation (CSO) knowledge-related 
activities
• The PO/CSO’s role as co-producer of knowledge with specialists, as well 
as connector or translator between different worlds of expertise
• Its propensity to embrace or to challenge biomedical knowledge
• Content of information it produces (lay expertise versus experience-based 
expertise) and nature and scope of its targeted audiences
• Tools it mobilises for staging, shaping, circulating, and legitimating its 
expertise
• Participation in research projects and programs at national and European 
levels
Methods
• Collecting data through the PO/CSO website, publications (newsletter, 
brochures, leaflets, position paper if any), literature survey
• Identifying and interviewing key informants who are involved in knowl-
edge-related activities6
This grid was clearly aimed at creating a common gaze on the POs we intended 
to study. It not only suggested how the fieldwork should be carried out, but also 
how to make it in ways that would later facilitate the crossing of our observations. 
This grid can therefore be a vehicle for circulating from one site to the next.
As science studies pointed out long ago, the manufacture of knowledge not 
only implies formal and explicit conventions, but also a shared culture resulting 
from repeated interactions between participants (Collins 1974; Knorr-Cetina 
1981). We were soon reminded that social sciences do not make exceptions to 
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the rule, especially when some partners raised questions about what exactly 
we meant by ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowledge-related activities’. Despite our initial 
attempt to ‘contain’ potential conceptual divergences on what should count 
as ‘knowledge’, as coordinators of the project we had to post a long note to all 
partner teams after the meeting in order to clarify the articulation between lay 
knowledge and formal knowledge:
Methodological Note:  
How to Make Choices for Fieldwork
As promised, here is a note, which is supposed to clarify the way we should 
make choices regarding fieldwork.
In the oral presentation, we may not have put enough emphasis on a 
central point of the project: the articulation between lay knowledge and 
academic expertise  (i.e. medical expertise, but also economic expertise, 
health technology assessment, and so on). To tell it very roughly, we are 
interested in situations where:
• Patients’ organisations try to push ‘lay knowledge’ in places where 
they are not normally considered relevant (i.e. in the determination 
of therapeutic strategies, in the elaboration of research programs or 
health policies, and so on).
•  Patients’ organisations participate in the production of ‘expert knowl-
edge’ in order to achieve a number of goals and to strengthen certain 
claims.
• We are therefore seeking cases where there is an effort to build con-
nections between different forms of knowledge, different worlds, and 
where some ‘political issue’, whether at individual or collective level, 
is at stake. (Unpublished note, 10 March 2009: 1)
We also had to restate our approach to the fieldwork after some partners’ con-
cerns with the use of ethnography. In the childbirth case for instance, we were 
really surprised at how similar knowledge-related activities exist within the five 
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groups we studied, despite huge differences in their organisational features and 
initial motives for mobilising. That being said, the team which explored NCT 
UK recalled that the five groups are in fact very different. NCT UK, for instance, 
organises birth training sessions (which the other groups not do), and our col-
leagues who studied NCT UK suggested that it might be interesting at some 
point to do ethnography on the five groups. As coordinators of the project, we 
had to reassert that we did not intend to do ethnography on the POs, but rather 
to make observations that might help us to look at each of their knowledge prac-
tices in light of the others’. In the note mentioned above, we recommended that:
The word ‘ethnography’, which is used once in the project and has been used a few 
times in our meeting, should be taken in a very modest sense. ‘Observations’ should 
better describe what we mean: if any of us has for example, the opportunity to 
assist general assemblies, board of directors meetings, scientific committee 
meetings, official commissions meetings (organised by administrations or 
health organisations), it might be interesting to do it; to grasp the nature of 
arguments which are used by participants and evaluate the role of specific 
knowledge. But our approach is somehow heterogeneous and mainly pragmatic: 
we need to identify right places, relevant documentation, key informants in 
order to tell stories that will allow us to describe and analyse what is at stake 
around knowledge-related activities in each organisation, and in relation to 
their strategies towards various actors.7 [Our emphasis]
Retrospectively, despite the diversity of our backgrounds, we can fairly say 
that this recommendation played a crucial role in creating and maintaining a 
cohesive approach to our project. These notes certainly reinforced the creation 
of a common gaze on the sites we chose to explore. However, they achieved 
more than that: they settled down the premises of a common analytical frame 
by stating, for instance, that ‘the very nature of (POs’) self-help activities is not 
the focus of our research project’.
Most importantly, two elements from our research proposal, the proto-
typology and the notion of national context, literally disappeared at this point. 
The vanishing of the proto-typology provides a clear indication of our approach 
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to comparison. That is, we did not regard comparison as a classificatory method. 
Instead, we conceived comparison as a set of practices and tools for cutting 
across different sites with the same series of questions: what knowledge-related 
activities do POs undertake, for what purposes, and with what effects? Our 
ultimate aim was to test our hypothesis that knowledge indeed constitutes a 
strategic element of POs’ activism, however diverse they are. As for the notion 
of context, we can reasonably say that we did not consider it to be an analyti-
cal concept for explaining why and how knowledge does or does not matter. 
Rather, we proposed to our partners that they should embrace the perspective 
of POs and identify how they actively partake in the definition of the context in 
which they themselves intervene. However, these exclusions remained implicit, 
leaving room for some tensions between theoretical backgrounds and research 
practices to accumulate until they popped up in the form of questions raised by 
our partners. Ultimately, the practice of comparison seems to have an agency of 
its own, fuelled by many micro-differences not only in the objects compared, but 
also in the comparators themselves, thus following a more sinuous path than the 
one we tried to predetermine through our recommendations to our partners.
Work ing  out  S ingular i t i e s  and  Commonal i t i e s
Fixing the modus operandi for fieldwork was not enough, of course, for we also had 
to reflect on the way we would concretely combine the outputs of the fieldwork. 
Communication, exchanges, and modes of discussion were extensively reworked 
all along the project, the organisation of each meeting being the occasion to 
reflect again and again on the kind of comparative work we wanted to undertake.
After the kick-off meeting and up to the July 2010 meeting, partner teams 
involved in each work package visited each other and/or exchanged emails to 
discuss the observations they made. They thus began to look at each PO focus-
ing on one given condition (in light of POs concerned with the same condition 
in other countries).
The July 2010 meeting was conceived in order to extend this comparative 
exercise to all POs and all partner teams along the following procedures. Based 
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on preliminary data reports circulated amongst partners, the first day of the 
meeting was devoted to presentations organised by work packages:
1) Firstly, according to the common grid we circulated, each team working 
on one given PO reported on the data it collected and gave a few sugges-
tions on how to characterise the PO’s form of engagement with knowledge.
2) Secondly, those of us not involved in the work package (i.e. not concerned 
with the corresponding condition), were asked to display the similarities 
and differences s/he identified between the POs concerned with the same 
condition, and to bring in her/his views on these POs in light of what s/he 
observed in the case s/he studied.
3) Thirdly, a discussion took place where all partner teams commented on 
the analysis that emerged out of these presentations.
The second day of the meeting targeted the discussion of concepts, some 
of which drew on the literature, while others elaborated on the fieldwork to 
capture and make sense of the similarities and differences between the POs 
we studied.
Throughout this protocol, a dual process that put comparison at the heart 
of the research process was at stake: the objective was to ingrain the pro-
ject as a ‘whole’ in the description of each case, as well to make the ‘whole’ 
emerge out of the diversity of cases. The expectation was that these repeated 
confrontations would produce a collective sensitivity to the specificities of 
each case, and that they would increase the relevance of our analysis on the 
common issue of the project (i.e. POs’ modes of engagement with knowledge 
and their meaning).
However, as already stated, comparison came into play with its own agency, 
sometimes de-structuring what we thought had been stabilised for a while. 
For example, take the two groups of parents of children with ADHD in France 
and Ireland. In our presentation of the French group, we insisted on the fact 
that parents are assembling various species of knowledge in order to provide 
a multidisciplinary approach to the disorder and its treatment. Moreover, 
we mentioned the group of parents’ contribution to the notion of cognitive 
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disability, a category which is to be seen in the 2005 French Disability Act, 
but which does not exist in other countries. Our Irish partners also presented 
the variety of knowledge that the Irish National Council for ADHD Support 
Groups (INCADDS) and its member groups engage with. Although INCADDS 
embraces a biomedical definition for stating the fact of the disorder, it also pays 
attention to family therapies, as well as cognitive sciences and the promises 
of neurofeedback theory. It is most likely because of our focus on ‘cognitive 
disability’ as a French category that our colleague commented on the two 
presentations and was caught up with the question of the differences between 
the two groups. Almost automatically, the general discussion brought back the 
issue of ‘national context’ we thought we had neatly boxed as a manifestation 
of the ‘differential agency of comparison’. This led us to ask: ‘are there elements 
of these national contexts which may explain the differences between the two 
groups, and if yes, how do we account for these elements in our analysis’? It 
forced us to reopen the debate and to re-elaborate collective answers, which in 
this case translated into the idea that rather than talking of context, we should 
examine how each PO construes the disease.
Through the devices we progressively put in place over the project, we 
should say that instead of ‘doing comparison’ (i.e. comparing POs according 
a predetermined metrics that would be external to them), we were ‘making 
comparison’ (i.e. manufacturing comparators allowing to grasp from within 
POs’ singularities and commonalities) (Deville et al. this volume).
F rom  Ca s e s  to  Conce pt s ,  and  Back
The closing session of the July 2010 meeting was devoted to discussing a series 
of concepts to make sense of the observations we made, and to delineate the 
significant features of the knowledge-related activities which patients’ organisa-
tions undertook, and which we planned to dig through over the coming months. 
As with any research project, our ultimate goal was indeed to publish, which 
implied that we had to disseminate our fieldwork to the space of academic pro-
duction. This entailed another comparative endeavour, consisting of a twofold 
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task: firstly, putting our case studies to the trial of relevant bodies of literature; 
and secondly, forging our own analytical tools to signpost how our approach 
might renew the understanding of patients’ activism.
The Academic Arena: Another Space of Comparison
Prior to the meeting, we circulated a list of concepts drawn from the literature. 
Some notions were coined by fellow researchers who investigated the upsurge 
of knowledge in the preoccupations of patients’ organisations. This, for instance, 
was the case for Steven Epstein’s ‘therapeutic activism’ (1995). Though very 
inspiring, this notion was too restrictive in regard to the variety of cases we 
examined, for it mainly targeted patients’ organisations which engaged in bio-
medical research and aimed at fostering the development of new therapeutics. 
Other concepts were proposed by scholars to capture the transformative effects 
of certain health movements. Maren Klawiter’s ‘disease regimes’ (2004) stood 
as an example, and raised much discussion amongst us. Some felt quite uneasy 
with this notion, due to the possibility that it might overshadow the multiple 
uncertainties in which certain conditions we explored were mired. Still, other 
concepts pointing to broad understandings of social changes were also on 
the list. This, for instance, was the case for the concept of medicalisation/de-
medicalisation. We were pretty much cautious, however, about applying such 
an overarching concept to our fieldwork, for it might fail to account for the 
singular dynamic of each organisation we studied. Finally, we reflected on Sheila 
Jasanoff ’s ‘civic epistemology’, which she defined as ‘the institutional practices 
by which members of a given society test knowledge claims used as a basis for 
making collective choices’ (2005: 255). Jasanoff coined this notion to explain 
the differences between the politics and policy of life sciences in the USA, the 
UK, and Germany. Though intended to serve a comparative purpose, this notion 
did not match the methodology we put together. Indeed, we did not look at 
the commonalities of patients’ organisations in one given country with an aim 
to compare these with the commonalities of patients’ organisations in another 
given country. Our project was at odds with such an approach: it rather insisted 
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on the existence of numerous links between patients’ organisations of different 
countries, via European umbrella organisations, for instance, and questioned 
the circulation of models of activism between them.
To be sure, confronting our observations and epistemic orientations with 
those of other researchers is a classic academic game of sorts: colleagues expect 
you to consider previous studies on the same kind of empirical objects, and to 
discuss your analytical perspective in relation to existing ones. In retrospect, our 
playing of the game denotes two things. Firstly, we did it as yet another compara-
tive trial extended to bodies of researchers/case studies we felt we were part 
and parcel of. Secondly, we did it to assert our collective agency by equipping 
ourselves with a shared reading of the literature. To strengthen this collective 
agency, we went a step further in elaborating a common interpretative framework 
grounded in our mutual understanding of the cases we studied and discussed.
Elaborating a Common Interpretat ive Framework
Our critical reading of existing concepts was motivated by our willingness 
to contribute something original to the understanding of patients’ activism. 
To achieve this, each of us was invited to propose descriptors which best 
translated what s/he observed and to question the others’ case studies in 
light of these descriptors. However, this collective production and discussion 
of descriptors did not occur in a conceptual void. As mentioned above, we 
balanced the merits and limits of existing notions in light of our fieldwork, 
paying extreme attention to how and what extent these notions captured the 
singularity of the situations we explored. For instance, in order to highlight 
patient organisations’ dual problematisation of what their conditions are, this 
prompted some of us to suggest moving from Klawiter’s concept of ‘disease 
regime’ to the notion of ‘cause regime,’ and what these conditions are the 
cause of (i.e. what sort of issues they bring in). Eventually, we dropped the 
very notion of ‘regime’, for it was too constraining in regard to the multifarious 
trajectories of patients’ organisations we studied. Instead of applying concepts 
from the outside, we were scrutinising if, and how, these concepts helped us 
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to say something relevant about the specific issues which patients’ organisa-
tions gave shape to, and to which they brought about concrete solutions. As 
a way of illustration, one of us concluded our discussion on medicalisation/
de-medicalisation as follows:
I feel like medicalisation/de-medicalisation is a highly situated issue […] 
We should consider it (medicalisation/de-medicalisation) as one PO’s 
concerns (amongst many others), rather than an analytical framework for 
us (EPOKS concepts 2009).
What then did our analytical framework look like? It articulated a series of 
descriptors of our own which enabled us to simultaneously dig around the 
similarities between the cases we studied, and to sharpen our attention to 
the specificities of each case. For instance, we clustered a series of descriptors 
under a common heading: ‘Cause – Singularisation/Generalisation – Politics 
of numbers – Recombinant science’. This allowed us to underlie a common 
feature of the POs we observed, such as the dynamic and joint transformation 
of their motives to mobilise and the networks of alliances of which they partake. 
Moreover, as illustrated by the following note, it also allowed us to highlight 
how each PO engages in this process:
Rare diseases patients’ organisations explicitly engage in ‘politics of numbers’ 
that they voice as follows: ‘Diseases are rare but rare diseases patients are 
numerous’ […] Recombining scientific knowledge constitutes another way 
to expand ‘causes’ […] By mobilising, combining and confronting various 
multidisciplinary bodies of scientific knowledge, some rare diseases POs, 
although concerned with very different diseases, come to identify poten-
tial transversal issues […] The French ADHD organisation recombines 
heterogeneous pieces of expertise and comes to ally with other collectives 
on this basis.
Now equipped with a common list of descriptors, each partner completed her/
his study of POs’ knowledge-related activities and reported to the team seven 
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months later, in February 2011. As coordinators, we hesitated quite a lot between 
two modes of organising this subsequent meeting, and asked ourselves ‘should 
we privilege conditions as entry points for presenting and debating our mate-
rial, or the descriptors we put together’? We finally opted for the first option, 
fearing that the second one
… might constitute a too quick jump into a conceptual grid without 
paying enough attention to the specificities of each case, and lead to super-
ficial exchanges [Our emphasis] (Email to the project team members, 16 
December 2010).
We also envisioned parallel sessions, each on one given condition, but this did 
not prove feasible for each of us who were involved in different conditions. 
Furthermore, we explained to our colleagues that
[w]e need to consider that each condition is only an entry point into the 
discussion, but that depending on the issues raised, it should involve material 
and analysis from other work packages (Akrich, email to the project team 
members, 16 December 2010).
We stated over and over again our priority was to make sense of each case in 
its singularity, while immersing it into a common atmosphere created by our 
shared methodology and common descriptive language. Everyone played the 
game of comparing a few descriptors with specific knowledge-related activities 
that s/he studied. The descriptors which were the easiest to express through 
empirical data were the most successful, and allowed the integration of different 
case studies with a common interpretative framework. This was notably the case 
for our notion of ‘evidence-based activism’, which captured striking similarities 
in our observations (i.e. the fact that knowledge is not a mere resource but an 
object of enquiry for patients’ organisations, and that this affects their role in 
the governance of health issues in a variety of ways).
To recap, the process we went through was one of ‘constant comparison’ 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967) which took the form of a loop. The procedure started 
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by travelling to each case individually, eventually returning to the original one 
with new lenses for augmenting its contrasts. The discussion about existing con-
cepts and the production of original descriptors was embedded into this process, 
so much so that the group came up as an integrated comparator interlocking 
individuals, case studies, and notions. This has a crucial effect on the intellec-
tual space we progressively designed: it is a space within which the analysis of 
each case is deepened through the circulation from one site to the next, thus 
suggesting a mode of generalisation which does not consist of extracting a few 
dimensions out of the singularity of each case, but rather thickens its singularity 
in light of the others. We will return to this point in our concluding remarks.
The  Mult i p l e  T ra p s  o f  Wr i t ing  ‘ Comparat i v e ’ 
Pa p e r s
After the February 2011 meeting, we decided to prepare a special issue of an 
academic journal on our notion of ‘evidence-based activism’, which appeared 
to encapsulate our findings the best. The issue was structured as follows:
1) An editorial recapitulating what we meant by ‘evidence-based activism’, 
and situating our notion vis-à-vis other concepts.
2) Four papers (one per condition) putting this notion to work and dem-
onstrating how it renewed understanding of patients’ and health activism 
in these condition areas.
Doing and making fieldwork, brainstorming our cases, and playing around 
with concepts is one thing. However, writing academic articles is quite another 
matter. So far, we have deployed ourselves within spaces whose contours we 
carefully demarcated, and staged a methodology which permitted us to debate 
research questions in ways which suited us. When it came to writing papers, our 
previous efforts for putting things under control were dramatically challenged. 
Writing an academic article is of course highly constraining, if only because the 
authors are required to order empirical material, concepts, and arguments in a 
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standardised 10,000-word-piece! In addition, however, we encountered a series 
of difficulties: some we anticipated, others we did not. In particular, the issue of 
‘how to compare’, which we thought we sealed in our methodological and con-
ceptual box, resurfaced like an evil spirit at different moments of the writing and 
revising process. How we faced this process is the purpose of this last section.
S tructur ing  a  Comparat i v e  Art i c l e  and  Fac ing 
th e  E v i l  S p i r i t  o f  Compar i son
As Hassenteufel (2005) rightly points out, writing a comparative article is a risky 
business. Either the author structures the article around a common interpreta-
tive framework and takes the risk of displaying the cases under comparison as 
mere illustrations of the concepts s/he puts forward, or the author details the 
cases s/he studies and concludes with a general discussion, an option which 
may undermine the comparative nature of the paper. We knew that we had to 
find our way through these two alternatives. What we were not fully aware of, 
however, was that the solution to this dilemma was very much dependent upon 
the number of cases we examined in each condition area, as manifested in the 
first version of our ‘childbirth’ paper (for which we investigated five activists’ 
groups in four countries).
In the introduction of our ‘childbirth’ paper, we reviewed the existing literature 
on childbirth activism in order to situate our approach (i.e. the fact that we con-
centrated on practices rather than on ideological discourses on de-medicalisation 
of childbirth, and that we especially investigated knowledge-related activities with 
an aim to reconsider childbirth activists’ groups’ positions vis-à-vis medicine). 
We then had four sections, each focusing on the national groups we studied, 
and on specific sets of knowledge-related activities that these groups developed:
1) Making normal birth an operative category: statistical evidence about 
practices as a coordination device in the UK.




3) From scientific evidence to matters of concern: CIANE’s participation 
in producing French guidelines.
4) International authoritative evidence as a source and a resource for the 
Portuguese childbirth movement.
Through this choice, we tried to hold together the internal coherence of each 
case and an analytical argument for the whole paper. The reviewers’ comments 
made us realise that pooling together a juxtaposition of case studies and a 
substantial demonstration proved to hold nothing! They were sensitive to our 
prevarications, and although they recommended that our paper was worth being 
revised, they also raised a number of criticisms. The first reviewer, for instance, 
could not perceive that each empirical case was intended to make a specific 
point, and said that (s)he did not know ‘how to work through the mountains 
of evidence presented to (him/her)’ (excerpt from the letter sent by the journal 
editor to the authors).
In addition to the structure of our articles, we were confronted with a seri-
ous burden related to being adamant that singularities matter. As the reviewer 
above confessed, s/he was lost in ‘the mountains of evidence’ we provided. How 
to make sense of ‘mountains of evidence’ without sampling, sorting out, and 
arranging them into categories? This question takes up a salient feature when 
writing comparative papers, for readers somehow expect to find out explanatory 
evidence of the differences and similarities between cases. This was where the 
issue of ‘how to compare’ reappeared like an evil spirit, not only in exchanges 
between us as co-authors, but also in some reviewers’ comments. Moreover, 
and this we did not fully foresee, it did so differently in each of the papers. Let 
us narrate how the evil spirit of comparison caught us, and how we pulled our-
selves out of its traps in the three papers we co-authored.
The  T ra p  o f  Ty pology
Because of the number of cases we studied – five groups in four countries – 
the ‘childbirth’ paper challenged us with the trap of typology. With five 
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cases, one can hardly avoid typology readings, if only to ease the cognitive 
appropriation of the cases. In order to prevent such readings, we inserted 
quite a long discussion at the end of the first version, where the objective 
was to make sense of the differences between the cases (which any reader, 
even the most distracted one, could not miss), but without reifying explana-
tory factors of these differences. This puzzled the reviewers: the first found 
our paper too descriptive, whereas the second and the third read our piece 
as a preliminary step towards the elaboration of a typology that calls for 
further structural explanations, and they asked for more information on 
the organisations and countries. In effect, what we experienced was how 
difficult it is to report on multi-sited observations without inducing readings 
that escape the authors’ control. This is because multi-sited observations 
inevitably suggest readings either in terms of typology, or in terms of ‘global 
system-local situations’.
The solution we thus adopted was to revert to a more classic form of expo-
sition: an articulation of the major claims in the introduction, an explicit and 
sustained argument in each part, the disentanglement of these arguments from 
specific case studies, and a clarification on the comparison issue. As we explained 
in our reply to the reviewers’ comments,
[t]he paper does not set out to undertake a comparison of the organisations 
or countries with a view to identifying variables that would explain their 
differences. It is now clearly signposted in the introduction that we focus 
instead on the capacity of the organisations to transform and redefine their 
environments by eliciting the emergence of new actors and new facts (Letter 
to the journal editor, 20 February 2013).
The  T ra p  o f  th e  ‘Mode l ’
With the ‘rare diseases’ paper which involved France and Portugal, we were 
caught in quite a different trap: that of the ‘cas d’école’ model, ‘golden event’ 
(Lévi-Strauss 1958). This stemmed from the fact that our previous research 
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on the AFM led us to conclude that this organisation may be considered as 
a ‘cas d’école’ of partnership between patients and biomedical communities. 
Subsequent quantitative surveys and ethnographic fieldwork provided evidence 
on this ‘cas d’école’ being turned into a model that a large proportion of French 
rare diseases patients’ organisations, as well as the European Organisation on 
Rare Diseases (EURORDIS), endorsed. Because EURORDIS was very active 
in structuring umbrella organisations in Portugal, we confidently presumed 
that the French model of activism was disseminated in this country. Quite 
surprisingly, our quantitative and qualitative data disconfirmed our hypoth-
esis: not only were Portuguese rare diseases patients’ organisations not as 
proactively engaged in biomedical research as their French sister organisations, 
but some were very critical of the notion of rareness, arguing that it did not 
do justice to patients’ and families’ real life problems, such as disability and 
social exclusion.
These findings considerably complicated the drafting of the first version 
of our paper. On the one hand we were, and still are, convinced that there 
is something peculiar to rareness. On the other hand, it was pretty clear that 
the ‘model of rareness activism’ which we initially had in mind took a seri-
ous hit! The initial version of our paper tried to play around this tension. 
This did not escape one of the reviewers, who criticised our methodological 
inconsistencies:
[The authors’] strategy of highlighting examples that contradict expectations 
is not the same as hypothesis testing.
Our mistake! After much discussion between the co-authors, we eventually 
decided to no longer posit the form of activism developed by French rare diseases 
patients’ organisations as a model against which we measure their Portuguese 
counterparts. Instead, we focused our article on how the very notion of rareness 
was problematised and transformed in the local sites it crossed. We also consid-
ered Portuguese organisations’ behaviours and actions as lenses through which 
to look back at French organisations, and, more fundamentally, questioned the 
very existence of a French model.
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The  T ra p  o f  ‘ Compar ing  Compar i son ’
With the ‘ADHD’ paper, which involved one group of parents in France and 
one in Ireland, the concept of medicalisation resurfaced. Though we consid-
ered that this concept could not serve as an analytical framework for us after 
the February 2011 workshop, we did not clearly realise at that time that we 
could no longer rely upon this concept for ordering our comparative writing. 
However, because the literature on ADHD largely mobilises this concept, we 
put too much effort into arguing that our notion of ‘evidence-based activism’ 
better captures the two organisations’ epistemic efforts for extending and 
articulating a variety of evidence on the disorder (which go well beyond the 
realm of biomedical expertise). This was to such a degree that we did not find 
an intelligible way for highlighting how each organisation construed ADHD. 
Thus, as Stengers (2011) asserts, we were caught in the trap of ‘comparing 
comparisons’, and were too preoccupied with weighing the vices of the medi-
calisation frame on the one hand, and the virtues of ours in terms of ‘evidence-
based activism’, on the other.
As we should have expected, it was precisely this issue of ‘comparing com-
parisons’ which the reviewers pointed out. They were all very enthusiastic about 
the richness of our empirical material, and just as much very critical of what 
they felt was an immoderate attack upon the concept of medicalisation. They 
suggested that we forced our empirical data into a restrictive analytical frame, 
and that somehow we were not fair enough in playing the game of ‘comparing 
comparisons’. Consequently, they raised the issue of how exactly we compared 
the two organisations, and asked whether the national contexts into which 
they evolved might explain their differences, which our demonstration left 
little room to do.
While revising the paper, much discussion arose amongst the co-authors 
on how to handle this issue of national contexts. Eventually, we developed a 
twofold argument:
1) That the two organisations are preoccupied with aligning their politics of 
illness (i.e. ADHD is a multidimensional disorder which needs a multimodal 
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therapeutic approach) with their politics of knowledge (i.e. an interest in 
different species of credentialed expertise – biomedical, psychiatric, psy-
chological, educational, etc.). Moreover, it appears that in order for this to 
be achieved, medicalisation is a starting point for the two organisations but 
not the end of the story.
2) That the two organisations’ politics of illness/knowledge aims to trans-
form the network of experts and professionals they ally with/oppose, and 
that these alliances/oppositions themselves result from the ways the two 
organisations problematise patients’ and families’ specific situations.
Subsequently, the second version of our paper tried to tighten more than we 
did initially:
1) The comparison between our approach to ADHD activism and alterna-
tive understandings of the same phenomenon.
2) The comparison between the two cases we studied.
In retrospect, it is clear that putting together our special issue was yet another 
device: a very demanding one which forced us to provoke once more the issue 
of comparison and to sharpen our view on what exactly we ended up with. Of 
course, the writing of academic articles is always a trial, if only because reviewers 
have their own embodied epistemic perspectives and political agendas which 
the authors may not share. The comments we got from the reviewers on the first 
drafts of our papers also reopened our comparative toolkit and brought back 
the question: how to compare without explaining differences and similarities 
between cases from the outside? As a matter-of-fact, reviewers’ criticisms, as 
well as discussions between the co-authors over the writing and revising process, 
epitomised the ‘differential agency of comparison’, which manifested itself in a 
variety of ways and at different moments from the start to the end of our project. 
We faced the cumbersome injunction for international comparison, which we 
strived to get rid of in our proposal to the EU call. We fixed our methodological 
and conceptual approach to comparison and did the work accordingly. When the 
time came to write and revise our articles, we were overwhelmed by questions 
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we thought we had mastered: what to do with national contexts? How to pull 
ourselves out of the traps of picturing the situations we examined as elements of 
a typology, or models of broader phenomena, or exceptions to well-established 
social theories? How to make sense of singularities which emerged out of our 
comparative approach without giving the impression of being too descriptive 
and lacking analytical depth? Those were the challenges which the evil spirit of 
comparison asked us to take up, and which led us to entirely rewrite the articles 
we submitted. Having gone through that process, we now feel (a bit) more 
comfortable with the questions Madeleine’s colleague raised in the beginning 
of this paper.
Conclu s ion
Recall that our colleague asked Madeleine about the general lessons we could 
draw on for our comparative research project. Comparison was indeed long 
considered as a surrogate experimental device for either revealing the general 
character of certain social phenomena, or for producing a model of the structure 
and functioning of society and its elements. The respective merits of quantitative 
and qualitative methods were fiercely debated: those who followed a positivist 
approach to society à la Durkheim embraced statistical methods, whereas those 
after Lévi-Strauss viewed society as a mechanics to be dissected and favoured 
case studies.8 Those debates on ‘variable-based’ versus ‘case-based’ comparison 
(Ragin 1981) have certainly evolved, but they have left two legacies: (1) that 
social sciences should overcome the singularity attached to case studies; and (2) 
that comparison is the methodology par excellence for elaborating and testing 
general causal explanations in social sciences.
The conception of comparison as a set of methods for generalising observa-
tions and research findings still looms large in many discourses, most notably 
in ones about EU research proposals. Explaining differences between national 
case studies by national contexts is the alpha and omega of EU comparative 
projects. For reasons related to our political agenda and our actor-network 
theory background, we did not go with this causal explanatory framework. Our 
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contention was that whatever national contexts are, patients’ organisations dis-
play strikingly similar epistemic capacities for shaping health issues they deem 
relevant, transforming their environment for these issues to be considered at 
an individual and collective level. We were simultaneously very sensitive to the 
irreducible character of each organisation, and argued that patients’ organisa-
tions cannot be compared using a predefined exogenous metrics. This sounds 
like a catch-22: how to maintain that patients’ organisations are similar and 
yet irreducible? How to work out the ‘same but different’, as Deville et al. (this 
volume) nicely put it?
The methodology we staged aimed to handle this puzzle and propose an 
alternative approach to classic international comparisons. We progressively 
forged our consortium as a comparator: as a collective of individual researchers, 
case studies and concepts whose work was to make the situations we selected 
commensurable, i.e. searchable through the same set of research questions and 
procedures for data collection, and to augment contrasts within each situation 
in light of cross-examination and cross-interpretation of our observations. This 
way of comparing came with a radically different conception of generalisation: 
that is, generalisation in our research project was not a matter of ‘montée en 
généralité’ (Boltanski and Thévenot 1987), where case studies are abstracted 
from their idiosyncratic character. Rather, it was a matter of singularisation, which 
entailed shedding light on and making sense of how each patients’ organisation 
construed its cause and its context (Asdal and Moser 2012) in light of how 
other organisations do it. Our approach towards ‘how to compare’ and ‘what 
for’, attempts to put an end to the prevarications between sociology and history 
(Wievorka 1992; Passeron and Revel 2005). We neither built a social theory of 
patients’ organisations out of case-based comparison, nor did we celebrate the 
uniqueness of events which punctuate the history of each organisation. What 
we did instead was to highlight the existence of common practices amongst 
patients’ organisations, and to examine each organisation through the lenses 
of these practices. This eventually enabled us to pick out each organisation’s 
specificities, and to deepen understandings on their singular and original way 
of dealing with their own problems.
There are two additional issues which we would like to conclude with. One 
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is the issue of how to measure patients’ organisations’ successes/failures in 
order to change policies. As it stands, this question does not resonate with our 
preoccupations, not because it is of no interest to us, but because it supposes 
the existence of a standard against which to evaluate successes/failures. Yet, we 
cannot compare ceteris paribus what happened before and what occurred after 
one patients’ organisation engaged in a condition-area, for patients’ interven-
tion transformed the network of issues, problems, and actors at stake. It is the 
scope of these transformations and their effects that we should examine closely 
if we are to grasp the meaning of patients’ activism. Moreover, we suspect that 
this question of success and failure conveys another supposition, that certain 
national contexts are more conducive to patients’ and health activism than 
others. One commonplace thinking, for instance, is that within the EU certain 
countries are ‘advanced’ whereas others are ‘backward’ in respect to patients’ 
participation in health policies.9 Though tempting, such a supposition does 
not do justice to patients’ organisations’ transformative effects, including in 
the production of ideas on which countries are moving forward, and which 
ones are lagging behind in the condition areas they are concerned with. Our 
project also supported a more dynamic view on the ongoing construction of 
the EU by offering an alternative understanding of differences and similarities 
between its member states.
The last issue we would like to conclude with is the effect of our own com-
parative research project. From the outset, we were willing to act politically (i.e. 
to contribute something to the recognition of patients’ organisations as genuine 
actors in the domain of health and medicine), and not just as auxiliaries to 
traditional stakeholders (i.e. researchers, health institutions, political authori-
ties, the industry), or as social movement organisations opposing traditional 
stakeholders. Our project certainly strengthened our political agenda: our data 
and analysis provided evidence on patients’ organisations’ active involvement 
in ‘collective enquiries’ which give shape to ‘publics and their problems’ (to 
borrow from Dewey [1927]), and helped us to argue that these POs’ practices 
are core to their activism. To convey the idea that patients’ organisations are 
legitimate experts on issues they raise, we organised a participative conference 
with social scientists, patients’ organisations, and stakeholders in the condition 
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areas we studied. This conference took place in Lancaster in September 2011, 
and gathered about sixty participants. The epistemic-political message we 
transmitted over the conference was that whatever their specificities, all patients’ 
organisations have epistemic capacities: that is, they do not consider knowledge 
as mere resources for defending their causes, but as ‘things’ they are able to work 
around inventively and reflexively for transforming the politics and polity in their 
condition areas. This is what we actually meant by our notion of ‘evidence-based 
activism’, and this was diversely appreciated. Some patients feared that it echoed 
evidence-based policy and evidence-based medicine (EBM) too much, and 
may well have adverse effects in picturing patients’ organisations as insiders into 
research and political milieu. Others warmly welcomed our notion, arguing that 
it indeed offers a positive view on patients’ organisations as ‘knowledge-able’ 
(Felt 2013) and responsible actors who contribute something to society. So, one 
effect of our comparative project was to have extended dialogue (including with 
patients’ organisations) around the fact that despite their heterogeneity, they 
must be considered, and consider themselves, as full-fledged epistemic actors 
able to question the relevance and legitimacy of evidence onto which collective 
decisions are made. No doubt, we will continue to dig around this message, for 
it is what our comparative project enabled us to articulate.
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Note s
1 European legislation defines rare diseases as conditions that affect less than 1 out of 
every 2,000 people, or 5 out of every 10,000 people in a given area.
2 The EU call was funded by the ‘Science in Society’ initiative of the European 
Commission FP7.
3 There were notable exceptions such as Steven Epstein (1996), who studied HIV-Aids 
activism in the US, and Janine Barbot (2002) and Nicolas Dodier (2003), who studied 
HIV-Aids activism in France.
4 We warmly thank Joe Deville for suggesting this idea of an ‘agency of comparison’.
5 In her piece, Marilyn Strathern opposes ‘perspectivalism’ and ‘perspectivism’: ‘To be 
perspectivalist acts out Euro-American pluralism, ontologically grounded in one world 
and many viewpoints; whereas perspectivism implies an ontology of many worlds and 
one capacity to take a viewpoint’(2011: 92).
6 This grid is taken from Akrich and Rabeharisoa’s PowerPoint presentation at the 
EPOKS Kick-off Meeting, 24 February 2009.
7 We suggest adopting Isabelle Baszanger and Nicolas Dodier’s (1996) term ‘ethnographie 
combinatoire’ (combinatory ethnography), described as a process of selective collection 
of data/events which aims to account for situated activities that cannot be interpreted in 
terms of a unified set of normative references.
8 On those early debates about what comparison entails, see for instance the introduction 
to the special issue of Common Knowledge (2001) provocatively titled: ‘Comparative 
Relativism. Symposium on an Impossibility’. See also Niewöhner and Scheffer (2008) 
and Krause (this volume).
9 On these ‘development rankings’ of EU Member States, see also Teresa Stöckelova’s 
paper in this volume.
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FRAME AGAINST THE 
GRAIN:  ASYMMETRIES , 
INTERFERENCE,  AND THE 
POLITICS OF EU COMPARISON
Tereza Stöckelová
Since it is only worth comparing the incommensurable, comparing the 
commensurable is a task for accountants, not anthropologists (Viveiros de 
Castro 2004: 14).
eduardo viveiros de castro May have Been too narroW-Minded 
about accountants (since 2008, we have learnt the hard way that their practice 
is much more creative than previously imagined), but he surely was right about 
anthropologists. Comparing the apparently commensurable not only offers 
very little insight beyond confirming what has been assumed already, but it 
also politically aligns social science analysis with the dominant orderings of 
reality. (In)comparability is not a perpetual, given feature of the phenomena 
we investigate, but a result of framing(s) enacted by various actors – research-
ers included. To paraphrase Bruno Latour’s principle of (ir)reducibility (1988: 
158), nothing is, by itself, either comparable or incomparable to anything else. 
It has to be made so.
Since (in)comparability is not ‘out there’, a framing that makes reasonable 
specific comparisons and excludes others is by no means politically and epis-
temologically innocent. Implicated in power relations, it is a practice that can 
stabilise, strengthen, or subvert. And, as we will see, it (re)shapes the realities 
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concerned. It is in this sense that I use here the notion of frame and framing, freely 
inspired by a variety of social scientists (e.g. Goffman 1974; Callon 1998). These 
scholars have deployed it to analyse the apparent paradox between the (often 
hidden) constructed-ness of things, persons, and issues (which in one regard are 
not given by nature, but are socially, materially, and discursively enacted) and 
their relative stability and effectuality. Surely quantification is today’s favoured 
strategy for imposing frames of comparison as if they were natural, thus rendering 
them effectively invisible (Porter 1995). The vivid social life of university rank-
ings, which apparently make all institutions across the globe easily comparable 
at a single glance, is just one example (for evidence from the Netherlands, see 
de Rijcke et al., this volume). Such framing and comparative efforts – serving as 
a tool with which to govern academia in managerial and bureaucratic modes – 
have been elaborately analysed and criticised by social scientists (e.g. Strathern 
2000; Shore 2008). There are, however, other practices implicated in enacting 
frames and units of comparison in which academics (including social scientists) 
massively partake. Among these are the entrenched geopolitical orderings that 
I will attend to closely in this chapter.
This chapter is certainly not an argument against comparing or comparative 
research. Rather, it is a call to pay attention to hidden framings and asymmetries 
of comparison, and for a reflexive, or diffractive (Haraway 1992) discussion 
on the effects of ‘making (in)comparable’, in which our social science research 
practices prominently participate.
From this perspective, I reflect on two interrelated research projects I was 
involved in between 2006 and 2010. Focused on changing academic cultures 
and practices, both of these projects had strong comparative elements. The 
first project, Knowledge, Institutions and Gender: An East-West Comparative 
Study (KNOWING) (2006–2008), was funded by the EU’s Sixth Framework 
Programme (FP6), and involved five research teams from Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Finland, Slovakia, and the UK. Each team carried out qualitative 
research including interviews, focus group discussions, and participant observa-
tion in two academic institutions in the social sciences (most often but not solely 
sociology), and in the biosciences (molecular biology, biochemistry, organic 
chemistry). The primary aim of the project was to ‘examine the production of 
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knowledge contexts and cultures, including the role of gender, from an “East-
West” perspective and identify structural and institutionalised practices and 
procedures, including standards of excellence, that hinder and/or promote 
the equal participation of women in science’ (KNOWING Proposal, Annex 
I 2005: 4).
The second project, Articulations of Science Policies in Research Practice 
and the Academic Path (2009–2010), funded by the Grant Agency of the 
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (GAAV), was a follow-up to 
KNOWING in the Czech Republic and focused on two selected topics (aca-
demic paths, and assessment and accountability). It drew upon KNOWING 
data and group interviews conducted with researchers in different disciplines 
and types of academic institutions. Alongside our interest in investigating the 
topics in more detail, we also saw potential to follow the ongoing changes in 
Czech science policy and their ‘translations’ into variable institutional and 
regional contexts. Our study was carried out amidst the most intense academic 
protests in Czech history against cuts in the research budget for the Academy 
of Sciences, the increased public funding for industrial research and innova-
tion, and the introduction of a research evaluation framework that ties public 
funding to strictly quantitative criteria for assessing research performance. 
This is important, as it introduced a special dynamic into the relationship 
between research participants and us as researchers, something that I will 
discuss further on in the text.
Both projects thus intended to make multiple comparisons between 
European countries, between ‘East and West’, selected academic disciplines, 
and different types of research institutions. At the same time, the investigated 
realities already involved a number of framings such as assessment exercises 
comparing the ‘research performance’ of teams (in an institute) or researcher 
organisations (in a country). Here I look into how and with what (collateral) 
effects we as researchers practised comparisons in these two projects: what 
was taken as the frame of comparison? How did researchers’ framings interfere 
with those of research participants? How were the frames reflected, taken into 
account, or made an object of enquiry sui generis? What epistemic and geopoliti-
cal asymmetries were embedded in our practices of comparison, and how may 
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they have become destabilised over the course of the two projects? While we 
cannot stop framing, I will argue in the conclusion that there are alternatives to 
how we compare, and we should try to frame (in the EU projects) ‘against the 
grain’. I suggest that we should be more courageous and challenging in relation 
to epistemologically and politically established framings.
Mak ing  Un i t s
Comprised of research teams from different countries, the consortia of EU -
funded projects addressing societal challenges imply comparisons between EU 
member states. This corresponds to the European idea of  ‘identity in diversity’ 
(of cultures, people, policies, and so on) that has to be investigated, understood, 
and constantly managed and harmonised.1 These comparisons do not simply 
represent realities ‘out there’ – they contribute to their enactment. In an analysis 
of the performative effects of the Eurobarometers, John Law observed that
these statistical methods are creating a homogeneous European collective space 
containing isomorphic individuals which is then re-stratified into sub-spaces 
or sub-populations (for instance, 27 country distributions of opinion) and, 
so, in re-creating the nation state in a particular mode’ (2009: 248).
What are the assumptions and effects of multi-member-state EU projects 
(including qualitative ones), and how do they shape the realities they study?
Let us look closely at the KNOWING project. Although we were interested 
in the disciplinary differences between the social sciences and the biosciences 
(and in comparisons along gender lines), what moved strongly to the forefront 
during the project were comparisons between ‘each country’s distinct episte-
mological culture and practice’ (KNOWING Proposal, Annex I 2005: 13). As 
in many other social science projects carried out in the European Commission 
(EC) framework (Godfroy 2010), each team in this project investigated the 
research landscape and institutions in its own member state and in its native 
language (except for one German researcher in the Czech team who had been 
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living in Prague for many years and who investigated – mostly in English – 
Czech and foreign researchers at the bioscience institute). When we met for a 
consortium-wide workshop, members of each team spoke mainly about (and 
from) the perspective of their own ‘national’ data. While discussions among 
the Czech team back in Prague contained differences and similarities between 
investigated domestic fieldwork sites, ‘national reality’ tended to come to the 
forefront in the consortium debates and become homogeneous. Most of the 
time, it was ‘national reports’ that were mainly and solely elaborated through 
work packages, and which we exchanged before consortium meetings. In 
essence, they became the basic elements of our collective debates.2 They were 
the durable and mobile inscriptions that we could always easily refer to during 
the whole project.
In each country, there are surely distinct evaluation systems as well as fund-
ing schemes, agencies, and specific (language) audiences (particularly in the 
social sciences) that call for national comparisons and the identification of 
similarities and differences between nation-states. However, the strong com-
parative logic of EU member states – as projected into the format of ‘national’ 
research teams and funding for domestic fieldwork – tends to make certain 
kinds of phenomena less visible and researchable. In quantitative surveys such 
as the Eurobarometer in Law’s (2009) example, nation-states are in most cases 
enacted as internally homogeneous units of comparison. In qualitative studies 
such as KNOWING, epistemic asymmetries (and possibly huge heterogenei-
ties inside a member state) may be made invisible, as researchers – due to the 
constraints in project budget and researchers’ capacity influenced by multiple 
project obligations – tend to carry out their fieldwork in the area where they 
live and work. That is also where research institutions able to successfully apply 
for EU funding are situated.3 However, in consortium debates and international 
publications, the results are then often taken as representative of the country 
or national culture as such.
At that point, the assumption of the research process was that EU member 
states are relatively stable entities with distinct research cultures which can be 
reasonably compared, and which are faced with (and need to) negotiate the 
‘European discourse’ of excellence. And by means of our own research, we 
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contributed to strengthening the stabilisation of these entities. Here is an illus-
trative quotation from a collective monograph published from the KNOWING 
project:
Already a first analysis of our material shows that the excellence discourse 
has reached all the countries investigated and that national and European 
discourses are closely intertwined (although in the UK, national excellence 
discourses are perhaps less explicitly entangled with European ones). Yet 
the way this concept becomes operationalised, filled with meaning and 
transformed into practice differs in interesting ways. These variations might 
be seen as linked to the different histories of national research systems, to 
the imagined place a country/institution holds on a more global research 
map and in particular to when and how research assessment exercises have 
started to be integrated (Felt and Stöckelová 2008: 76).
How, then, are such comparative conclusions arrived at, and backed up?
J uggl ing  Comparab i l i t y
In our research practice, the actual material for comparison did not involve 
primary data. These we did not share – due to language barriers, privacy pro-
tection, and the potential epistemological and ethical difficulties of working 
with ethnographic data generated by someone else in a different fieldwork. 
We felt this could not be seriously tackled in a three-year project with a limited 
budget (there were, for example, no resources for translation). Additionally, the 
proposition that at least some non-ethnographic data could be generated and 
exchanged for a comparative analysis was strongly resisted by some teams in 
the consortium. There was a proposal in the first work package of the project to 
distribute a ‘life course questionnaire’ (LCQ) as a standardised tool with sup-
posedly ‘identical’ questions to researchers in the academic institutions under 
study. These would be processed statistically across the five countries prior to 
the participant observation phase of the fieldwork, and a sort of comparative 
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baseline between them would be established. The ultimate point of disagree-
ment was over the obligatory use of a Lickert scale in the questionnaire. This 
caused a major conflict within the consortium. Some of us were wary of creating 
an impression of easy and objective comparability packaged in statistics, and 
argued, for example, that
[a]lthough we seem to be quite aware of contingencies, contexts or cultural 
specificities in the construction and structuring of epistemic communities 
that we study we do not assume these same contingencies when constructing 
our methodology […] [There are] different cultures of expressing discontent 
or dissatisfaction. How are we then going to interpret the measurements: 
Are people in institutions in one country more critical/satisfied/hesitating 
or are the conditions in the institutions more/less satisfactory? (Internal 
consortium communication 2006)
Others believed that
it is necessary for all teams to have a common basis to work on. We do not 
share the idea that quantitative analysis of Lickert-scaled questions only 
makes sense if all conditions are equal. We rather think it can be quite 
interesting when keeping in mind these unequal conditions. We also do 
not want to risk giving up the original idea of the project to have it com-
monly conducted, and fear this could happen if we now start using different 
methods. We are aware of the fact, that there is a need to consider nationally 
differing and distorting variables in interpreting the LCQ […] [W]e think 
that comparisons of raw data and first analyses can be possible – or should 
not be made impossible right from the beginning at least. We think it would 
be a pity if we did away with possible ways of comparison this early, especially 
as it does not seem too time-consuming or extensive to add such questions 
(Internal consortium communication 2006).
Though all the teams were determined to generate the LCQ data, the conflict 
over the questionnaire’s content and form of its actual implementation (e.g. 
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by personal interview vs. by post) was so polarising within the consortium 
that it could only be resolved through the voting procedure stipulated in the 
official contract, and not by negotiation. The margin of the vote on the ques-
tion of whether ‘it is obligatory for each partner in the consortium carrying 
out the research to use the Lickert-scale item questions’ was very narrow – 
4:3 in favour of each partner being free to include, or not, the Lickert-scale 
items. What is interesting about the whole controversy is that all the different 
positions of comparability and incomparability were argued with reference 
to nation-state specifics. The nation-state teams were reassembled as sites of 
epistemic autonomy in the consortium – they voted and expressed positions.4 
Moreover, at the same time, the nation-states were reinforced as the units of 
in/comparability.
The failed attempt at comparing ‘raw data’ did not, however, prevent us 
from making any comparisons at all. In the later stages of the project, what was 
compared most often were the ‘claims’ made about national research practices, 
as well as cultures and policies based on our fieldwork (but often also other 
experiences of ours as academics, committee board members, and so on). These 
were either formulated in national work package reports, during consortium 
discussions when commenting on each other’s chapter drafts (Felt 2009: 35), or 
through various informal conversations and cross-cutting relations established 
throughout the project.
Comparability (and the limits to it) was gradually built up through a series 
of exchanges in the consortium during the lifespan of the project. At the same 
time, certain ambivalence remained about the nature of our comparative efforts 
across the team. In our collective monograph, we say that ‘[p]erhaps compari-
son, then, may reside not in the comparing of data, or results or findings, but 
in consideration of what questions it even made sense to ask in the first place’ 
(Molyneux-Hodgson 2009: iii). Equally, we suggest it resides in ‘the capturing of 
important similarities and differences among the countries participating in the 
study’ (Felt 2009: 35). The key point for my argument is that in the first place, 
during the process of (hopefully) making sense and travelling well beyond the 
consortium, our claims re-enact the very existence of the countries as substan-
tially homogeneous units that can later be compared.
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Sian Lazar distinguishes between the ‘representative form of comparison’ 
(comparing samples in more or less strict statistical terms), and ‘disjunctive 
comparison’, which involves setting ‘two groups (or cultures, societies) alongside 
one another and see[ing] what comes out of an examination of their similarities 
and differences’ (2012: 352). What happens in qualitative EU projects is surely 
not a representative statistical comparison. But it is not simply a disjunctive 
comparison either, as it is not arbitrary but speaks to the (pre-)existing EU 
political realities and the image of a ‘harmonised Europe’. Though applicants 
might deny subscribing to this agenda, they know very well how the application 
has to be phrased in order to get funding. This is what we promised as an ‘EU 
added value’, a category required in the application:
The added value of this project lies in its comparative design. By pairing new 
member states with established EU member states, the project will benefit 
from both prior experience and new outlooks. Further, this comparative 
collaborative framework maximises the usefulness of the project results 
on a European scale by incorporating varied contexts. The recommenda-
tions produced from the project will serve to better harmonise standards 
of scientific excellence throughout Europe, thus contributing to existing 
debates on scientific excellence (KNOWING Proposal, Annex I 2005: 20).
The uses and effects of knowledge codetermined by such ‘harmonised’ coordi-
nates are only partly in the hands of researchers.
R ewr i t ing  A s ymmetr i e s
The above quote points to the fact that the frame of comparison used in the 
research project corresponds to a specific EU political imagination, and it also 
suggests that the units compared are not equal. The proposal distinguished 
between ‘new’ member states and the ‘established’ ones, and this had implica-
tions for our comparative practice. Even though we reflected in our collective 
monograph that ‘[t]he original intent to somehow bring “East” and “West” 
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into a form of relation – by anticipating difference between the contexts and 
cultures implied by these geopolitically influenced words – was found in the end 
to offer little that was meaningful’ (Molyneux-Hodgson 2009: ii), the position 
of one of the countries counted among the established in the original proposal 
(namely the UK) remained distinctive in many respects. In essence, it was the 
most established amongst the established. First, the science policies introduced 
in different times across Europe were the most ‘advanced’ in the UK (e.g. the 
nationwide Research Assessment Exercise). Second, the UK (as well as Germany 
and the United States) was often referred to by our research participants as a 
comparative benchmark in terms of research quality and a desired mobility 
destination. Third, a great deal of the Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
literature that we worked with was concerned with the UK, was written by UK 
researchers, and was, obviously, in English. And last, but not least, consortium 
meetings took place in English, which, in principle, gave an advantage to native 
speakers who were able to express themselves more easily and in a more nuanced 
way. Anglo-Saxon realities were thus omnipresent.
This had at least two interrelated effects on the comparisons that were made. 
On the one hand, the UK – the research team as well as researchers under study – 
compared itself less to other European countries, and if they referred to other 
countries it was most often the US. The UK played out as a rather self-contained 
case. On the other hand, it was difficult for other research teams to avoid direct 
or indirect, and explicit or implicit, comparisons to the UK.5
Susan Meriläinen et al. (2008) analysed a similar dynamic when they traced 
the peer review process of a paper they submitted to the journal Organization, 
which today declares itself to be ‘theory-driven, international in scope and vision, 
open, reflective, imaginative and critical, interdisciplinary, facilitating exchange 
amongst scholars from a wide range of current disciplinary bases and perspec-
tive’ (Organization 2013). Meriläinen et al. interpreted their experience of this 
process to be an example of ‘hegemonic academic practice’, as the journal’s 
reviewers called on them to use UK data as a benchmark for Finnish data, and 
the data on male managers as a benchmark for female managers (2008:591). 
They also stated that ‘[w]hile Britishness became the norm, Finnishness was 
reduced to a deviation from the norm’ (Ibid. 591).
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Although I have not experienced any explicit pressure from journals such 
as that described by Meriläinen and her colleagues, negotiating Anglo-Saxon 
realities has been a near-constant process, as most of the (STS) literature we 
worked with in the project drew upon research, and technical, cultural, and 
natural references from those geopolitical parts of the world. Furthermore, it 
must be emphasised that most of the time I actively and happily participated in 
re-enacting these comparative asymmetries, even if I tried to make some differ-
ence to (and with) them. To give an example from a policymaking context, our 
team made use of the asymmetry between the Czech Republic and the UK when 
we invited our UK colleague in the project consortium to speak at a conference 
(on science policy) that we organised in the Senate of the Parliament. We did not 
present the UK simply as an advanced case to be followed and ‘caught up with’; 
instead we tried to ‘problematize the idea that Western European countries have 
found an ideal science policy that can be mechanically transferred to the Czech 
Republic’ (quote from the Science Policy and Science in Action Conference 
Invitation). However, as far as we understood them, all the questions that were 
asked after our UK colleague’s presentation in the Senate seemed to proceed from 
the assumption that she must be trying to justify the UK Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE)/Research Excellence Framework (REF) system as a positive 
model that would help the local academic community argue against the current 
version of research assessment in the Czech Republic.
Academics on the ‘periphery’ do not often subvert; on the contrary, they 
try to capitalise on the hegemonic configuration. As Meriläinen et al. observed,
[i]n general, scholars from peripheral countries such as Finland are seduced 
to marginalize themselves in international fora so that they may gain benefits 
domestically (getting articles accepted in high impact journals improves their 
position at home, e.g. in applying for academic jobs). They are forced to opt 
in core-periphery relations if they want to stay in the “game” in the periph-
ery’ (2008: 594; for a similar argument see also Aalbers 2004: 320–321).
I was, of course, interested in publishing in English in UK-based journals, and 
in packaging my arguments for the Anglophone ‘model reader’. As well as my 
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interest in reaching the wider STS community, I also knew that doing so would 
count in the institutional assessment of my work. Somewhat paradoxically, a 
key argument of one of my articles was a critique of the understanding (largely 
shared by science policies and science studies) of scientific knowledge and 
objects as ‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour 1987) and the problematic consequences 
this has for the social sciences in non-Anglophone countries – as well as for the 
local relevance of the knowledge they produce, and for their contribution to the 
performance of globally converging societies (Stöckelová 2012). And to round 
out the paradox, I later got a special financial bonus from my research institute 
for having published in a journal with such a high impact factor, as it increased 
the public funding of the institute – calculated according to a research assess-
ment methodology that I critically analyse in the same article. The attempt to 
disturb the asymmetry in evaluating and valuing knowledge was at the same 
time incorporated in its operation.
The special and repeated efforts needed to displace and diffract asymmetries 
can hardly be overestimated. As noted above, in the KNOWING project we 
investigated two research institutions in each country – one in the biosciences, 
and one in the social sciences. The epistemic and policy landscape in which our 
study was conducted was strongly unbalanced in favour of the biosciences. On 
the one hand, a great majority of STS concepts (such as the notion of ‘lab eth-
nography’) were developed on the basis of empirical material drawn from the 
field of natural and biosciences (Garforth 2012). And it is also these disciplines 
and types of research that serve as a more or less explicit model of and for policy 
(Garforth and Stöckelová 2012). It almost took permanent effort and reflection 
in order for us to overcome this uneven condition when we were developing our 
understanding of studied research practices, cultures, and policies, and to avoid 
talking about the social sciences as an exception or deviation from a ‘standard’. 
Paradoxically, the fact that we all came from the social sciences did not help 
much. On the contrary; it may have created a feeling that we all understood our 
field already, and that we did not need to spend as much time discussing our 
social science data. The political and epistemic economy worked in favour of the 
asymmetries embedded in the comparison. I will note in the conclusion below 
that going against these asymmetries can be an effective methodological strategy.
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I n t e r f e r ing  w i th  th e  R e s earched
The complexities of comparing data generated in the context of different 
disciplines made themselves very apparent in the follow-up to KNOWING. 
This was carried out in the Czech Republic from 2009–2010. In the project, 
‘Articulations of Science Policies in Research Practice and Academic Path’, we 
carried out additional group interviews with researchers in different disciplines 
and institutional contexts. What was extraordinary about the project was its 
timing in that it coincided with the introduction of major changes in the research 
assessment system in the country. Experiments with a new assessment system 
began in 2004 when basic measures were introduced to quantitatively evaluate 
research outputs. They did not draw much attention from ordinary research-
ers as they had no immediate consequence. However, in 2009, institutional 
funding for research and university organisations began to be closely tied to 
evaluation scores at the same time as overall cuts were being made in the public 
budget for research. To make a long story short, this resulted in substantial 
cuts in the budget for the Academy of Sciences (which, unlike universities, 
gets public money solely for doing research) and a consequent increase in 
tension between the institutions and disciplines inside the Academy which 
have to compete with each other for diminishing resources. In this atmosphere, 
there were heated debates (in public as well as in academic spaces) about the 
adequacy of the evaluation procedure and its criteria. Some of the questions 
often raised were what types of output (academic, extra academic), and what 
types of institutions (research institutes, universities) and disciplines (social 
sciences and humanities, natural sciences, technical disciplines) are compara-
ble or commensurable, and what the appropriate levels are on which to make 
comparisons and rankings (on the level of disciplines, institutions, research 
teams, and individuals).
We set out to study how, and with what effects, the unprecedented quanti-
tative comparisons of the entities characterised by these multiple differences 
were constructed.6 We were interested in the processes of commensuration 
and ‘making things comparable’. In our analysis, we showed how the national 
evaluation was originally an initiative of a group of bioscientists who strove 
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to establish their superiority in the research system in terms of professional 
accountability, but who later started to lose control over the whole process 
as industrial lobbies, the bureaucratic logic, and managerial accountability 
asserted themselves (Linková and Stöckelová 2012). During the fieldwork, our 
study was perceived by the research participants as interfering rather directly 
in the controversy. Most researchers that we approached with a request for an 
interview had a strong opinion on these issues, and they wanted to share and 
make their opinions heard through our research. While the national evalua-
tion tried to impose universal commensurability and ranking, its opponents 
denounced the hidden asymmetries in the seemingly impartial evaluation 
criteria, and argued either for a different frame of comparison (one more 
favourable to them and their institutions and disciplines), or for acknowledg-
ing the incommensurability of the compared entities – for instance, noting the 
incommensurable nature of the output of different disciplines, their epistemic 
genres, and societal roles. Those in the latter group actually saw our ‘com-
parative research’ project as a possible means of showing these entities to be 
incomparable – and making them so.
The situation of the public and policy controversy might be specific to an 
extent, but it illuminates an important issue concerning comparative studies. 
Research never starts on un(infra)structured grounds, and it inevitably inter-
feres with the existing frames of comparison and the (in)commensurabilities 
practised by various actors in the field (not least by Viveiros de Castro’s account-
ants). These interferences may remain invisible if the frames of comparison 
and their asymmetries are settled and practised more or less consensually in 
the studied field, and if the researcher does not set out to deliberately unsettle 
the framings but instead goes along with them. In this case, she interferes by 
effectively strengthening them. I argue that an empiricist approach to com-
parison – which prescribes that only what is ‘objectively’ comparable can 
be legitimately compared – does exactly this. It strengthens the dominant 
frames of comparison by respecting them – as in the case of anthropological 
‘cross-cultural comparisons’ – when practised as a comparison of ‘the others’ 




Compar ing  Aga in s t  th e  Gra in
Comparing boxing and computer programming, Robert Schmidt (2008) makes 
a case against a kind of comparison which ‘simply emphasizes the links and 
commonalities between the objects of comparison’ (2008: 340), and argues 
for an experimental approach to comparison. He insists it is the latter that can 
bring about a desirable epistemological rupture and unexpected insight. In 
a similar vein, I argued in this chapter against the epistemological naïveté of 
comparability dwelling ‘out there’ as a limit to what we can and should compare 
as researchers.
My point is, however, more political. The trap of the notion of comparability 
awaiting the researcher ‘out there’ is not only epistemological. It concerns what 
reality is, and how it will change and develop. Indeed, there exist recognised 
units and frames of comparison and in/comparabilities in the reality we investi-
gate. However, they are not given but practised by various actors and inscribed 
into infrastructures, architectures, and imaginations. Social research can, and 
should, study these comparative practices and arrangements, while it cannot 
itself avoid engaging in and with them (be it in a critical or affirmative mode). 
With researchers’ contributions, they can be practised differently, or not. I do 
not argue that as researchers, we should always stand in a subversive relation-
ship to the framings practised by the actors we study. There might be minor or 
subaltern frames of comparison we decide to reinforce and make visible. Also, 
strategically sharing a dominant frame may help to make certain points that it 
would otherwise be hard to hear. But it seems crucial to remain aware of the 
performativity of our comparative undertakings. What would the elements of 
cultivating such awareness be?
The first issue is timing. Awareness should influence the ways we design our 
research projects. What are the key frames and units of comparison present in 
the field we are about to enter? Do we want to strengthen or question them? 
Are there lateral ways of formulating and researching our themes that would 
not only open new intellectual horizons, but would also deploy new or hitherto 
marginal realities? And in the context of (qualitative) multinational EU projects, 
an explicit quest should be to examine how we can unsettle the entrenched 
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research design where national teams study the (homogenised) reality of their 
nation/member state. Certainly, there are things that cannot be planned and 
avoided in advance. We can only learn about them from the responses, requests, 
and traces we leave in the field. Nevertheless, we should learn.
It is remarkable that the KNOWING project was an explicitly feminist one, 
but it still generated rather limited reflection within (and after) the project on 
asymmetries and inequalities. While the proposal stated that
[r]esearch conducted from a feminist perspective is characterized by a cri-
tique of social inequalities (including but not limited to gender), a research 
design that provides space for the exploration of women’s everyday experi-
ences and knowledges, is sensitive to and tries to minimise the power dif-
ferentials between researcher and research participant, and is motivated by 
the desire to create positive social change’ (KNOWING Proposal, Annex 
I 2005: 22),
we were little prepared or equipped to handle the power differentials within the 
project consortium, particularly in the researched reality. If we were pushed to 
reflection at one point, it was only due to a conflict (which is not a bad thing in 
principle). However, severe conflicts may threaten a project as a whole, erode 
mutual trust, and needlessly use up a lot of energy. Thinking in the terms of 
the EC newspeak of ‘work packages’, it would be useful to include ‘reflection’ 
alongside ‘management’ for the duration of a project. In the busy schedule of 
other work package meetings, milestones, and deliverables, there is indeed very 
limited time-space and energy for such reflection – even when the willingness 
and interest are there.
The second issue concerns scale. In the social sciences, the gravity of the 
performativity issue will rarely be linked to a single project. Rather, it is the 
multiple, recurring execution of projects that creates powerful machinery for the 
reproduction of specific frames, units, and asymmetries. This raises questions 
not only for a single project, but for research and disciplinary communities. In 
this chapter, I sketched contours of what we create (intentionally or not) by 
engaging in projects and reproducing the arrangement where national/member 
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state research teams investigate their national/member state realities. Is this 
what our disciplines wish to (and should) contribute to Europe?
I would argue that one of the key intellectual missions and socio-political 
roles of the social sciences has historically been to open established black 
boxes. However, the black boxes of the nation/member states are reproduced 
rather than opened up by the usual arrangements of the ‘societal challenges 
pillar’ of EU-funded research. Such arrangements not only re-enact black 
boxes, but they also deaden empirical research sensibility for complex realities 
escaping established categories. I am neither arguing for any easy cosmopolit-
ism, as if Europe is – or should necessarily be – a smoothly shared, common 
socio-material-discursive space, nor for switching to an alternative standard for 
European social research. On the contrary, I insist that as much as the European 
cosmopolitics of composing a shared world (Latour 1999) needs to be experi-
mental, the social research contributing to it also needs to be so. In my view, 
more space and resources should be dedicated to unexpected comparisons and 
experimental research designs.
Such research could seemingly not drive the ‘fast lane’ of academic produc-
tion (Vostal 2015) and be slower and stumbling, thus coming into conflict with 
the current standards and measures of ‘excellence’ in ever-growth-oriented 
academia. As STS has numerously shown (especially in relation to (non-social) 
sciences), the epistemic content and organisational process of research cannot 
be separated (e.g. Latour 1987). Thus, it can hardly be underestimated that 
‘research design’ issues are not simply methodological, but they simultaneously 
concern multiple facets of politics, including the academic one.
As a research community (always incoherent and multi-vocal, of course), 
we also have to find a way to translate these debates into messages regarding 
implications and limits of current research arrangements to sponsors and funders 
(such as the European Commission). The reason is that the actual funded 
projects are responses to – explicit or implicit – expectations inscribed in calls 
and evaluation criteria. However, in the context of Europe, the wording of the 
Vilnius Declaration – a recent, and so far rather unique, message from the social 
sciences and humanities to policymakers – conceals the performativity of social 
research. It talks about the social sciences and humanities as ‘indispensable [sic] 
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in generating knowledge about the dynamic changes in human values, identities 
and citizenship that transform our societies’, and about ‘realigning science with 
ongoing changes in the ways in which society operates’ (Horizons for Social 
Sciences and Humanities 2013; my emphasis). Here, science is supposed to 
catch up with (a single) pre-existing (though changing) society, and it asks for 
the resources to do so.
I believe we need a more reciprocal understanding of the relation between 
the social sciences and the realities they study, and a more performative take on 
knowledge and knowing. For the sake of what there is, and what can be, social 
research should strive to create investigative frictions and make comparisons 
that go ‘against the grain’ of prevailing notions, rather than polish (however 
inadvertently) existing dominant realities. I am sure this would not be to the 
detriment of intellectual creativity.
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Note s
1 This idea may be undergoing change now (in the ‘crisis’) with differences between the 
‘North’ and ‘South’ of Europe appearing unbridgeable and escalating into conflicts. We 
have yet to see if and how this change will translate from economic policies to research 
ones.
2 Thanks to Lisa Garforth for drawing my attention to the significance of ‘national 
reports’ in this context.
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3 Across the KNOWING consortium, there was indeed only one case study carried out 
outside the area of a researcher’s residence.
4 In fact, the consultant to the project based in the UK voted differently from the UK 
partner team carrying out the research, while the consultant based in the Czech Republic 
abstained from voting.
5 Lisa Garforth (a UK colleague from KNOWING) provided an interesting 
complementary perspective on the issue of asymmetry when she commented on a draft 
of this chapter. While she agreed that the UK context kept asserting itself as a particularly 
vivid reality and standard for comparison in the project, she also pointed to another side of 
this privileged position. She noted that ‘UK teams have no “private” research findings (in 
principle everything is available in its first language to the whole team) or non-common 
language at meetings which occasionally we found a bit problematic; there can be no 
“asides” in a native language just for colleagues, for example; everything is potentially 
hearable by everybody’ (2014). And she added that ‘we were also constantly aware of 
being the least “European” team with the least experience of EC funding systems, reporting 
systems, even Euro-English language (e.g. the comfortable use of “scientific” to mean what 
we would call “academic” in EC speak, which I think was also familiar and comfortable to 
most of the researchers but we never internalised it). For us, this meant that some version 
of “Europe” or “European research” was being encountered as a relative novelty, especially 
via the EC’s language and systems’ (written feedback on the draft of the chapter, 2014).
6 Different comparative ‘remarks’ concerning the value and quality of different academic 
disciplines and intuitions in the Czech Republic had been in the air for several years, but 
were never translated into an official and quantitative evaluation system.
7 For an analysis of practices of the modern/non-modern incommensurability, see 
Latour (1993); for a nuanced critique of comparative approaches in anthropology, see 
Gingrich and Fox (2000).
B i b l iography
Aalbers, M. B., ‘Creative Destruction through the Anglo-American Hegemony: a Non-
Anglo-American View on Publications, Referees and Language’, Area, 36.3 (2004), 
319–322
Callon, M., ‘An Essay on Framing and Overflowing: Economic Externalities Revisited by 
Sociology’ in M. Callon, ed., The Laws of the Markets (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 
pp. 244–269
De Rijcke, et al., ‘Comparing Comparisons: On Rankings and Accounting in Hospitals 
and Universities’, this volume
Felt, U., ‘Introduction: Knowing and Living in Academic Research’, in U. Felt, ed., Knowing 
and Living in Academic Research: Convergence and Heterogeneity in Research Cultures 
in the European Context (Prague: Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences 
of the Czech Republic, 2009), pp. 17–40
185
FraMe against the grain
Felt, U., and T. Stöckelová, ‘Modes of Ordering and Boundaries that Matter in Academic 
Knowledge Production’, in U. Felt, ed., Knowing and Living in Academic Research: 
Convergence and Heterogeneity in Research Cultures in the European Context (Prague: 
Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 2009), 
pp. 41–124
Garforth, L., ‘In/Visibilities of Research: Seeing and Knowing in STS’, Science, Technology, 
& Human Values, 37 (2012), 264–285
Garforth, L., and T. Stöckelová, ‘Science Policy and STS from Other Epistemic Places’, 
Science, Technology, & Human Values, 37 (2012), 226–240
Gingrich, A., R. G. Fox, eds., Anthropology, by Comparison (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2000)
Godfroy, A. -S., ‘International Comparisons in Science Studies: What and Why do we 
Compare?’, Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 23 (2010), 37–48
Goffman, E., Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1974)
Haraway, D., ‘The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d 
Others’, in L. Grossberg, C. Nelson, and P. A. Treichler, eds., Cultural Studies (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 295–337
Latour, B., Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press, 1987)
——The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988)
——We have Never been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993)
——Politiques de la nature: comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie (Paris: La 
Découverte, 1999)
Law, J., ‘Seeing like a Survey’, Cultural Sociology, 3 (2009), 239–56
Lazar, S., ‘Disjunctive Comparison: Citizenship and Trade Unionism in Bolivia and 
Argentina’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.), 18 (2012), 349–368
Linková, M., and T. Stöckelová, ‘Public Accountability and the Politicization of Science: 
The Peculiar Journey of Czech Research Assessment’, Science & Public Policy, 39 
(2012), 618–629
Meriläinen, S., J. Tienari, R. Thomas, and A. Davies, ‘Hegemonic Academic Practices: 
Experiences of Publishing from the Periphery’, Organization, 15 (2008), 584–97
Molyneux-Hodgson, S., ‘Preface: The Contexts of Knowing’, in U. Felt, ed., Knowing and 
Living in Academic Research: Convergence and Heterogeneity in Research Cultures in 
the European Context (Prague: Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences 
of the Czech Republic, 2009), pp. i–iii
Organization Journal, < http://org.sagepub.com/> [accessed September 2014]
Porter, T., Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995)
Shore, C., ‘Audit Culture and Illiberal Governance: Universities and the Politics of 
Accountability’, Anthropological Theory, 8 (2008), 278–98
186
practising coMparison
Schmidt, R., ‘Gaining Insight from Incomparability: Exploratory Comparison in Studies 
of Social Practices’, Comparative Sociology, 7 (2008), 338–61
Stöckelová, T., ‘Immutable Mobiles Derailed: STS and the Epistemic Geopolitics of 
Research Assessment’, Science, Technology, & Human Values, 37 (2012), 286–311
Strathern, M., ed., Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics and the 
Academy (London and New York: Routledge, 2000)
Vilnius Declaration – Horizons for Social Sciences and Humanities (2013), <http://horizons.
mruni.eu/> [accessed 18 January 2014]
Viveiros de Castro, E., ‘Perspectival Anthropology and the Method of Controlled 
Equivocation’, Tipití: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South 
America, 2 (2004), article 1 <http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/tipiti/vol2/iss1/1> 
[accessed 18 January 2014]
Vostal, F., ‘Academic Life in the Fast Lane: The Experience of Time and Speed in British 
Academia’, Time & Society (2015), 71–95






Christopher Gad and Casper Bruun Jensen
I n troduct ion
coMparison has Been an iMportant, perhaps even deFining, Meth-
odological and conceptual preoccupation in fields ranging from anthropology 
and history to linguistics. However, to the extent that comparison has been 
important in science and technology studies (STS) – our ‘home field’ – it 
has largely functioned implicitly and rarely programmatically (but see Barnes 
1973; Jasanoff 2007: 13–42; Knorr-Cetina 1999). Considered genealogically, 
the disinclination towards comparative studies per se can be related to the 
generic constructivism of most STS and its attendant scepticism towards stable 
yardsticks capable of grounding comparative analysis. Indeed, it does not seem 
likely that a long-lasting agreement on the relevant units of comparison will 
ever be reached, or even that it would be desirable: for what might be the units 
guiding comparative study? The cultures of national science policy ( Jasanoff 
2007)? Organisational forms (Scott 1981)? Types of technology relations 
(Ihde 1990)? Epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina 1999)? Modes of existence 
(Latour 2013)? Held under a constructivist microscope, each of these units 
seems equally prone to disperse as units.
A similar dispersal has fuelled the growing scepticism towards comparison (in 
the classical ‘grand style’) in anthropology. Indeed, whereas comparison used to 
be something of a ‘gold standard’ in anthropology, it is noteworthy that the com-
parative endeavour has increasingly fallen by the wayside. Like STS, this decline 
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can be related to vigorous postmodern and reflexive critiques of representation, 
universalism, and holism. Not least, these critiques were directed at an earlier 
evolutionism premised on the large-scale comparison of different ‘cultures’. Even 
so, certain modes of comparison have recently regained vigour (e.g. Otto and 
Bubandt 2010). This paper aims to further that trajectory by examining some 
potentials of comparison at the intersection of STS and anthropology.
The notion of ‘lateral reason’ comes from anthropologist Bill Maurer’s 
(2005) work on Islamic banking and alternative currencies in the US. Laterality 
centres on the observation that it is not the prerogative of social scientists to 
conceptualise and compare, for ethnographic fields are rife with such efforts. 
Informants are thus ‘fellow travellers along the routes of social abstraction and 
analysis’ (Maurer 2005: xv). As a consequence, social science comparisons 
are located ‘alongside’ the worlds of those they compare; they offer no general 
overview or meta-perspective on them. And, as a result, the traffic of compari-
sons and their effects run in multiple directions. It follows that although social 
science comparisons are often viewed as elucidating aspects of a found social 
reality, social science might also learn from indigenous comparisons about how 
to rethink its own analytical strategies.
At one level, this is to do with extracting and transforming modes of under-
standing found in the field. At another, it is a matter of recognising that compari-
son takes material-technological forms as often as linguistic-discursive ones. And 
yet another laterality points to the fundamental open-endedness of the relation 
between academic analysis and (other) worldly practices. Comparisons of the 
kinds we describe below might therefore give rise to further comparisons that 
extend into other academic, practice, or policy domains – as testified by several 
contributions to this volume. The lateral point is that no rulebook can predict 
how this may happen, nor can it dictate how it ought to happen.
The present analysis focuses specifically on comparative technologies; those 
used on board a Danish fishery inspection vessel for assorted purposes (includ-
ing the navigation of the sea and Danish and EU bureaucracies). Exploring 
assemblages of comparison on the ship’s bridge (and in the broader ecologies 
of bureaucracy), we elicit acts of comparison as parts of variably configured 
and emergent practices that move across a series of standard divisions of social 
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science. These comparisons include description and conceptualisation ( Jensen 
2011; Maurer 2011, 2012; Ratner 2012; Riles 2000), informant and researcher 
(Hansen 2011; Maurer 2005), and indeed, humans and technology (Gad 2012; 
Walford 2013).
The comparisons at hand are diverse. Some are built into machines. Some 
are deployed by informants to make sense of the sea environment, and yet 
others are put to use by researchers to address social scientific questions. This 
diversity suggests the difficulty of localising comparison at any particular 
empirical or analytical level. Our attempt to take into account the coexistence 
and movement of multiple forms of comparison is thus lateral in a double sense. 
Its premise is based on a refusal to circumscribe what counts as comparative 
material. Moreover, it centres on the variability, hybridity, and extendibility of 
comparison.
As an analytical propensity, lateral comparison is relentlessly non-hierar-
chical. It refuses to assume the privilege of any particular kind of comparator, 
including the researcher. Instead, the motor of lateral comparison is that the 
most heterogeneous actors unceasingly compare the most unpredictable things 
in the most surprising ways (see Meyer, this volume). Indeed, this point is 
exemplified by Deville, Guggenheim, and Hrdličková’s appropriation of the 
very notion of the comparator (this volume). While they tell us the term 
generically refers to a standard against which an object is compared, their 
usage is drawn from the capacities of a microchip (also called a comparator) 
which both compares and regulates fixed and variable voltages. Offering this 
lateral comparison of comparison enables Deville et al. to conduct their analy-
sis in a novel register, emphasising description and intervention in the same 
analytical movement.
Aside from enriching description, one of the benefits of such a move is 
that it steers clear of the always-lurking representationalism in anthropology 
and STS which tends to belittle the value of inventive conceptualisation in 
the name of getting descriptions right (see Holbraad 2012). Instead, Deville 
et al. emphasise that it is premised on the recognition that representation is 
both intervention (see Hacking 1983; Haraway 1994) and invention (see 
Wagner 1975). It highlights the notion that who compares, what is invented 
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by comparing, how such inventions may come to matter, and in which ways, is 
undecided from the get-go.
The premise does not suggest that everything is always compared, or that 
everything necessarily should be compared. Rather, the point is that everything 
may be rendered comparable (Latour 1988: 161–62; see Stöckelová, this 
volume). We might then say that our own comparisons should also be allowed 
to intermingle with those of others. Yet this formulation is slightly misleading 
insofar as it suggests that the researcher retains the capacity to make the deci-
sion. More precisely, we know that social scientific comparisons often come 
to mingle with those conducted by informants in unforeseeable ways. Lateral 
comparison takes this contingent possibility seriously, but just for that reason 
it contains no normative prescription – for enforced comparative mingling is 
not what is at stake.
To locate the distinctiveness of lateral comparisons, we begin by turning 
back the clock to the mid-to-late 1980s (a time when the comparative methods 
of anthropology had begun to show some serious cracks).
Forms  o f  Compar i son :  A  Short  G enea logy
Comparison and Its Discontents
In 1987, the anthropologist Ladislav Holy dedicated his introduction to 
Comparative Anthropology, showing that the anthropological preoccupation with 
‘cross-cultural comparison as the method for generating and testing hypotheses 
derives from the positivistic paradigm’ (1987: 1). Classical anthropology, Holy 
wrote, considered itself a branch of Durkheim’s comparative sociology; not a 
‘particular branch of sociology’, but rather ‘sociology itself insofar as it ceases to 
be purely descriptive and aspires to account for facts’ (Ibid. 2, citing Durkheim 
1964: 139). According to this understanding, ‘description provided the facts, and 
comparative method was adopted to account for them; it was seen as a means of 
formulating and testing hypotheses and generalizations valid not only for one 
specific society or culture but cross culturally’ (Holy 1987: 2; see Kuper 2002: 
144–45). For Mark Hobart (writing in the same volume),
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the special status of comparison in anthropology related to the fact that it 
underpinned explicitly or implicitly almost all the ways of talking about 
other cultures. Whether we study agriculture or food, narrative or myth, 
divinity or witches, we are comparing our popular or technical categories 
with other peoples. Analysis in terms of economic ‘infrastructures’ or self-
interest assumes the shared reality of production or the utilitarian nature 
of human action. Discussions concerning ‘political systems’ presuppose 
the generality of systems, and makes a suggestion that forms of power are 
comparable (1987: 22).
Hobart further noted that comparison has been viewed as the ‘anthropologi-
cal equivalent of the controlled experimentation of natural scientists’ (Hobart 
1987: 23; see Jensen 2011: 3–5).
In tandem with the interpretive, reflexive, and postcolonial turns in anthro-
pology, comparison nevertheless came to be viewed with increasing scepticism. 
One problem concerned ‘the relations between anthropologists’ descriptions 
of particular cultures and societies and their generalisation about human cul-
ture and society’ (Holy 1987: 1). As Fox and Gingrich argued in Anthropology, 
By Comparison, though comparison from afar seems both fundamental and 
unproblematic, upon closer inspection it tends to dissolve ‘into dozens of other 
issues, pieces and fragments’ (2002: 1). Adam Kuper similarly pinpointed the 
tendency of comparison to fragment: he argued that the units of anthropologi-
cal comparison are fundamentally contestable since the boundaries of what is 
compared are always uncertain:
Are the South African Bushmen one ethnographic case or several? Second, 
in what sense are the units that are constructed strictly comparable? Can the 
Bushmen reasonably be treated as a ‘case’ alongside ‘the Bedouin’, let alone 
Ming China? Much the same difficulties arise when it comes to defining 
an ethnographic object for purposes of comparison. Is ‘sacrifice’ among 
the Nuer really a distinctive, separable thing? And in what sense is it like 
‘sacrifice’ among the ancient Israelites, or in Classical Greece or among the 
Aztecs? (Kuper 2002: 145).
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In 1987, Holy had already argued that ‘there is no longer a “comparative method” 
in anthropology’(1987: 2). If ever there was such a method, it had been ‘replaced 
by varying styles of comparison’ (Ibid.), generally used ‘to facilitate our under-
standing of […] culturally specific meanings, i.e. to identify or bring into focus 
cultural specificity’ (Ibid. 10). In their later edition, Fox and Gingrich argued that
it is possible to move beyond the ruins of a monopolistic claim to one kind 
of comparison and beyond the stifling of intellectual competition it visited 
upon anthropology. Now, a rich plurality of qualitative comparative methodolo-
gies has emerged – none claiming exclusive rights, each offering its insights 
and evidence (2002: 12).
In a special issue on ‘Thick Comparison’, Jörg Niewöhner and Thomas Scheffer 
likewise observed that ‘the standard mode of comparison has been criticised as 
mechanistic, technical, and naïve (vis-à-vis hegemonic concepts and categories)’ 
(2008: 274). They strengthened the argument for a plurality of comparisons by 
emphasising that ‘the rising demand for cross-cultural and comparative research 
has proved productive for ethnographers (as cultural translators)’ (Ibid.).
However, the pluralisation of comparison identified by Holy, promoted by 
Fox and Gingrich, and enhanced by Niewöhner and Scheffer, has also been 
considered analytically costly. Specifically, it has undermined what some view as 
one of the central virtues of comparison in the ‘grand style’ – namely its attempt 
to generalise. This effort has been replaced by a plethora of specific studies that 
generally have limited comparative aspiration (see Beaulieu et al. 2007; Jensen 
2013).1 As rich and diverse as such ethnographies may be, they often rely on 
a descriptivist ethos, opening their flanks to Edmund Leach’s classical swipe 
at an ethnographic ‘butterfly collection’ (1961: 25) where the harvesting of 
descriptions and facts serves no overarching analytical or comparative purpose.
Forty years after Leach’s complaint, Kuper offered an amplified version of 
the same critique:
Ethnography is now the core business of social anthropology […] and long-
term immersion in ethnographic research is increasingly common. […]The 
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challenge is to add value to the dauntingly large body of ethnographic and 
historical reports available on almost any region (2002: 144).
Yet, Kuper lamented, some refuse ‘to move beyond the handful of people they 
have studied intensively at first hand, though it is difficult to see why we should 
take an interest in an arbitrary little network of friends or informants unless we 
can learn something of more general relevance’ (Ibid. 148). Quoting Maurice 
Bloch’s denouncement of ethnographies consisting of ‘assemblages of anecdotes 
of this and that’ (Holbraad 2012: 32, citing Bloch 2005: 9), Martin Holbraad 
similarly points to ‘the strong tendency in recent years to refrain from compara-
tive theoretical generalisations and to favor accounts of particular ethnographic 
instances’ (2012: 31).
One way forward is found in Niewöhner and Scheffer’s argument that ‘thick 
comparison’ implies a focus on the production of comparability itself (2008: 
275). They ask ethnographers to pay close attention to how ethnographic com-
parisons interact with comparative endeavours already occurring in the field, 
and how this produces comparability and ‘objects of comparison’ (Ibid. 280). 
They urge engagement with such emergent objects of comparison ‘in their 
performative force, meaning the ways they make new links and relations and 
explicate novel qualities and dynamics (both within the ethnographic field and 
in ethnographers’ social scientific discipline)’ (Ibid.). In a related vein, Helen 
Verran (2001) has turned the empirical study of forms of generalisation into a 
comparative project in its own right. Thus, she has compared the ways in which 
Western educators and Nigerian maths teachers do mathematical generalisa-
tion, and the forms of understanding that undergird Australian aboriginals’ and 
eco-scientists’ forms of land management.
Some of our own recent work similarly advocates for an agenda of ‘compara-
tive relativism’ (e.g. Jensen 2011; Strathern 2011; Viveiros de Castro 2011), 
emphasising the importance of conducting ‘comparison of comparisons’ in order 
to open up and relativise understandings of what different people ‘compare for’. 
This latter aspect ties in directly with the lateral comparisons we pick up on in 
this paper. What laterality adds is a sense of the unforeseeable movements of 
such diverse, relativised comparisons.
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Comparison with a Difference
Though STS by no means embraces comparative relativism, some scholars in this 
field have also grappled with the question of how to do comparison differently. 
In his contribution to the aforementioned special issue on thick comparison, 
Robert Schmidt draws on Max Weber to consider what comparison might mean 
if detached from a positivist agenda. Schmidt argues that Weber’s perspective 
offers a distinct vantage point from which to redefine comparativism. For Weber, 
he reminds us that
comparing critically (kritische Vergleichung) does not serve a search for 
analogies and parallels but rather should be deployed to shed light on the 
peculiarity (Herausarbeitung der Eigenart) of the cases and objects (1999: 7).
Quite contrary to the frequent scepticism about comparative analysis in ethnog-
raphy and qualitative research, Weber depicts comparative perspectives not as 
abstracting from or overriding the uniqueness of social phenomena, but rather 
as uncovering them (Schmidt 2008: 357). Accordingly, Weber’s comparative 
project does not presuppose ‘shared properties of objects’ and should not be 
seen as ‘equating objects and cases to each other’ (Ibid. 358). Instead, Schmidt’s 
reading of Weber suggests that the focal interest is ‘to make use of contrasts 
and differences, to gain insights from incomparability and inadequacy’ (Ibid.).
In STS, one of the best examples is Karin Knorr-Cetina’s studies of epistemic 
cultures. Her interest is in charting the different contours of ‘expert systems’ 
(1999: 1) such as the different modes of making knowledge that characterise 
molecular biology and physics. Rather than strive to identify ‘shared proper-
ties’, Knorr-Cetina calls attention to the fragmentation and disunity of science 
(see Galison and Stump 1996). Her aim is to display ‘different architectures of 
empirical approaches, specific constructions of the referent, particular ontolo-
gies of instruments, and different social machineries’ (Knorr-Cetina 1999: 3). 
‘A comparative optics’, she argues, ‘brings out not the essential features of each 
field but differences between the fields’ (Ibid. 4) such as ‘the communitarian 
science of physics’, and ‘the individual, bodily, lab-bench science of molecular 
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biology’ (Ibid. 4). Whereas physics aims to go beyond ‘anthropocentric and 
culture-centric scales of time and space in its organization and work, the other 
(molecular biology) holds on to them and exploits them’ (Ibid.). While physics 
‘is characterized by a relative loss of the empirical’, molecular biology is ‘heav-
ily experiential’ (Ibid.). Furthermore, whereas physics ‘transforms machines 
into physiological beings’ (Ibid.), the reverse is the case for molecular biology.
In the context of science policy studies, another prominent STS scholar, 
Sheila Jasanoff, has likewise proposed a novel comparative agenda. In the chapter 
‘Why Compare?’, Jasanoff (2005) notes the general decline of universalism and 
objectivism and the rise of poststructuralist and constructivist approaches in 
much of social science. She suggests it is increasingly recognised that science, 
technology, and policy are mutually embedded and co-produced.
Whereas comparison of science policies used to seem unnecessary (since 
science, assumed universal, was not supposed to be influenced by politics or 
culture), a first wave of comparative studies came to focus on the ‘national styles 
of policy’, aiming to identify the ‘styles’ most conducive to supporting scientific 
progress. Advocating a second wave, Jasanoff states that such research needs
a different justification than simply propagation of improved managerial 
techniques. Rather than prescribing decontextualized best practices for 
an imagined global administrative elite, comparison should be seen as 
a means for investigating the interactions between science and politics, 
with far-reaching implications for governance in advanced industrialized 
democracies (2005: 15).
In agreement with Weber’s injunction, her proposal centres on the explora-
tion of political culture – defined dynamically. Thus, her comparisons both 
rely on, and challenge, such ‘quasi-holistic’ notions as ‘the state’ and ‘political 
culture’. Aiming to elucidate topographies of comparison inhabited by national 
and scientific cultures, Jasanoff ’s comparative agenda is explicit about its own 
ontological and epistemological commitments.
Knorr-Cetina and Jasanoff offer some of the most explicit illustrations within 
the STS corpus of what comparison after positivism might look like. Neither 
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‘equates’ cases with one another, but uses comparison to highlight distinctive 
features of phenomena. In some ways, however, both also retain a rather clas-
sical vision of comparison.
First, while their comparisons work by the extraction of certain ‘traits’ from 
practices, they do not generally extend their interest to acts of comparison within 
practices. Thus, they exhibit limited interest in how and why the actors them-
selves compare. In that sense, they fall short of Niewöhner and Scheffers’ call 
for ‘thick comparisons’. This is probably due to the fact that both Knorr-Cetina 
and Jasanoff maintain a rather strict separation between empirical practices 
(which are compared) and academic analyses (where researchers use theoretical 
frameworks to compare). It is therefore little surprise that neither pays much 
attention to the lateral comparisons that informants themselves use to relate 
and distinguish their practices from one another. Furthermore, these authors 
show little concern for how their own comparisons establish lateral linkages.
In contrast, our ambition is to push the comparative envelope by focusing on 
such linkages. We find inspiration to do so in a series of recent studies located 
at the intersection of STS and anthropology.
Lateral Inspirations
One inspiration for the interest in lateral comparison arises from the now gener-
ally observed complexity of the relationship between ‘observer’ and ‘observed’. 
If this complexity has diverse sources, one of them is the experience of meeting 
informants whose projects and ways of thinking are not radically different from 
(or indeed sometimes very similar to) and certainly comparable to those of the 
researcher (Riles 2000). This is prominently (but by no means exclusively) the 
case when anthropology and STS study ‘modern’ knowledge practices.
This increasingly common situation challenges the implicit, if not basic, ‘social 
scientific contract’, according to which the relationship between researcher and 
informant implies a division of labour such that the latter ‘offer’ to the former 
their practices and thoughts for analysis and explanation. Presently (whether 
in science or business), expert informants with significant cultural capital are 
199
lateral coMparisons
fully able to read and comment on social science texts, and they are quite likely 
to disagree and offer alternative perspectives.
Annelise Riles has argued that the collapsing distance between ‘our’ and 
‘their’ knowledges calls for a new anthropological response, one that is capable of 
drawing, in more sustained ways, upon the ways in which informants themselves 
theorise their activities. Her argument aligns with actor-network theory’s insist-
ence that informants’ theories are often more relevant for ‘our’ understanding 
of ‘their’ practices than social scientific ones. Insofar, however, as actor-network 
theory (at least sometimes) claims to eschew theory in favour of elucidating 
actors’ perspectives, the solutions diverge. For Riles, the pressing question is 
how to respond to the threat of collapsing distance, without unwittingly accel-
erating that collapse through efforts to mimic our informants. In The Network 
Inside Out, for example, she compares the making of Fijian mats to the making 
of policy documents by a Fijian NGO working on gender issues (2000: 70ff).
Bill Maurer has also pinpointed the undercurrent of representationalism 
lurking underneath actor-network theory (and much other STS thinking). In 
Maurer’s view,
Latour’s realism is problematic for the same reason that it is so useful: refus-
ing the separation of epistemology from ontology opens up the innumerable 
black boxes that warrant ‘reality’, but it does so in terms of that refusal’s own 
agnosticism (Maurer 2005: 14).
Even so, actor-network theory has considerably more on offer than an inclination 
to realism. For one thing, it has attuned us to the notion that acts of comparison 
are not carried out exclusively by human actors (e.g. Hutchins 1995; Latour 
1988). Instead, it offers a view of comparison as a distributed activity, a hybrid 
achievement involving heterogeneous actors that only retrospectively tends to 
be condensed and attributed to (individual) human actors, rather than networks 
in toto. Anthropologist Atsuro Morita (2014) has also recently deployed this 
argument to inventive effect: comparisons, he argues, occur not only in the 
human domain, but also ‘within’ machines that contain their own contexts and 
scales. Morita accepts anthropologist Marilyn Strathern’s premise that the study 
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of others cannot avoid entailing the study of our own practices and knowledges. 
This mutual implication is invariably brought out in the discrepancy between 
our own presuppositions and the surprises arising from ethnography.2
Describing the work of Thai mechanics to make a Japanese cultivator operate 
efficiently in the environment of north-eastern Thailand, Morita argues that 
the breakdown of the cultivator led not only to comparisons of the expertise 
or skill levels of Thai and Japanese engineers, but also to the elicitation from 
within the machine of comparisons between the ecological conditions of Thai 
and Japanese fields. In a lateral extension, Morita continues to compare the 
operations of the cultivator to ethnography, a move that allows him to envi-
sion the anthropological enterprise as itself a ‘machine’ for articulating ‘strange 
connections’.
Now, if the separation between human and technology is a modern preoc-
cupation, so is the maintenance of boundaries between analysis and descrip-
tion, and theory and practice. However, Morita’s analysis shows that lateral 
comparison enables a cross-cutting analytical movement, whereby the ‘theories’ 
embedded in machines can inspire the practice of anthropological analysis. In 
our view, the principal interest of this study lies in its demonstration of the inven-
tive potentials of tracing comparisons ethnographically, only to subsequently 
utilise them for other analytical or practical purposes.
As a final example, Bill Maurer aims to reinvigorate comparison by explicit 
deployment of lateral comparisons. In his exploration of alternative currency 
experiments in the US, Maurer refrains from comparing these cases using 
theoretically derived categories. Instead, he traces lateral connections between 
them:
Islamic banking and Ithaca HOURS [an alternative currency] became nec-
essary to one another in my own efforts to restage what I saw them doing. 
They do not ‘represent’ each other or ‘shed light’ on each other so much as 
they draw on each other – but only sometimes, contingently and laterally. 
They metastasize into one another, but that metastasis is not essential to 
either of them, nor is it causal. For each overlaps and interconnects with 
other things, too (2005: 10).
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Maurer insists this does not mean that the two cases ‘automatically suggest each 
other, either’ (Ibid.). Instead, he writes, ‘at every step my effort to “compare” got 
interrupted by the form of that which I was “comparing”’ (Ibid.). These move-
ments, at once empirical and conceptual, ‘revealed the tropes of Islamic banking, 
alternative currencies, and my inquiry as open and unsteady’ (Ibid. 11).
It is precisely this sense of the ‘open and unsteady’ course of comparisons that 
guides us as we turn to a study of comparative technologies in fisheries inspection.
On the  We s t  C oas t 3
The West Coast is a 49.9-metre-long vessel used for fisheries inspection on the 
Danish sea.4 A crew of nine men (including a captain), one or two mates, two 
marine engineers, a cook, and one to three ship assistants, operates the ship. 
Contemporary fishing is a highly regulated arena, involving a range of regulatory 
issues including (but not limited to) quotas, equipment, catch landing, registra-
tion, and licensing issues. The inspection work carried out by the West Coast aims 
to ensure that fishermen comply with these regulations. Presently, inspection 
accounts for about 95% of the work hours, though the ship is also a key actor in 
the Danish National Rescue Service. Equally crucial is the fact that work on the 
West Coast relies on technologically mediated information of many sorts. Not 
least, technologies provide updated knowledge about the environment of the 
ship and its location. As we discuss in the following, the production of reliable 
information is integrally related to a series of comparisons.
On the Bridge: Local Assemblages and Immanent Comparisons
In her study of Dutch drug users under rehabilitation, Emilie Gomart (2004) 
found comparison to be an important preoccupation among doctors and patients. 
These comparisons were consequential: ‘drugs were alternatives, they were the 
very possibility to negotiate, to adjust and to change slightly’ (2004: 98). As we 
shall see, the need ‘to adjust and change slightly’ is also an important aspect of the 
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navigational requirements on the bridge of the West Coast. It, too, is facilitated 
by comparison. Contrary to Gomart’s study of human comparisons, however, 
these comparisons are embedded in technological assemblages.
Upon boarding the West Coast, one is immediately struck by the density of 
the technological environment. This is especially the case on the ship’s bridge. 
Throughout Gad’s fieldwork, one of the most prominent tasks of inspectors 
consisted of engagement with multiple navigational technologies. It would 
not be unreasonable to suspect that these technologies embody a division of 
labour in which each fulfils its own specific and specialised role. Certainly, this 
was Gad’s assumption when, ignorant to their purposes, he first encountered 
these technological black boxes. However, it gradually became clear that many 
of these different technologies had similar functions.
Today, navigation is primarily done using the electronic sea chart. This chart 
was introduced on the West Coast around the mid-2000s. However, even as this 
chart (on which the position of the ship is continuously updated by a geographi-
cal positioning system (GPS)) is now the primary means for navigation, the 
striking fact is that none of the older technologies have been discarded. Thus, 
in principle (and occasionally in practice) navigation can be done in several 
ways – namely using radar, compass, or landmarks. Danish law requires the ship 
to maintain paper maps and even a sextant. Somewhat absurdly, a positioning 
system that used to receive FM waves from land towers filled an entire panel 
on the bridge, although it had not been used for a long while.
Perhaps the apparent irrationality of this (more or less) obsolete techno-
logical arrangement diminishes if one thinks in economic terms. If the space 
is not urgently needed, there is little incentive to refurbish the whole bridge 
simply because one technology no longer serves a current purpose. However, 
the overwhelming sense of redundancy (extending to compasses and sextants) 
which few have the skills to use any more, points to a more general aspect of the 
technological environment: technologies tend not to replace one another on 
the West Coast. Instead, new ones are simply added to the existing assemblage 
of technologies and tasks on board the ship. The sense of redundancy or replica-
tion is intensified once it is realised that some technologies come in pairs. For 
example, on the bridge there are four steering gears and two radars.
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What might account for such functional overlaps? The most obvious reason 
is safety and risk management. A variety of technologies, similar and different, 
new and old, are available as backups in case others fail. If, as Marilyn Strathern 
observed about the comparative enterprise of anthropology, that ‘a distinct 
challenge […] is how to pace oneself for a future that is not ashamed of finding 
‘old’ as well as ‘new’ resources’ (2002: xiv), then this might be equally said of 
navigation (whether ‘old’ anthropological resources might be seen as a ‘backup’ 
in case newer ones fail need not detain us at this point). Even so, figuring out 
just what these diverse technologies are good for, and in which situations, is not 
simple. This is not only the case for the ignorant ethnographer, but also for the 
members of the crew. Moreover, these complications are precisely the starting 
points for acts of comparison.
For example, whether the new electronic sea chart is more ‘trustworthy’ 
than the older radar is contingent upon various considerations. The similarity 
of these technologies is easily understood, since both display the position of 
the ship relative to land and other vessels. However, when queried about their 
differences, crew members stated that the radar shows reality as it ‘really’ is. Over 
the years, stand-alone radars have proven their capacity to reliably represent the 
position of the ship. In contrast, the more advanced representation made avail-
able on the sea chart is mediated by software running on a PC, which makes it 
vulnerable to assorted errors and breakdowns.
At the same time, the radar was not considered sufficiently trustworthy 
and the ship regularly used two radars at once. Furthermore, the informa-
tion collected via radar could also be challenged by comparison with other 
positioning technologies, including the sea chart. Thus, while the radar can 
be tuned to filter out high waves in bad weather, this comes with the risk of 
missing small boats. For the sailors, as for Isabelle Stengers’ scientists, ‘objec-
tivity is not the name for a method but for an achievement, for the creation 
of a rapport authorizing the definition of an object’ (2011: 50). Comparison, 
that is, facilitates the making of situated but authoritative definitions of which 
information is reliable and safe – i.e. what is ‘real’. This is not a question of 




Reliability and safety varies with the constantly changing sea environment. 
This sets in motion another series of comparative acts. For example, it might 
be assumed that looking out of the window is the best way to observe ‘reality’. 
Why bother then with all these technologies? For one thing, the radar can 
‘see’ far in all directions and it will sound an alarm if other ships or obstacles 
approach. Second, ‘unmediated’ observation using eyesight is only feasible 
in situations where the sky is clear and the sea is calm. If there is heavy rain, a 
gusting storm, or if waves splash against the window, it is hardly possible to see 
anything. Since the radar can ignore most deflections due to bad weather, it 
offers a far better ‘window’ onto the realities of sea under such conditions (one 
captain explained – not without pride – that he had once docked in harbour 
using only the radar). Again, the trustworthiness and reliability of technologies 
are comparatively established and relative.
However, there is more to this variability than technological properties, for 
the addition of new technologies to the bridge also affects crew members’ skills 
and knowledge. Not least, the introduction of advanced technologies means 
that sailors must exert themselves to learn their use. Invariably, the ability to 
use old technologies begins to fade. Though many technologies are available, 
not every crew member is able to use them. Today, few can position using the 
sextant or fully master the mandatory paper charts.
The question of how to maintain ‘good old’ seafaring skills, in a context where 
new technologies are continuously added, was indeed a matter of concern aboard 
the ship. After all, as one crew member said, technologies are only good ‘as long 
as they work’. Thus, the fading ability to use older technologies – intimately 
bound up with the traditional skills and identities of sailors – was linked to a 
common worry about ‘deskilling’. In the parlance of actor-network theory, this 
process can be described in less nostalgic terms as the ongoing (and invariable) 
redistribution of technical and social competencies, and the attending (again 
invariable) transformations of what it means to be a sailor. The important point, 
however, is that establishing what counts as deskilling in this context (saturated 
by technology), can only be done comparatively.
Surprisingly, concerns about the use of technology were brought to light 
not only in consideration of technologies that, although available, may in fact 
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no longer be usable, but also about technologies that seem to work too well. 
Insofar as technologies appear to operate with smooth efficiency, sailors are 
prone to rely too much on them, and this can be dangerous. Stories circulated 
about captains who had trusted their equipment so much that they had failed 
to look out the window and wrecked their ships. Whether apocryphal or not, 
these stories highlight the life and death importance of relevant and timely 
navigational comparisons. Certainly, the GPS system is not infallible. Thus, 
paradoxically, in an inherently unstable sea environment, any technology that 
appears to be too trustworthy risks losing trust.5
Similarly, the autopilot and other technologies of automation were seen to 
carry the risk of rendering sailors inattentive at the precise moment when their 
skills would be most needed. To fight the threat to vigilance posed by automation, 
the crew adopted innovative, if somewhat banal, routines. Rather than remov-
ing sailors from the bridge, the autopilot gave rise to the new demand that two 
persons must always be present. A motion detector linked to an alarm ensured 
that the crew would be alerted if the bridge had become too quiet for comfort.
By looking into immanent comparisons on the bridge, this section has aimed 
to show that reliability and safety are effects of ongoing practices of compari-
son at sea. Technologies, new or old, become trustworthy only insofar as they 
are confirmed by other technologies. In rare cases where the technologies on 
the bridge produce realities that refuse to align, the entire assemblage ceases 
to resonate and becomes unreliable and unstable. Under such circumstances, 
crew members initiate investigative ‘repair work’. Reparation, however, does not 
move us outside the orbit of comparison. Instead, it entails even more detailed 
and intensive comparative efforts, such as recalibrating the radars, and using 
one radar to check the reliability of another display.
On the West Coast, reliable navigational information is thus constructed 
through a series of interlinked comparative practices. Comparisons are elicited 
through relationships between technologies on the bridge. They are neither 
human centred, nor strictly technology driven. Instead, the whole technologi-
cal set-up on the bridge can be seen as an assemblage for comparison. What it 
generates is temporary and partial trust in information, which allows the West 
Coast to navigate safely.
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Techno-bureaucratic Practices: Within a Comparative Ecology
If the previous section focused on immanent comparisons on the bridge, the 
present discussion highlights the web into which a single one of these technolo-
gies (i.e. the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS)), is spun. Rather than narrowing 
analysis, this exploration requires extension.
Brit Ross Winthereik and Henriette Langstrup Nielsen have argued ‘in 
favor of comparing sites […] by juxtaposing analyses’ of contexts (2008: 364). 
Similarly, Timothy Choy’s work on Ecologies of Comparison urges attention to 
‘techniques and politics of specification, exemplification, and comparison’ (2011: 
5). Choy offers these as ‘trigger words inviting reflection’ on how ‘practices draw 
and conceptualize connections’ between an array of concerns and things such 
as ‘forms of life and their environs […] what is considered big and […] small, 
between particulars and universals, between particular cases of a common rule, 
between specificities and generalisations’ (Ibid. 5–6). The VMS, too, is part of 
an ecology that stretches far beyond the West Coast and invites consideration 
of how sites are comparatively juxtaposed.
The VMS, as other technologies we have encountered, enables inspectors to 
position the West Coast and it helps them make decisions about how to move 
around at sea. As a navigational device, the VMS is also part of the assemblage 
of comparisons on the bridge. At the same time, it is tied into a broader, dis-
tributed ecology of comparisons that extend far beyond the physical confines 
of the ship. As part of this ecology, it relates to other techno-bureaucratic prac-
tices. It is therefore interwoven with different ‘scales and levels of obligation’ 
(Povinelli 2000: 509).
The VMS was introduced in 1999 in response to an EU initiative which 
committed member states to adopt information technologies for the inspec-
tion of their fishing fleets. By 2005, all Danish fishing vessels longer than fifteen 
metres were subject to this requirement. Technically, the VMS consists of a 
transceiver and an aerial installed on board each fishing vessel, and the transceiver 
is connected to GPS. It sends information about position, course, and speed 
to a satellite controlled by the International Maritime Satellite Organisation 
(INMARSAT). The satellite passes on this information to a communication 
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centre located in the Netherlands, which in turn passes it on to the fisheries 
directorates of the member states. The VMS on the West Coast receives this 
information from the Danish directorate. The West Coast retrieves information 
about vessels registered in Denmark and located in any maritime territory in 
Europe, as well as foreign vessels operating in Danish territory. The frequency 
of the signals can be set individually for each boat.
Aboard the West Coast, this information is accessible on a PC sitting on the 
bridge. An application called vTrack allows for visualisation of the whereabouts, 
speed, and course of each vessel. In order to decide where to head next, inspec-
tors open vTrack several times each day. To enable efficient boarding of many 
vessels, they usually look for clusters of ships.
In addition to information about the location of ships, inspectors can use 
vTrack to trace the movements of a vessel over time. They can also gather 
information about the state of the transceiver on any vessel. For example, if 
the transceiver has been turned off, this information is automatically stored in 
the VMS. The importance of this hinges on the fact that a boat that emits no 
signals; in fact it signals possible misconduct, since the transceiver signal may 
well have been intentionally shut off.
Furthermore, inspectors can access information about previous sightings of 
a vessel, whether registered by the West Coast, by other inspection ships, or by 
land-based inspection. Information about any previous illegalities, quotas, and 
licenses is also available. The monitoring system is thus quite comprehensive.
Yet, the inspection system does not rely exclusively on the VMS. Indeed, 
multiple forms of data are necessary to make inspection decisions. Thus, the 
ship has internet access via satellite connection, enabling the crew to send and 
receive messages about inspection plans, new legislation, and other relevant 
data. This ‘Fisheries System’ complements the VMS by providing information 
about vessels, records of catches, personal details about fishermen, information 
about licenses, observed vessels, lawbreakers, and more. The combined set of 
information is used by inspectors to prioritise their efforts, and determine what 
to search for on a vessel boarded for inspection.
In principle then, the VMS makes available to inspectors knowledge of the 
whereabouts of each vessel, and they have a range of supplementary information 
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at their fingertips. However, because this information is continuously updated, 
they struggle to keep abreast and maintain an overview. The abundance of 
information both expands and limits their practical knowledge (see Jensen and 
Winthereik 2013: 159–63). The result is new forms of specialisation, whereby 
one inspector may become an expert in regulations about cod, while another 
may be knowledgeable about the allowed sizes of nets, and so on. To enable 
comparison of specific fishing vessels with the most updated regulations, inspec-
tors increasingly rely on one another as information brokers.
Even if information is turned into knowledge, it is by no means certain that 
it can be made relevant and useful for inspection purposes. The problem of 
creating operational knowledge out of a sea of information is most clearly seen 
in relation to the phenomenon of ‘quota jumping’. Suspicions of quota jumping 
are likely to emerge when a ship is observed crossing back and forth over the 
border between two fisheries zones. The zigzagging movement suggests that 
the vessel is catching fish in one zone, and registering it in another, thus jump-
ing the quota. However, in order to establish a legal case for quota jumping, 
the pattern of movement seen on the computer screen provides insufficient 
evidence, for it is not illegal merely to sail in this pattern. Conclusive evidence 
requires the West Coast to be co-present with the offending vessel and observe 
the act of illegal fishing directly.
The trouble is that if the West Coast sails even remotely close to the zigzag-
ging boat, the latter is highly unlikely to continue to do anything illegal. Hence, 
the legally required comparison is almost impossible to effect in practice. The 
consequence is that even when inspectors using the VMS observe what they 
take to be unequivocal signs of quota jumping, they often decide not to inves-
tigate. Since the West Coast has no way of sneaking up on an offending vessel, 
the effort would at best be only temporarily preventive, and most likely futile.
Delving into the comparative ecology of the VMS, we can identify in another 
guise a ‘problem of representation’ to which acts of comparison on the bridge 
were also the solution. On the bridge, we showed acts of comparison deployed 
to establish trustworthy information about the sea environment. The question 
was how to know that technologies reliably represent the world. Focusing on 
the sociotechnical ecology of vTrack, the problem is in some sense the reverse: 
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inspectors do ‘know’ that the technologies are reliable, but they cannot reliably 
link that knowledge with action as required by law. In principle, inspectors are 
convinced of the commensurability between sign and reality. In practice, the 
‘sign’ displayed by vTrack remains incommensurable with this reality, since the 
time and movement required to verify illegality would disrupt the verification 
process. The problem of comparison here is not about knowledge’s validity, but 
about how to make the world respond to reliable knowledge.
Our discussions have highlighted that at sea no technology is an island. 
On the bridge, the efficacy of each technology is established within a localised 
assemblage of comparison, but technologies like the VMS are also part of more 
extended ecologies, stretching into legal systems, Danish bureaucracies, Dutch 
databases, and into the EU. Indeed, the very existence of the VMS is partly the 
result of the EU’s own comparisons of the monitoring capacities of its member 
states (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries of Denmark 2006: 52–57). 
Whether we focus on local assemblages or broader ecologies, the general fact 
thus remains that in all cases, technologies are used comparatively to deal with 
the ‘fields of embodied obligation’ (Povinelli 2000: 510) of inspection work.
There is no room within this mode of analysis for the assumption that any 
form of comparison is more inherent to work on the West Coast than any other. 
We can neither define navigational comparisons as primary and legal compari-
sons as derivative, nor vice versa. No aspect of comparative activity ultimately 
indexes the ‘real stuff ’ (Ibid.) of fisheries inspection more authentically than any 
other. Laterally speaking, the form comparisons take (as well as the implications 
they may have) are always in principle open-ended (see Krause, this volume).
Lat e ra l  Compar i sons
On the West Coast, we encountered an assemblage of comparison. Upon further 
inspection, technologies also turn out to operate as comparative devices in a 
much broader bureaucratic ecology. But wait – did we really ‘encounter’ such an 
assemblage? Did the technologies simply ‘turn out’ to operate comparatively? 
The lateral answer is both ‘yes’ and ‘no’, for whereas our characterisation is 
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supported by ethnography, it is not determined by it. Rather, the analysis is 
actualised simultaneously by our concern with comparison, as a social sci-
entific tool and as empirical finding. It thus moves between the two, in both 
directions.
The intrinsic relationship between comparisons unfolding ethnographically 
and comparisons activated analytically can be elucidated by means of a contrast 
between two approaches that, at first glance, appear radically opposed. On the 
one hand, anthropologists like Riles and Maurer insist on the inventiveness 
of ethnographic re-description, a form of creativity they consider stifled by 
actor-network theory’s purported ‘realism’. As Maurer insists, ‘[t]he point is not 
to identify entanglements and name them when you see them, but to obviate 
that very move as the analysis proceeds and to remain very much within that 
procession’ (2005: 14).
On the other hand, philosopher of science Stengers argues that the central 
question is whether ‘we impose comparison or we [are] authorised to compare 
by the subjects we address?’ (2011: 48). Stengers argues that this question is 
‘very demanding’ because it implies that ‘no comparison is legitimate if the par-
ties compared cannot each present his own version of what the comparison is 
about; and each must be able to resist the imposition of irrelevant criteria’ (2011: 
56). No comparison is legitimate, she argues, if it is unilateral – and most social 
scientific comparisons are. If Riles takes the liberty of comparing Fijian mats 
with policy documents, or Maurer compares Chinese characters with offshore 
banking (Martin and Maurer 2012), are we not witness to the imposition of 
irrelevant criteria? Similarly, when we describe the bridge on the West Coast 
as an assemblage of comparison, does this not introduce an extant analytical 
apparatus? This worry begins to dissipate with the realisation that comparisons 
are at once omnipresent and multiple, immanent and cross-cutting, both among 
our informants and ourselves.
For one thing, much that happens on board the West Coast is in response 
to things that are as foreign to the crew as our characterisation of their work: 
things like international law, EU regulations, and regimes of natural resource 
management. However, while the demands these regimes impose are in some 
sense ‘unilateral’, the ongoing comparisons on the ship work to ‘indigenise’ 
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these impositions. Local comparisons make them amenable to particular forms 
of manipulation and re-inflection. Through comparative work, the impositions 
gradually become part of the local assemblages. In other words, the clear-cut 
distinction between external and internal blurs.
Even so, it can surely be said that the terminology of assemblage and ecology 
that we use to describe these situations is foreign to the field. This is certainly 
the case, for it comes out of reading works by scholars like Latour, Deleuze, 
Strathern, and Maurer as part of our disciplinary education, and in response 
to our own emergent research interests. Obviously, and unavoidably, those 
interests shape our sense of what an interesting comparative project might look 
like. Hence, the particular comparisons on which we have focused are elicited 
in a dynamic interplay between our intellectual preoccupations and what we 
encountered on the West Coast. These comparisons are neither ‘imposed’ nor 
simply found there. Exemplifying the lateral point, they operate in the uncertain 
space in-between. At the end of the day, these are nevertheless our comparisons. 
After all, Christopher’s informants have other things to do than write for this 
volume. However, that these comparisons are ours in that sense does not imply 
that we were ever in a position to fully control them, even if we wanted to. But 
then, we explicitly did not.
Explaining her analytical interest in Dutch doctors and drug addicts, Gomart 
wrote that
I would not assume they were like me; but I would allow that others pose 
questions with me. My aim became to describe […] the experimentations 
they were able to deploy in such settings (2004: 86).
Gomart insisted that ‘[t]o learn something from these actors’, she would have 
to discipline herself to be ‘surprised’ by their experiments (Ibid.). For Gomart, 
as for us, such disciplining is not simply an act of will. It is a learning process 
that draws not only on ethnographic experience, but also on a set of emergent 
intellectual dispositions. Such dispositions are shaped by a corpus of readings 
and discussions that train us to be attentive to empirical and conceptual surprises, 
as well as to the surprises of their interacting effects, all at once.
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Undoubtedly, this creates a vantage point from which social science com-
parisons are imposed in that they are not those of informants – but also one in 
which the imposition is not unilateral – since the comparisons conducted by 
informants turn into surprises for research. Those surprises, in turn, generate the 
comparisons made by the social researcher for other purposes. Intentionally or 
not, some of those comparisons may fold back upon, and affect, the practices of 
informants. One of the surprises generated by the study of fisheries inspection 
on board the West Coast is that, in a certain sense, their reasons for deploying 
comparisons are analogous to the reasons for social scientific comparison. In 
both cases, comparisons are about tuning and attuning to reality in order to 
make it amenable to both analysis and action. Nevertheless, of course, the kinds 
of analysis and action that the comparisons enable are radically different. It is this 
interplay between similarity and difference that subsequently facilitates lateral 
deployments of others’ comparisons.
The work of fisheries inspectors unfolds in a world only partially known. 
This uncertainty guides their comparative efforts to maintain navigational 
safety. Each technology within the assemblage on the bridge offers a ‘generous 
constraint’ (Gomart 2004: 105), contingently taken into account in producing 
a trustworthy picture. As part of inspectors’ practical ontological work, then 
(Gad, Jensen, and Winthereik 2015), acts of comparison function as tools for 
creating reliability. Comparison helps them calibrate a reality experienced as 
potentially disorderly.
In the social sciences, the ‘problem of representation’ continues to recur in 
a range of situations and debates. How can we know what the world is? How 
can we know that we are representing it correctly? As we have argued, on board 
the West Coast this problem is routinely dealt with in a form far more pressing 
than the one encountered by most social scientists: at sea, failure to know the 
world adequately can lead to shipwreck. We cannot say whether the inspectors 
are realists or constructivists with respect to this world, for though they come 
up with what we might refer to as realist or constructivist responses as part of 
their comparative practices, they never named such positions. Even so, the way 
in which this question is handled bears little resemblance to the demands of 
social scientists or philosophers keen on accurate representation. Inspectors 
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maintain a pragmatic attitude, premised on the precautionary refusal to ascribe 
trust in any single version of reality offered by any technology.
Though fisheries inspectors need accuracy to navigate safely, they have little 
need for the idea of a static reality. More akin to Maurer’s depiction of anthro-
pology as ‘open and unsteady’, the fluctuating reality of fisheries inspection is 
temporarily stabilised through ongoing efforts to make timely comparisons. The 
technological assemblage and wider ecology of comparison into which fisheries 
inspection is spun, enables inspectors to hold the dynamic sea environment 
sufficiently in check to continue their work.
Stefan Helmreich (2011) has observed that over the decades, social scien-
tists have mined the sea for metaphors and concepts. Indeed, he suggests, the 
sea functions akin to a ‘theory-machine’ from which widespread theories and 
frameworks centring on flows, fluidity, and circulations have emerged. Helmreich 
draws the conclusion that
[t]heory (and for that matter seawater) is at once abstraction as well as thing 
in the world; theories constantly cut across and complicate our paths as we 
navigate the ‘real’ world (2011: 5).
Rather than engage with the sea as an entity on its own, we have followed the 
work of fisheries inspectors who are constantly preoccupied with its unpre-
dictable behaviour. Their attempts to maintain a sense of control in this fluid 
environment rely on a technological assemblage of comparisons. Even their 
much-cherished idea of the ‘free life at sea’ (Gad 2012) is deeply entangled with 
the management of uncertainty enabled by this assemblage.
Comparat i v e  Imag inat ions
In her preface to Anthropology, By Comparison, Marilyn Strathern expressed 
concern that an abiding sense of connectedness generates epistemic laziness 
among its proponents (2002: xv). She suggested the metaphor of extended net-
works ‘gobbles up all the spaces between’ and depicts ‘a continentalizing empire, 
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leaving nothing that is not potentially connectable to everything else’ (Ibid.). 
Although our comparative endeavour can hardly be said to refute ‘twenty-first 
century imaginings’, the West Coast’s ecology of comparisons might give us pause.
There is no doubt that fishery inspection is entangled in an extended web. 
Indeed, was it to be detached from this wider ecology, there would be little 
chance that the work could continue. Yet it is not clear whether this ecology 
adds up to an ‘empire’: certainly all the spaces in between have not yet been 
‘gobbled up’. Indeed, even though fishery inspectors worry about their increasing 
dependence on wider networks of regulations and technologies, their concern 
is not with a general ‘continentalisation’ of their work. It is rather with retaining 
room for specific kinds of manoeuvre within their ecologies of comparison. 
Thus, while fishery inspectors are unceasingly critical about the bureaucratic 
regimes of which they are part, they also manage to find ways to ‘operate in the 
gaps’ in order to do ‘good’ inspection. Distancing themselves from governmen-
tal demands made by the Danish state and the EU, they often emphasise their 
similarity with the fishermen whose job it is to inspect.
This particular comparative alignment elicits the paradox (from the point 
of view of the inspectors) that it is their task to control other sailors, who, like 
themselves, ought to be ‘free’. An important aspect of inspection is the naviga-
tion of this troubling contradiction, both in terms of the ‘identity crisis’ it gen-
erates for the inspectors, and in relation to the question of how to respectfully 
enter the private homes (i.e. the ships) of fishermen in order to control their 
behaviour. A similar carefulness might, in turn, be said to describe the relation-
ship between the crew members, their own ship, and its different technologies. 
Reciprocally, the technological assemblage on the ship could of course also be 
seen as taking care of the inspectors. Indeed, inspectors quite often referred to 
the ship as their ‘second home’.
It is impossible to say how long this comparative chain could be expanded. 
However, this is precisely the point of lateral comparison. For in the cases we 
have characterised, the location and boundaries of comparisons are invariably 
somewhat loose and indeterminate. They stretch across inspectors and their 
machines; bureaucracies and tracking systems; felt moral obligations and 
legal requirements; and also ethnographers’ observational capacities and their 
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conceptual inclinations. Thus, lateral comparisons are likely to occur anywhere 
and everywhere ( Jensen and Gad 2009; Gad and Jensen 2010), but the ways in 
which they are conducted, assembled, and brought together across domains are 
altogether variable. This is the basis for our initial refusal to delimit what may 
count as comparative material.
Even so, in a book chapter there are clear practical limitations on extendibility, 
and therefore there are always choices to be made about description and exposi-
tion. Here, we have articulated just this lateral comparative chain for a very specific 
purpose: not primarily to give deep insight into the working lives or technologised 
practices of fisheries inspectors, but precisely to make visible some potentials 
that lateral comparison might hold for STS, anthropology, and social science.
In our view, a reinvigoration of the comparative imaginations of the social 
sciences is both timely and promising, but its promise does not lie in the speci-
fication of a new comparative agenda tout court. One of the major problems 
with such an agenda is that it offers few possibilities for ‘inventing around’. Its 
rigour comes in the way of noticing and playing with the lateral comparisons 
that invisibly sustain it. As Strathern wrote about the now deceased project of 
grand-style anthropological comparison,
it was hard to see how it could be added to, qualified, introduced into other 
contexts or travel, like Latour’s mutable mobiles – in short, how it could 
become interesting. It only produced knowledge like itself (2002: xv).
However, whereas a return to comparative studies in the grand style is thus not 
only epistemologically and methodologically unfeasible, but also delimiting 
and uninteresting, it seems equally clear that acts of comparison – both ethno-
graphic and analytic – still matter. Indeed, as our cases have suggested, acts of 
comparison are both practically crucial and conceptually magnetic, not only 
to social scientists, but also to their informants, who deploy them in the most 
diverse ways. As Stengers wrote, we are indeed, ‘all comparativists’ (2011: 48).
Here we have argued that one way to heighten our comparative imagination, 
and keep the surprises and effects of comparisons in full view, is to focus on their 




1 Holy noted that ‘[t]he possibility of generalizing from a single case was of course 
not ruled out, but the merits and deficiencies of this type of generalizing in contrast to 
generalization on the basis of systematic comparison of several cases, were addressed as a 
methodological problem (Köbben 1970, cited in Holy 1987: 2). This intriguing possibility 
has been reintroduced under the rubric of ‘comparative relativism’ ( Jensen 2011).
2 For example, Strathern has used Melanesian ethnography to elucidate English kinship 
(1992) and Western audit cultures (2000).
3 Gad did fieldwork on the West Coast from 2008–2009, mostly on the ship’s bridge.
4 The ship might as well have been just a bit over fifty metres long, Gad was told, but in 
that case the law would have required the ship to have an additional crew member. In this 
sense, the length of the West Coast was ‘determined’ by a comparison between the ship 
and security standards. 
5 Situations in which too much trust turns out to be dangerous and may cause subsequent 
breakdowns of trust, are also prevalent elsewhere. For instance, uncritical reliance on 
mapping and positioning devices is also problematic for drivers (see e.g. ranker.com 2014). 
These cases illustrate that trust in technology without a comparative basis is common, but 
also that it is often risky. This is an insight of which fisheries inspectors were well aware.
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I n troduct ion
this chapter steMs FroM My ethnographic study oF senior hoMe care 
in the United States and Sweden. In this study, I trace relations between people 
and technology as they come together in gatherings or ‘collectives’ (Moreira 
2010) for care. Specifically, I am interested in how care moves with these collec-
tives and generates interrelated consequences for the human and nonhuman 
actors concerned. However, these relational moves of care are rarely smooth. 
Instead, they comprise ongoing tensions or ‘frictions’ (Tsing 2005) which situate 
multiple acts of negotiation and ‘tinkering’ (Mol 2008; Mol et al. 2010). As such, 
‘care moves’ offers a conceptual-empirical figure for fine-tuning ethnographic 
attention to care as a rough and tinkered process. It denotes an analytical empha-
sis on care as a mediating phenomenon interwoven with collective relations on 
the move, empirically and conceptually – entailing both effects and affects.
At the same time, I have not sought after a standardised social scientific 
comparison of two national healthcare systems, even though I worked in two 
different countries. Rather than rely on established categories, I remain interested 
in how to ethnographically tinker together – and thus care with – transnational 
comparisons in a more fluid or flexible manner. As such, I seek an experimental 
and ethnographic approach sensitive to the specific ways care moves with its 
collective relations.
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Nevertheless, in my efforts, I have met numerous and unexpected hurdles. In 
this chapter, I revisit some of these challenges. They interrelate with informant 
or ‘emic’ comparisons about care and how it should move. These range from 
how to attend to mobility in and around the home, to future concerns including 
when to transfer into assisted living. My ethnographic travels between these dif-
ferent care moves led to perspectives that resist straightforward comparison. For 
instance, some seniors have family members nearby who help with home care, 
while others do not. Some have sufficient health coverage, while others struggle 
to find affordable good care. Some face serious health challenges that impede 
mobility and increase isolation, while others retain relatively good health. More 
importantly, care situations change dramatically in a single instant, and from 
one day to the next. If an older person falls, for example, it may dramatically 
alter the senior home care arrangements.
In this diverse field of care, certain comparisons suddenly seem unwieldy, 
while others become irrelevant or mundane. I find getting stuck in these com-
parative complexities akin to Donna Haraway’s (2008) notion of ‘staying with 
the trouble’. In other words, my efforts to compare became tightly connected 
with the troubles and rough moves of care that I encountered. Here, I have in 
mind a different breed of comparison, untethered from modes of comparison 
that solely adopt the standardised categories of a scientific repertoire. In this 
chapter, I set out to develop this approach as ‘comparative tinkering’.
Ethnography is central to this approach because it generates ‘passages’ to 
tinker with different comparisons of care moves. As such, ethnographic pas-
sages help ground comparative tinkering as a tool for mobilising social scientific 
insights. Like senior home care moves, comparative tinkering with ethnographic 
passages equates to rough, zigzagging, analytical moves. Michel Serres’ (1980) 
‘northwest passages’ is a good analogy here.1 The difference is that my ethno-
graphic passages entangle reflexive comparisons between careful doing and 
thinking. More generally, my comparative efforts relate to an experimental turn 
in social scientific methodology (Otto and Bubandt 2010; Lury and Wakeford 
2012) and the interest in ethnographic transnational comparison.
Through my ethnographic passages – consisting of ‘field-desk relations’ 
(Strathern 1999) or ‘conceptual-empirical mixtures’ (see Gad and Ribes 
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2014) – a series of questions emerge that ground this chapter. How, for instance, 
do complex care moves compare in senior home care? Similarly, how do the 
subtle tinkering moves of care compare in a transnational analysis? How might 
social scientists make careful comparisons of others’ comparisons without 
losing sight of the messy work and moves of care itself? Moreover, how do such 
questions challenge what we deem to be ‘noteworthy’ comparisons – namely 
comparisons worth taking notes on in the field and tracing as valuable insights 
in scientific discussions? With these questions, I focus attention on how note-
worthy comparison can entail travel worthiness, whereby comparisons with 
care move both empirically and conceptually.
The assertion that comparison resides in motion is relevant here, and relates 
to recent ideas in anthropology and science and technology studies (STS) about 
how to blend different kinds of scientific-informant, or etic-emic, knowledge 
relations. Work by Gergely Mohácsi and Atsuro Morita is exemplary. They focus 
on the interrelations between travel and transnational comparison and proffer 
the notion of ‘travelling comparisons’ (2013) as an experimental analytical 
approach. With this notion, they draw attention to the importance of mundane 
human and nonhuman movements that make and unmake similarities and dif-
ferences in practice. For instance, in one account, Morita (2013a) traces how 
Thai workers compare Japanese-made cultivator blades that become tangled 
with Thai weeds when tilling the land. He shows how these machine-weed 
tangles situate Thai farmers’ and mechanics’ comparisons between their local 
work practices, their environments, and the Japanese-made machines, which 
the Thai import, modify, and copy. Morita explains:
In this context, the specific parts of the machine that caused the trouble – 
the blades entangled with weeds – generated a sort of comparative vision. 
The mechanics and farmers saw the weeds wrapped around the blades as a 
difference between the Japanese environment that the machine embodied 
and the actual environment in the farmers’ fields. In other words, the blades 
entangled with the weeds produced a double vision in which the Thai and 
the Japanese environments were seen at once through their difference 
(2013a: 235–6).
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Thus, Morita argues that the coming together of heterogeneous entities – farm-
ers, mechanics, engineers, blades, weeds, and so on – offers an opportunity to 
locate social scientific comparison in practice. Key in Morita’s analysis is the 
attention to others’ use of technology, and how machines present workers with 
the opportunity to generate transnational comparisons. For inspiration, Mohácsi 
and Morita also turn to Marilyn Strathern and others who argue for analytical 
experimentation in the relationship between emic and etic comparisons, and 
what some consider ‘lateral’ moves (Maurer 2005; Gad and Jensen, this volume).
Similarly, I hope to contribute to this way of rethinking the agency of social 
scientific comparison in relation to movement and transnational research, and 
between emic and etic concerns. Two of my previously published articles provide 
material for my deliberation. One article focuses on the movement of house-
hold clutter and technology in US senior home care (Lutz 2010). In the other, 
I centre on how healthcare technology helps generate different spatiotemporal 
‘surfacing’ moves in Swedish senior home care (Lutz 2013). It is important to 
stress, however, that I sidestep transnational comparison in these publications. 
At the time of writing, I simply did not find what seemed like traversable eth-
nographic passages for a transnational comparison. As I indicate above, senior 
home care in both countries, and in its different situations, appeared undeserv-
ing of comparative travel.
With the idea of comparative tinkering in hand, here I retrace the potentials 
of comparison in these passages. This includes a search for links between my own 
comparisons and those of my informants. Drawing on ideas in anthropology 
and STS about comparison and human-nonhuman care, I tinker carefully with 
how care moves might inspire social scientific comparison in an ethnographic 
and transnational mode. As an experimental concept, comparative tinkering 
denotes the rough and uncertain process of mediating categorical differences to 
generate new comparisons, which link to how care moves in practice. Although 
this does not align with the usual notion of scientific comparison, I propose that 
it situates a significant comparative approach.
The literature on care in practice (Mol 2008; Mol et al. 2010) influences 
my thinking about careful comparisons as relational tinkering.2 Others have 
suggested similar terms. For instance, Jeanette Pols (2012) emphasises ‘fitting’, 
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while Myriam Winance (2006) proffers ‘adjustment’. In Mol’s view, the aim is 
to find ways to study care ‘in and on its own terms’ to open up different ways 
of knowing what care is and evoke ‘what it is to hang together’ (2010: 265). I 
suggest that this also pertains to making scientific comparison work and move 
with care, and this entails accounting for the comparative practices of informants.
A team of Swedish care workers provide an apt example. One morning, 
over coffee, they explained their approach. With the increasing number of 
senior clients in their care, they decided to alternate their client rounds each 
week so that every worker could gain fresh knowledge about every senior’s 
changing situation. This approach made their work less monotonous. More 
importantly, it supported the collective decision-making about necessary 
adjustments to an individual’s care routine. ‘Otherwise’, they remark, ‘we 
have no real perspective’.
These multiple tinkering care moves – with its adjustments and ongoing 
comparisons – relates closely to my own reflexive efforts to comparatively tinker 
with ethnographic passages. In this way, I suggest that tinkering comparisons 
opens up possibilities to blur the distinction between emic and etic. Yet, the 
scientific literature often takes a different path by fixing its comparative catego-
ries. To exemplify this, next I review how the gerontological literature treats the 
transnational comparison of senior care in the US and Sweden. This will help to 
further orient the analytical challenges I found in my own work and motivate 
the notion of comparative tinkering, which I develop in the rest of the chapter.
Compar i sons  o f  Car e
We should not compare US and Swedish geriatric services […] The cul-
tures and healthcare systems are just too different to support meaningful 
comparisons.
 – John Rowe (2011)3
There are many comparative studies of healthcare systems in the scientific lit-
erature. However, I only found a handful that explicitly compare the situation 
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for older people who require home care in the US and Sweden. Why do some 
scholars apparently sidestep this transnational comparison? In the quotation 
above, Rowe indicates the issue of cultural and healthcare differences. Marti 
Parker echoes this point when she suggests that such a comparison risks absurd-
ity, given the vast population differences in each country (2001: 86). Sweden 
is a country of more than 9.5 million, while the US population has reached 
320 million (World Population Review 2014).4 In addition, some US seniors 
face extreme poverty, while there has been a lack of poverty among Swedish 
seniors since World War II (Parker 2001: 26). Parker also argues that these two 
countries historically represent ideological opposites in terms of welfare policies 
and services. For instance, Sweden traditionally has universal public healthcare, 
while the US typically adopts a market-driven model.
On the other hand, Parker considers how this comparison also makes sense. 
Both countries face welfare challenges linked to the changing demographics – 
so-called ‘population ageing’. Currently, people over the age of 65 make up 
19% of the Swedish population and 14% of the US population (World Bank 
2014). In addition, Parker argues that both countries increasingly adopt similar 
healthcare strategies. For example, in Sweden, there is a growing emphasis on 
decentralisation and privatisation, while initiatives like the Affordable Care 
Act – also known as ObamaCare – have increased the national regulation 
of healthcare in the US. In addition, there is a growing emphasis on targeted 
healthcare needs and evaluation, although each country has developed a different 
version (Parker 2001: 73). Parker concludes that this increasing ‘convergence’ 
of healthcare for seniors offers opportunities to learn from the successes and 
failures in each country (Ibid. 88).
Additional studies that follow this comparison include Adam Davey et al. 
(2005), Dennis Shea et al. (2003), and Dominique Wang and Christian Aspalter 
(2007). Both Davey et al. and Shea et al. compare ‘formal’ or paid home care – 
provided by professional care workers – and ‘informal’ or voluntary home care 
provided by family members or friends in each country. Here the label ‘Activities 
of Daily Living’ (ADLs) groups together a diverse and complex range of needs 
into a single category.5 These articles, based on statistical analysis, conclude that 
while there is some convergence between the two countries, Swedish seniors 
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are more likely to find ADL support. This conclusion confirmed the authors’ 
initial assumptions that the Swedish system offers several advantages for seniors 
in comparison to the US.
In their article, Wang and Aspalter (2007) survey healthcare systems in 
several countries, including the US and Sweden. To achieve their compari-
son, they focus on a series of ‘healthcare indicators’ consisting of statistical 
economic data on national healthcare expenditures. Their article does not 
distinguish senior home care per se, but it does offer implications for its broader 
socioeconomic conditions. The authors conclude that market forces largely 
shape the inequalities of healthcare in the US, while the tradition of universal 
public healthcare (based on solidarity and a strong public sector) still plays a 
dominant role in Sweden. In other words, while these studies acknowledge 
the convergence to which Parker refers, they also agree that Swedish seniors 
typically enjoy better care.
What additional insights might we gather from this handful of studies in 
terms of social scientific comparison? For instance, at first glance, this lack of 
US-Sweden comparison might appear to suggest a knowledge gap. However, 
this is not so. Extensive scientific knowledge about the healthcare in each of 
these countries does exist. Instead, I venture that many healthcare studies bypass 
transnational comparison to focus on an individual national healthcare system 
and its policies. The assumption here seems to be that each national healthcare 
system operates within its own specific set of contextual arrangements, where 
practices in other countries are less relevant. Such an assumption echoes Rowe’s 
relativistic statement regarding how healthcare differences between these two 
countries still create the risk of an incommensurable – or ‘apples and oranges’ – 
comparison. One might also surmise that transnational comparison simply 
does not present the most fruitful or easiest path of study. However, institutions 
like the World Health Organisation (WHO), concerned with global health 
and research agendas, continue to engage with transnational comparisons to 
inform their recommendations. Perhaps the issue does not simply concern the 
possibility or absence of transnational comparison, but whether it produces 
noteworthy scientific knowledge towards a specific purpose. Yet, how is this 
achieved in practice?
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This question relates to another important point about the use of standardised 
analytical categories for comparison. For instance, in the above studies, trans-
national comparisons of healthcare often stem from economic typologies such 
as ‘welfare’ versus ‘market’ systems.6 These combine medical terminologies to 
stake out the conceptual ground for transnational comparison. Examples here 
include: ‘convergence’ (Parker 2011), ‘ADL support’ (Davey et al. 2005; Shea et 
al. 2003), and ‘economic healthcare indicators’ (Wang and Aspalter 2007). This 
use of analytical categories for comparison is akin to the notion of a standard 
‘comparator’ – a device for measuring the properties or performance of a system 
with comparison to an established standard. In other words, standard categories 
as comparators help generate links between the different national healthcare 
systems for transnational comparison. However, I wager that such standard com-
parators also sidestep the empirical complexities of how care moves. We might 
think of this as regionalising or ‘domaining’ comparison without magnification 
(Strathern 2004), especially in terms of how senior home care transforms with 
its movements in practice.
From one point of view, the notion of ADL support presents an exception in 
the sense that it supposedly relates more specifically to the practice of care itself. 
ADL is shorthand for bathing, dressing, mobility, toileting, and eating – basic 
activities that concern senior home care in practice. However, I suggest that 
grouping these different practices together under the term ADL support glosses 
over the important and ongoing situational challenges that emerge with care 
moves. For instance, in Davey and Shea, we do not learn how any one ADL plays 
out in practice, nor what challenges it surfaces. Instead, they emphasise percentile 
differences between formal and informal support in both countries, based essen-
tially on an abstraction. Thus, I propose that even a term like ADL support can 
generate conceptual-empirical gaps that miss the pervasive, ongoing specificities 
of care and its comparisons. Senior home care remains rich with comparative vari-
ations that weave incontinence, disease, disabilities, local healthcare infrastruc-
tures, family members, and volunteers (or their absence). Perhaps comparisons 
of care can also include attempts to resonate with such complexities on the move.
To summarise, I have argued that perspectives akin to Rowe’s tend to consider 
the differences between senior healthcare services in the US and Sweden as too 
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vast for transnational comparison. On the other hand, the studies I outline in this 
section challenge this perspective. Yet, to pursue their transnational comparison 
they establish comparative categories – or standardised comparators – that 
bypass the endless stream of generative frictions produced as care moves in prac-
tice. For instance, ADL support, as a standard comparator, does not necessarily 
bring the analysis any closer to the multiple complexities found in care, in or on 
its own terms (Mol 2008, 2010). This critique echoes other observations about 
how comparisons of healthcare tend to sidestep or ignore the complex tensions 
of comparison in practice (Langstrup and Winthereik 2010). Related arguments 
also stress the need to weave social scientific comparison with comparisons 
made in care, including particular and ongoing decisions about the doing of 
‘good enough’ care (Mol 2002). My intention is not to dismiss the above com-
parative literature. Indeed, I agree with Parker that senior home care in the US 
and Sweden can offer valuable comparisons. However, might such comparisons 
do more, such as challenge the conceptual assumptions built into the standard 
comparators? Moreover, how might we pursue transnational comparisons that 
initially seem unworthy? What if we rethink the value of comparison as hedged 
in the uncovering of incommensurable gaps rather than trying to fill them? What 
kind of tertium comparationis – or comparative thirdness – might we need?
Such questions relate to Deville et al.’s (this volume) alternative notion of 
the ‘comparator assemblage’ that temporally surfaces as a hybrid mixture of 
people and things, including the researcher(s) in the doing of comparison. 
Likewise, Christopher Gad and Casper Jensen (this volume) propose the idea 
of ‘lateral’ comparisons that embrace non-hierarchical relations that reside in 
conceptual-empirical mixtures. These approaches set out to reject predetermined 
or standardised comparative categories, and instead accommodate comparison 
as a mutually transformative practice that runs in multiple directions.
Similarly, I revisit connections between my own comparisons and the 
comparisons I found other care workers making. By revisiting two of my ear-
lier articles that sidestep transnational comparison, I aim to experiment with 
how ethnographic passages might open up new avenues for comparison that 
initially appeared jammed. In the same turn, I also expose not only my own 
social scientific authority, but also my earlier hesitations about comparison. 
229
coMparative tinkering With care Moves
This retrospective turn to tinker with comparative views equates to what 
Strathern (2011) has termed a ‘binary license’ – the privilege to anthropo-
logically compare, through textual contrasts and bifurcations, the relative 
comparisons of different others. As such, my comparative tinkering relates 
to concerns about social scientific method as well as what counts as scientific 
knowledge. To preface this move, I next introduce the practical conditions of 
my study. This will help to further situate comparative tinkering as a generative 
and experimental approach.
Compar i sons  i n  Car e
My fieldwork on senior home care in the US and Sweden grew from a larger 
European research project. The wider objective of this project was to inform 
the future design and development of ‘ambient intelligent telecare’ for senior 
home care. Ambient intelligence is a term that references the artificial capacity 
to sense and respond to environmental cues and human expectations, while 
telecare is a general term for technology that supports home care. This initial 
research sought to contribute ethnographic knowledge that could intervene 
with design assumptions about senior home care, and thereby support the 
robust design of such technology. As noted, I focused on the question of how 
care moves and the relational frictions that such moves generate in these two 
countries. Given the underlying concern with the social scientific comparison 
in this chapter, below I overview how the conditions of this research entangled 
my own comparative efforts.
Various interests in the project influenced the decision to pursue fieldwork 
in the US and Sweden. In part, these stemmed from the project’s organisation. 
The Dutch multinational hi-tech conglomerate, Philips Research, led the pro-
ject, while the European Commission financed it.7 Both actors were interested 
in the development of technology to meet the challenge of population ageing. 
In addition, Philips had recently acquired a North American telecare business 
(Lifeline), which offers a popular emergency response service based on wear-
able wireless technology. The project’s assumption was that a comparative 
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ethnographic study of senior home care in practice could inform the design 
of new healthcare technologies in North America and Europe. In addition, we 
assumed that my personal knowledge of Sweden and the US, based on previous 
time spent in each country, could ease the challenge of fieldwork access. Thus, 
practical considerations influenced the direction of my comparative efforts 
with senior home care.8
Yet, as my travels and collected materials accumulated, my certainty about a 
standard transnational comparison weakened. In the previous section, I outlined 
reasons why a transnational comparison appeared questionable. These include 
differences in how these two countries finance and manage senior home care. In 
my fieldwork, personal dynamics also played a role, such as the informants’ will-
ingness to share their ‘moving’ stories about care. This mixed with my capacity to 
establish trust and rapport. At the same time, with each new situation, my uncer-
tainties increased. There were endless complexities stemming from the shifting 
concerns about ageing bodies, relations to household clutter, and the different 
spatial-timings of senior home care.9 Emergencies like falling could introduce 
urgent comparisons between ideas about stable and unstable bodies. Other com-
parisons concerned seniors’ past and present conditions, as well as the direction 
that future care moves should take. Despite the project’s initial comparative ambi-
tions, it was clear that a standard transnational comparison would face difficulty.
The actual routes of my fieldwork, interlinked with the wider national 
healthcare contexts, also influenced my ability to compare. For example, in the 
US, telecare users were my primary pool of informants. After a series of initial 
telephone screenings from a randomly compiled list of one hundred telecare 
customers living in Washington State, I selected seniors willing and interested 
to meet for face-to-face home interviews. After retracted interest and scheduling 
conflicts, I eventually met with approximately twenty seniors. These first-time 
meetings were usually one-on-one engagements with a senior informant. When 
available, a family member also joined. With six of these people, I carried out 
more extensive fieldwork engagements, including participant-observation in 
their home care activities. To complement these meetings and broaden the 
picture of senior home care, I also added interviews with home care administra-
tors, nurses, and local senior healthcare advocates.
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In Sweden, my fieldwork routes proceeded along different lines. Although 
private home care organisations are on the increase in Sweden, I felt I could 
reduce conflicts of interest by only recruiting in public home care organisa-
tions, rather than in privately owned home care businesses. In addition, with 
the absence of a customer database, I recruited my senior informants in person, 
in three municipal home care service organisations. After briefing the managers 
and their staff about my project, they agreed to identify senior clients whom they 
felt could best participate. Overall, health and mental alertness were among the 
factors the staff took into account.10 Once the seniors had confirmed their inter-
est and availability, I proceeded in one of two ways. Either I contacted seniors 
myself for the initial interview, or I joined the care staff on their rounds to meet 
the interested seniors in person. The different needs each senior required, as 
well as the relations between seniors and their care workers, also influenced my 
ability to recruit. Seniors who had good relations with the care workers were 
generally more eager to participate. I observed well over forty home care situ-
ations and interviewed many of the seniors in these situations. Approximately 
half a dozen of these seniors I then met on repeated occasions. As in the US, 
these follow-up visits often provided opportunities for participant-observation.
The US fieldwork generally produced more individual accounts based on 
one-on-one interactions, while the Swedish ethnography favoured group interac-
tions consisting of one-on-three (or more) encounters – namely a senior client, 
one or more care worker(s), and myself. These variations also linked with the 
differences in how these two countries organise senior home care. Thus, in the 
absence of Lifeline customers in Sweden, or public home care workers in the 
US, my ethnographic passages increasingly prompted the problem of incongru-
ent comparisons. In turn, these tinkered with my own empirical-conceptual 
moves. This included the rethinking of key terms such as ‘senior’, ‘home’, ‘care’, 
as well as ‘technology’ – all of which enfolded vastly different heterogeneities.
This knotting together of ethnographic passages, including my scribbled field 
notes on how care moves, spurred numerous questions about which factors to 
compare, as well as how to compare, without losing sight of their complexities. 
Increasingly, I felt it necessary to sidestep my initial comparative ambitions. In 
retrospect, akin to Rowe’s view above, I had detoured around the challenge of 
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transnational comparison in my analysis. The two published articles I discuss 
below, each focused on a different country, evidence this avoidance. In what 
follows, I revisit these articles and their ethnographic passages to reconsider 
ways to tinker with new comparisons. My ambition is not to smooth over the 
comparative frictions, but rather to experiment with how these might generate 
additional opportunities for social-scientific comparison.
Comparative Tinkering with Spatial-Timings
In ‘Surfacing Moves: Spatial-Timings of Senior Home Care’ (Lutz 2013), I 
argue for spatiotemporal differences in Swedish senior home care and develop 
the term ‘surfacing’ for this purpose. My article was an attempt to work through 
the distinction between subjective and objective time, which is pervasive in the 
social scientific literature. Inspired in part by Janelle Taylor (2005), and espe-
cially Bruno Latour’s (1997) ideas on spatial-timing, I consider how humans 
and nonhumans come together in care moves to generate multiple surfacings 
that challenge the subjective-objective distinction of time. I also consider the 
policies of time management in Swedish public senior home care. These policies 
set out to economise and standardise senior home care. However, I show how 
such policies add to the complexity of care and its spatiotemporal surfacing, 
which actors must tinker with to sustain good care.
Ethnographic passages, entailing the use of technologies for scheduling 
Swedish senior home care, ground this particular article. One example is how 
a scheduler interacted with her software using the finger-mouse to orient 
multi-coloured blocks on the computer screen. These blocks represent differ-
ent spatiotemporal entities that she neatly ordered into rows and columns on 
the screen to determine the weekly home care schedule. This spatiotemporal 
surfacing connected care workers with different seniors and their needs. The 
scheduler translated these needs from several standardised entries, including 
ADL codes that index ageing body needs with the necessary days and hours of 
the week for care. Simultaneously, this same move triggered the programme to 
automatically calculate the necessary times and routes for each senior client. 
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However, this formalisation of space-time was impossible without first trans-
forming people and things into what Latour calls ‘intermediaries’ – entities that 
move other entities with little or no mediation or transformation.
This was no simple task, and required the scheduler’s comparative tinkering 
to make the different spatial-timings fit and travel. In part, the scheduler must 
select and compare several different resources. These comprised archive docu-
ments of past care schedules and consultations with the other care workers, as 
well as with the managers overseeing the care services. Of course, she also drew 
from her previous employment experience as a care worker. Sticky notes left by 
her colleagues, stuck to the edge of her desk and keyboard, were also of central 
importance. These notes concerned updates in the clients’ care routines. On 
any particular day, senior care needs could conflict with the planned home care 
routines. This might entail a rescheduled doctor’s appointment or emergency 
hospitalisation. Thus, when it came to the actual hands-on doing of care, workers 
must again tinker with the timing and spacing of care. For instance, I witnessed 
how care workers concealed their paper schedule, out of sight in a pocket or the 
car, when working directly with seniors. When I asked the care workers about 
this habit, they expressed concern that the schedule would distract the quality 
of attention they tried to give their senior clients.11
During the preparation of that article, I did not find what I felt was a compa-
rable example in my US material. Organisational time management procedures 
were not clearly present in the relatively informal US senior home care I had 
witnessed. With more foresight, I speculate that I may have better aligned my 
ethnographic passages to enable such a comparison. For instance, had I worked 
with US home care organisations initially, rather than Lifeline customers, perhaps 
I could have discovered richer comparative opportunities between the US and 
Sweden. I also consoled myself with the knowledge that at its core, ethnographic 
fieldwork is often serendipitous and full of uncertainty.
It is clear to me now that I had adopted a relativist stance, akin to Rowe’s 
sidestepping of transnational comparison, when writing the article. Yet, I was 
never satisfied with this stance. I had the distinct sense that I had missed a 
comparative opportunity. Perhaps I had thrown out the baby with the bathwater 
and given the game of comparison away (Strathern 2002).
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With the notion of comparative tinkering in hand, I want to now retrace 
my ethnographic passages to consider how my US informants also tinkered 
comparatively with the scheduling of home care. Several US seniors struggled 
to have their care needs met. John’s care situation offers one example.12 John was 
a ninety-four-year-old widower, former university adjunct, community leader, 
war veteran, and farmer. His wife had died several years earlier, but he still lived 
in the same house he designed and built in the 1950s. He had four children. His 
oldest daughter Julie was in her sixties, and the most active with his care. When 
I first met John, he was in the process of hiring a new care worker to help with 
domestic tasks and some personal care. His previous paid care worker, Anita, 
had been excellent. Anita had been on time, made good food, paid attention 
to detail, and enjoyed intelligent conversation. However, Anita was a student 
and found an opportunity to study abroad. Suddenly, John needed to find a 
replacement.
On a whim, without consulting Julie, he hired Candice from an ad in the 
local paper. Unfortunately, Candice was often late. Her cooking was bland. 
She was unorganised and uninterested in conversation. Candice also had 
the habit of bringing her four-year-old son with her. John allowed this, but 
he felt it interfered with his own care. John and Julie agreed that Candice 
was not working out. She could not compare with the standards Anita had 
established. However, they were stuck with Candice until they could find her 
replacement. In an effort to improve Candice’s performance and accountability, 
Julie created a weekly schedule which she charted on paper and posted on 
the refrigerator door in the kitchen. This schedule listed the meals and basic 
routine duties. While this device temporarily improved Candice’s performance, 
her care remained unsatisfactory. John and Julie therefore replaced Candice 
with Debbie.
Debbie was timely, meticulous, a good cook, and enjoyed conversation. Thus, 
she compared more favourably to Anita. In light of these improvements, John and 
Julie considered removing the refrigerator schedule. However, Debbie suggested 
that they upgrade it with an erasable whiteboard planner, which they did. This 
schedule-cum-planner eventually helped the three of them better coordinate 
important changes in John’s care. With Debbie’s input, this care technology 
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now accommodated phone messages and other reminders about upcoming 
appointments that shifted the spatial-timings of John’s care. However, Debbie 
now incorporated the basic tasks into her daily work without reminders. This 
eliminated the need for the display Julie had first created for Candice. In this 
way, the scheduling of John’s care was made less visible, or what Latour would 
call a shift from mediator to intermediary.
What comparative insights emerge here? For one, Anita helped establish a 
rough standard of care, which John and Julie implicitly used to compare Candice 
and Debbie’s performance. While this was not a formalised procedure, it did 
ease comparative decisions about movements in care. Here too, the schedule-
cum-planner played a decisive, comparative role. John and Julie had first imple-
mented the schedule to better align Candice’s care moves with Anita’s version. 
Then, when Debbie offered John and Julie another point of comparison, their 
inclination was to remove the technology. Instead, Debbie proposed a modifica-
tion to allow collaborative adjustments to John’s care. In this way, the relatively 
inflexible schedule became a more flexible and collaborative care technology, 
transformed with changing collective of care. Here too, I find a comparative 
link with how Swedish care workers hid the schedule from their client’s view 
to generate more attentive hands-on care. Thus, tinkering with the visibility of 
more formalised care scheduling procedures in both cases connects to the doing 
of attentive, if not good, care.
My intention here is to show how comparative tinkering with care moves 
in ethnographic passages can produce important transnational comparisons. 
These comparisons do not stem from pre-established standardised categories 
but rather from the effects of care moves with technology. Starting with a 
curiosity about how spatiotemporal differences surface in Sweden, I employ 
a binary license to comparatively tinker with the possibility of similar effects 
in the US. More than the surfacing of different spatial-timings, I also show 
how care technology itself can shift and transform, namely from a disciplining 
device to one that flexibly and more implicitly coordinates collective decisions 
about care and how it should move. This insight echoes the notion of care 
as a human-nonhuman collective, which accompanies my zigzagging ethno-
graphic passages. Thus, comparative tinkering has produced a heterogeneous 
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comparator akin to Deville et al.’s formulation of a heterogeneous ‘comparator 
assemblage’. Next, to further articulate the potentials of comparative tinker-
ing, I turn to the issue of clutter in care and how it can generate additional 
opportunities to compare.
Comparative Tinkering with Clutter
In ‘Clutter Moves in Old Age Homecare’ (Lutz 2010), I consider the relation 
between domestic clutter and how it moves in US senior home care. This article 
starts with the observation that many US seniors live with household clutter. 
The gerontological literature often classifies this clutter as a hazard that can lead 
to problems with mobility, especially falling. However, I found that some US 
seniors used clutter in ways that challenge the conception of risky clutter. In my 
article, I unpack the category of clutter and highlight its positive implications 
for US senior home care. This includes rethinking the category of clutter as 
‘care technology’. For instance, some of my informants created cluttered ‘nests’ 
around their favourite chair or bed to reduce the need for physical movement 
around the house. These cluttered nesting relations could comprise many 
things – from reading materials to personal healthcare items such as pillboxes, 
eyeglasses, mobile phones, and remote controls. Other more ‘sentimental’ collec-
tions suggest another type of clutter care technology, which mix with concerns 
about ageing identity. Examples here include love letters, family photographs, 
and favourite antique heirlooms. A few US seniors also had relatively elaborate 
systems of organisation. For instance, I relate how one informant kept a series 
of shoeboxes for each of his children. Every time he found an item concerning 
one of his children, he put it in the corresponding box for later distribution. 
Based on such findings, my article proposes the notion of ‘clutter technology’ 
to think through the productive and beneficial aspects of clutter in US senior 
home care. As such, the article tinkers with the category of care technology.
Household clutter was present in some of the Swedish situations I encoun-
tered, and I also found examples of nesting and distribution. Hence, this 
comparison suggests that clutter moves with care in similar ways, in both 
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countries. However, I found clutter more often and in greater quantities in my 
US fieldwork. For instance, in some US homes, papers, clothing, food, and other 
objects littered the floor to such an extent that I could not easily walk in a clear 
path. Given this stark contrast between the US and Sweden, a transnational 
comparison of clutter seemed lopsided, uninteresting, and not worth noting.13 
Nevertheless, as with the previous article, I had the sense that I had missed a 
comparative opportunity.
Next, I revisit a different set of ethnographic passages to tinker with the 
potentials of this transnational comparison, unpacking further the notion of 
clutter as a kind of ‘technology’ for care. In my Swedish fieldwork, I met Anna-
Lisa, eighty-one years old. She had arthritic pain that made walking difficult. 
Her doctor had prescribed medication, but the side effects made her feel tired 
and weak. Eventually she decided to take her care into her own hands. Despite 
her pain, she stopped taking several of her medications, improved her diet, and 
increased her exercise. When she started feeling better, and grew weary of the 
public home care visits, she discontinued this service too, including help with 
cleaning and physical therapy.
Anna-Lisa lived with some domestic clutter. Compared with the US, how-
ever, it was not extreme. Even more remarkable was her cluttered assortment 
of pets. Anna-Lisa had grown up on a farm. Upon retirement, she decided that 
she wanted the experience of living with animals again. When I met her, she 
had six cats, two dogs, a parakeet, and several pet mice. This, I proffer, intro-
duces a different form of nonhuman clutter – what Haraway (2008) might call 
‘multispecied’ clutter.
The care for these animals presented some practical challenges, especially 
with her painful arthritis. For instance, she was unable to walk the dogs or clean 
the litter boxes as frequently as needed. Apparently, a neighbour had caught 
wind of her difficulties. One day, based on an anonymous tip, the Länsstyrelsens 
Djurskyddsinspektion (Swedish Animal Protection Authorities) paid her an 
unannounced visit. They found her home too cluttered and unhealthy for the 
animals. A few weeks later, she received a letter that proclaimed her unfit to care 
for the animals and banned her from keeping them. The authorities also billed 
her for their legal process. Upset and angry, she appealed the decision. However, 
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she lost and the authorities forced her to give the animals away. After this, she 
struggled with a bout of depression. She explained that she perceived her pets 
as part of her well-being and self-care and that they had helped keep her active:
The animals gave me life. They cared for me in their own way. They gave me 
the company I needed and physical attention. Now, without them, I get filled 
up with silence and loneliness. So I have that instead. I am filled up with 
the loneliness and try to find ways to empty some of it out but it’s not easy.
This ethnographic passage highlights how different categories of care and clutter 
can generate comparative frictions in practice. A key example here is the way 
the Swedish authorities attended to pet care, but ignored the importance that 
multispecied clutter played for Anna-Lisa. Here, the comparison of an actual 
care situation to an inflexible standard of ‘pet care’ produced an unfortunate 
outcome – namely a senior who lost her care companions. This also suggests 
how a standardised comparison can deny the opportunity to tinker with a 
mutually beneficial arrangement.14 In other words, although the categories of 
senior home care or domestic clutter do not typically include animals, here the 
categorical shift is clear. More importantly, this tinkered comparison suggests 
an ethnographic passage back to my US material.
In the US, I worked with Beth, who was in her in her mid-nineties, and her 
granddaughter, Mary, in her mid-fifties. Mary’s mother had died fifteen years 
earlier. On her deathbed, Mary had promised her mother that she would take 
care of Beth. For the past fifteen years, Mary drove once a week to visit her 
grandmother, a two-hour round trip, to the house she had lived in for more 
than sixty-five years. Until recently, Mary had enjoyed these visits. She had 
taken Beth out for lunch, or just sat and talked. Gradually, though, Beth’s health 
declined. Her ailments included glaucoma and blindness in the right eye, severe 
osteoporosis, acute neck pain, congestive heart failure, hearing loss, and difficul-
ties linked with mobility – for example, walking, balancing, and climbing the 
stairs. Mary had started to notice more bruises on Beth’s body, but Beth denied 
falling and insisted that her guardian angel had caught her. Mary joked that he 
must have been missing her more these days. Mary also suspected that Beth had 
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developed Alzheimer’s disease because Beth increasingly mistook Mary for her 
mother, and found it difficult to recall recent conversations.
With Beth’s decline, her home became cluttered and disarrayed. Mary added 
housework to her weekly visits. This included cleaning up and caring for Beth’s 
nine feral cats that she had adopted from the neighbourhood. Cat hair was eve-
rywhere. Their litter boxes went unchanged and their food bowls were often left 
empty. Like the architectural space itself, the house was seeped in their stench. 
The cats and their material relations had become synonymous with Beth’s home. 
In fact, her sentiments of home were so strong that Beth claimed she would die 
if she had to move away and leave her cats. Mary, on the other hand, felt she 
could no longer care for Beth or her cats without extra help. Mary had raised 
the topic of paid home care, but Beth quickly dismissed the idea, exclaiming, ‘I 
don’t want a stranger in my house!’
Mary discussed the possibility of assisted living with Uncle John, Beth’s only 
remaining son and legal guardian, but he refused. He was determined to respect 
his mother’s wishes. Mary felt, however, that he did not understand the situation. 
John lived several hours away and was extremely allergic to cats, so when he did 
visit he did not stay long. Mary also reasoned that John was in denial about his 
mother’s decline. He avoided discussing her condition and what to do about it 
in conversation. Mary felt stuck. Then, one day, John showed up to take Beth 
to her dentist appointment. When he arrived, he found his mother on the floor, 
unable to get up. Apparently, she had tripped over one of her cats. Mary partly 
joked that this had joggled John’s perspective: ‘It was the straw that broke the 
cat’s back’. John had finally realised that Beth needed constant care and it should 
be him. For nearly a month, he gave Beth regular meals and saw that she took 
her medications. Yet, due to his cat allergies he could not stay in the house for 
more than a few minutes at a time. Instead, he lived in his camper truck parked in 
Beth’s driveway. He quickly grew tired of this arrangement, however. He finally 
agreed to take Beth for a medical check-up, which confirmed her poor condi-
tion. John finally accepted that Beth now needed more intensive home care.
In the meantime, it was difficult to find someone Beth liked enough, and 
who was also willing to put up with her cats. For instance, one woman had all 
the necessary qualifications, but during the interview Beth protested that the 
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she had hit one of the cats. The woman explained that she had only reached out 
to pet it. Mary explained that it was unlikely the applicant had hit the cat, and 
attributed Beth’s reaction to her Alzheimer’s and increasing anxiety. Another 
applicant, Charlene, had shown extra affection for the cats, and Beth took an 
immediate liking to her. Charlene explained later that she sensed that the cats 
were the key to Beth’s trust. ‘Beth’s cats are her everything, and you must respect 
that. She watches the cats to see how they react and she observes that they trust 
me’. Beth added, ‘You spoil them like I do. You really do care’. Mary later con-
firmed, ‘Charlene earned Grandma’s trust by taking care of her cats […] They’re 
still Grandma’s cats, but now there’s somebody else who cares for them too’.
Like Anna-Lisa’s care, Beth’s cluttered assemblage of humans and felines 
emerges as a kind of care technology, with specific effects. This human-non-
human care collective played a decisive role in the tinkering of comparisons in 
Beth’s home care – especially decisions about present and future care arrange-
ments. Beth’s cats mattered in her ability to care for herself and her home. They 
also impacted how others adjusted and tinkered care with her. This included 
discussions with the doctor and the hiring of additional home care work.
Here, then, as with the example of spatial-timings in care, an opportunity 
for transnational comparison emerges. Where a comparison once seemed 
undeserving, now the notion of multispecied clutter as care technology offers a 
way to move comparatively between two different entities, namely senior home 
care in the US and Sweden. Rather than using standardised scientific categories 
which stem from etic or scientific terminologies alone, my comparisons tinker 
with care relations as they move in ethnographic passages. Admittedly, I am 
implicated in this work. It also requires analytical care to tinker these ethno-
graphic passages together into a suitable comparator. As a social scientist, I have 
an interpretive hand in directing the results. However, it is not my ambition 
to expose these comparisons to further analysis at this juncture, as doing so 
would exceed the scope of this chapter. Instead, my aim has been to outline the 
potentials of careful comparative tinkering and how it can unlock new avenues 
for social scientific comparison. It requires a retrospective and open disposition 
towards the multiple and empirical-conceptual relations as they come together 
in ethnographic passages.
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D i scu s s ion
Compare, v.
[…] To mark or point out the similarities and differences of (two or more 
things); to bring or place together (actually or mentally) for the purpose 
of noting the similarities and differences. […] [Construction] with (or to) 
another; together. […] to vie with, rival.
 – Oxford English Dictionary [OED], 2nd edition.
This definition echoes several points I have made in this chapter. First, it men-
tions the movement of bringing together two or more entities. Thus, to compare 
implies the gathering and assembling of different comparative elements, similar 
to Deville et al.’s proposal of a heterogeneous comparator. I have developed this 
as the gathering together of care moves in ethnographic passages. These entail 
the noting down of similarities and differences. Hence, to compare relates to the 
making of noteworthy observations and descriptions, travelled and written in 
ethnographic passages between field and desk. Moreover, comparative collec-
tions do not contain exclusively similar elements. Rather, they entail inherent 
frictions stemming from their relational combinations. This dimension is clearly 
present in the etymological roots of the Latin term comparare (com- ‘with’ + 
parare ‘prepare’), which the OED states as the bringing together to form pairs 
for a contest or match. This last aspect brings home the significance of compara-
tive tinkering with care moves and their frictional relations, as in to vie with, or 
rival. Comparison is anything but smooth.
Regarding the implications for social science, my argument is that compara-
tive tinkering offers a means to stay with the trouble of comparison. It focuses 
on comparisons that emerge with the movements of care in practice. From a 
conventional view, such frictions easily render comparison unworthy of pursuit. 
In this chapter, I develop comparative tinkering as a means to transform such 
frictions into productive potentials for knowledge, which ‘dance’ in retrospective 
zigzags with ethnographic passages. This is akin to Gad and Jensen’s proposal of 
‘lateral comparisons’, which open up new comparative travels. It also resonates 
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with Strathern and others who propose the comparison of others’ comparisons. 
These concern how care workers negotiate and compare their own care moves. 
In addition, there is an affinity here between comparative tinkering and Mohácsi 
and Morita’s notion of travelling comparisons.
Although my ethnographic passages do not evidence people’s comparisons 
with care in other countries, they do relate to how technology helps to trace 
the tinkering comparisons of others in their moves with care. Thus, I argue that 
tracing the use of technology in ethnographic passages can locate additional 
opportunities for social scientific comparison. I would also add the importance 
of remaining attentive to how transformative frictions in practice can ontologi-
cally shift the comparative categories themselves. For instance, in my examples 
I experiment with how care technology transforms with the tensions found in 
the scheduling and cluttering of home care.
The above ideas point to the analytical treatment of comparative tinkering 
as a transformative heterogeneous comparator which integrates ethnographic 
passages. This focus on ethnography resonates with another point Morita makes 
about the mutual entanglement of ethnography and technology as a compara-
tive ‘machine’. For instance, he writes, ‘[w]e have here a sort of ethnography 
that works as an evocative machine and a sort of machine that evokes an ethno-
graphic [comparative] effect’ (2013b: 16). This way of seeing the interrelations 
between description and analysis has inspired my use of ethnographic passages 
as a fundamental component of comparative tinkering. Such ideas echo other 
scholars who view the importance of ethnographic writing as a social scientific 
intervention (Michael 2012; Vikkelsø 2007; Winthereik and Verran 2012). 
Mike Michael, for one, proposes a move from the notion of written stories – or 
anecdotes – to ‘anecdotalization’ for interrogating the social scientific research 
process itself:
As a form of telling that gathers into itself previous tellings and performs 
critical reflections upon the mutualities of such tellings and retellings and 
the analytic resources that made such tellings tellable, anecdotalization has 
both a topological and a nomadic flavour. In terms of the topological, it 
brings together what might once have seemed distant and disconnected: past 
243
coMparative tinkering With care Moves
episodes that are marginal and trivial illuminate contemporary moments of 
critical reflection and reorientation, and contemporary concerns render what 
had long been uninteresting past moments full of relevance. This bringing 
together of the distant and disconnected is also a marker of the nomadic 
or the rhizomic, according to Deleuze and Guattari (1998). However, the 
nomadic serves to emphasise what is processual, iterative, emergent and, 
crucially, changeable and shifting in anecdotatization (2012: 33).
Michael’s anecdotalization thus situates a rhizomic and topological move, akin to 
the gathering and cutting of ethnographic passages, which crisscross in surprising 
and often dubious ways. Similarly, I have proposed that ethnographic passages 
situate avenues for a generative comparative methodology – one that not only 
records, but also brings together and tinkers with comparisons. Comparative 
tinkering with care moves in ethnographic passages thus suggests rough travel, 
reminiscent of Serres’ (1980) northwest passages that mediate and intervene as 
they entangle complex frictions.15 In a similar way, I have drawn on ethnographic 
passages that interweave the empirical with the conceptual – travel with text – in 
the same analytical and careful move.
Conclu s ion
This chapter opened with considerations about the relation between movement 
and social scientific comparison in anthropology and STS. Inspired by such 
work, I propose comparative tinkering as a generative approach for gathering 
together different care moves with ethnographic passages. To background my 
approach, I turn to how the gerontological literature typically treats the challenge 
of transnational comparison of senior care in Sweden and the US. Standardised 
categories linked with economic and medical terminologies emerge as important 
comparative features in this literature. However, I argue that such categories can 
also sidestep the more nitty-gritty moves on which senior home care depends. 
At the same time, the different ways care moves and transforms in practice are 
what make the transnational comparison of senior home care so challenging.
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To explore my own efforts to compare, I revisit two previous publications that 
sidestep transnational comparison. In the ‘Surfacing Moves: Spatial-Timings of 
Senior Home Care’ (Lutz 2013) article, I trace ethnographic passages concerned 
with how different spatial-timings in Swedish senior home care move. These 
passages implicate technologies for scheduling care, and the way they mediate 
comparisons in the pursuit of sustainable care. When writing that article, I did 
not find an opportunity for a noteworthy comparison in my US material. In 
retrospect, however, I realise that I allowed the standard practice of formalised 
scheduling to cloud comparative opportunities, particularly the informal use of 
mundane care technologies in the US. By opening up the category of schedul-
ing care technology as a more fluid category, I found additional ethnographic 
passages in which to tinker with my comparison. This move rested on how my 
informants comparatively tinker with the scheduling of senior home care in 
the US and Sweden to negotiate the multiple spatial-timings that surface in this 
practice. In other words, attention to the ways my informants comparatively 
tinkered with the scheduling of senior home care also partly inspired my own 
comparative tinkering in and with ethnographic passages.
In my second publication, ‘Clutter Moves in Old Age Homecare’ (Lutz 
2010), I focus on clutter in US senior home care as a kind of care technology. 
Here too, transnational comparison initially appeared unworthy of pursuit. 
Although I found similarities in the ways seniors in Sweden and the US inter-
acted with their household clutter, my hesitations stemmed from the degree of 
clutter I found in several of the US home care situations I had visited. In these 
situations, the extent of clutter was so extreme that it seemed incomparable to 
anything I found in Sweden. Nevertheless, by rethinking and re-tinkering with 
the ethnographic passages, which involved multispecied clutter, I could tinker 
with a different tertium comparationis to open up new insights about clutter as 
a form of care technology in both countries.
This chapter has sought additional avenues for the pursuit of comparison that 
go beyond the standard measures of national healthcare systems. My aim has not 
been to discount comparisons that employ standardised categories or statisti-
cal models, but to locate additional reflexive pathways for comparison. I have 
proposed the notion of comparative tinkering with care moves in ethnographic 
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passages as a topographical and heterogeneous comparator. This resonates with 
Mol’s (2008, 2010) assertion about care on and in its own ‘terms’ – in other 
words, those which resonate both conceptually and empirically with how care 
moves in practice, along with their generative or frictional affects and effects. 
As such, I suggest that comparative tinkering with care moves offers another 
route to think through, and with care, in contrast to terms for care that stem 
from medical ethics or policy jargon.
As such, my proposal entails several interrelated implications for the care-
ful transnational tinkering of social scientific comparison. For instance, one 
implication concerns the importance of ethnographic passages (and how they 
entangle text and travel) to establish a heterogeneous comparator. Another point 
concerns the tangled movements in care and how these can disturb or re-tinker 
with standardised categories of comparison. In turn, rather than stifle or throw 
out comparison, I have argued that ethnographic passages offer fodder for the 
comparative tinkering of care, including its standards and categories. This also 
raises a point about the careful adjustment of frictions between etic and emic 
comparisons found in practice.
In a complex world where misunderstandings seem increasingly prevalent, 
it is important to stress the potentials of comparative tinkering as a method 
for opening up additional transnational comparative perspectives, which also 
embrace nitty-gritty moves of specific practices. Senior home care has been 
both the source and testing ground for this notion. However, I also hope this 
chapter can inspire readers to pull the notion of comparative tinkering in ways 
that stay with the trouble of care – in all its forms – which concern humans as 
well as our worldly others.
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Note s
1 Steven Connor has translated Serres’ passages as ‘complex, digressive, irregular, 
unpredictable, encompassing wormholes and back-alleys as well as highways – between 
the different modes of knowledge’ (2009: 2).
2 The term ‘tinkering’ has earlier roots in scholarly usage. For instance, the French 
anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1966) introduced ‘bricolage’ (the French equivalent) 
as a form of sociocultural invention for making do in novel ways with the limited resources 
available. Tinkering also finds traction in debates about evolutionary transformation 
( Jacob 1977; 2001).
3 John Rowe is Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University. He 
is also a former professor of medicine and a founding director of the division on Aging 
at Harvard Medical School.
4 Parker’s article, from 2001, references a population of 8.6 million in Sweden and 250 
million in the US, which indicates a significant population growth in both countries.
5 These authors differentiate this further as ‘Instrumental Activities of Daily Living’ 
(IADLs) and ‘Physical Activities of Daily Living’ (PADLs).
6 Some authors use Sweden as the exemplar of a welfare state (Wang and Aspalter 2007).
7 Social Intelligence For Tele-Healthcare (SIFT) was a European Marie Curie Actions 
funded research project (2006–2008), hosted by Philips Research. Its interlinking interests 
between business, technology development, healthcare, and government, although highly 
influential, are beyond the focus of this chapter.
8 Some might argue that such practical concerns would not influence pure academic 
research – in other words, without industrial or applied constraints. Nevertheless, I would 
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argue that any social scientific research project must cope with multiple constraints that 
demand ongoing negotiation and tinkering. Thus, I maintain that the notion of ‘pure’ 
research is misleading.
9 Recursively, I found evidence that these complex care moves situate multiple social 
dimensions such as class, ethnicity, education, and gender. However, I will not develop 
these aspects here.
10 For ethical reasons, I did not recruit people with dementia in either country.
11 In my follow-up research, smartphone-based digital schedules had replaced the paper 
schedule. Yet, the care workers continued to conceal these devices during hands-on care 
work in a similar way.
12 In my work I use pseudonyms for all informants to protect their identity.
13 However, such comparisons do exist. For a Danish example, see Skov (2012).
14 However, there is supporting evidence from Sweden and the US that pets can positively 
affect care for seniors (Banks and Banks 2002; Beck-Friis et al. 2007; Hejra 2009; Folkesson 
2011; Höök and Höök 2010). For instance, one article (Folkesson 2011) mentions a 
Swedish study involving dog care at a nursing home for seniors with dementia. After 
six months, the dog’s presence had reduced worry and violent outbreaks as well as the 
need for medication. Other studies have compared live and robotic dogs for senior care 
(Banks et al. 2008), while Philips Research (2014) has developed the iCat for ambient 
intelligence research and robotic pet interaction. Such studies resonate with Anna-Lisa’s 
story, and suggest the relevance of comparing different notions of care and its technologies, 
including relations with ‘multispecied’ clutter.
15 Michael also draws on Serres’ philosophy to develop the concept of anecdotalization.
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ON RANKINGS AND 
ACCOUNTING IN HOSPITALS 
AND UNIVERSITIES
Sarah de Rijcke, Iris Wallenburg, Paul Wouters, Roland Bal
I n troduct ion
coMparisons have BecoMe uBiquitous in the ManageMent oF quality 
in social domains that were previously governed by professional elites. Often 
these comparisons are framed as ‘transparency instruments’ (Hazelkorn 2011b: 
41) which come in a variety of forms:
• informative guides for prospective ‘clients’ (e.g. students or patients);
• accreditation procedures to certify the legitimacy of a particular organisa-
tion to act as a university or hospital;
• benchmarking as a way to ‘compare like with like’ or to check the compli-
ance with formalised norms and standards;
• regular formalised evaluations or assessments of the activity, quality, and 
impact of the products’ analysing and processes;
• classification systems to develop sharper profiles of the institute and its 
components; and
• rankings of universities and hospitals to see who is ‘best’ in the comparison 
according to a particular set of measures.
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Driven by the aim of transparency and user empowerment in public and 
private services, comparisons have become a crucial instrument in contempo-
rary capitalism. Typically, they are supposed to ‘enable consumers to choose’ 
between telephone companies, universities, power companies, schools, or 
hospitals. These types of comparison are characteristically framed in terms 
of ‘improving quality’ (both in terms of service organisations and individual 
service workers) and ‘empowering consumers’ (in regards to how the visibility 
of performance enables consumers to make a deliberate choice about what 
service to choose for and by whom) (Shore and Wright 1999). Otherwise, 
comparisons are framed for organisations to ‘publicly account’ for their 
performance, and regulators take measures based on comparative analyses. 
Comparing is therefore not only an everyday practice; it is also a highly 
specialised activity that has become ubiquitous in many contemporary forms 
of governance.
In this chapter, we focus on one comparative technique: ranking. A key dif-
ference between ranking and other comparative techniques is that it presents 
an ordered list of an entity according to how it scores on a particular (set of) 
indicator(s), often starting with ‘the best’. A ranking is easier to grasp than a more 
complex comparative technique such as benchmarking or a multi-dimensional 
classification or assessment system. It is also easier to misunderstand. The indica-
tors used for ranking may not measure the qualities the ranking is supposed to 
capture. Moreover, the entities they measure may not have similar profiles. In 
this sense, to what extent are the current rankings of universities and hospitals 
(which are the focus of this chapter) comparing ‘like with like’? These criticisms 
have not diminished the power of rankings – in fact, it is quite the contrary. 
Though rankings often start with a heterogeneous set of organisations, they are 
able to make very different entities comparable. As an instance of a comparative 
technology, a ranking produces certain realities and identities; it creates that 
which is compared (see Mol 2002). In this sense, rankings are indeed a member 
of the family of comparative technologies: comparability is their outcome, as 
well as their foundation.
Below we examine how rankings came into being, how they are done, and 
what they do by comparing ranking systems for, and within, universities and 
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hospitals. On top of this, we seek to explore our own ways of comparing rank-
ing practices. As the introduction to this book explains, we wish to question 
the epistemic position of comparative methodologies in the social sciences. 
We neither believe that they are inherently superior to the in-depth study of 
one particular case, nor do we agree with the outright rejection of compara-
tive sociology as reductionist. Rather, we are interested in the kinds of effects 
that comparisons produce – both the comparative technologies of rankings 
systems, and our own comparative analysis of the ranking of (and within) 
universities and hospitals.
This chapter presents our comparative layers in the form of a triple jump. 
First, we describe the emergence and development of rankings in universi-
ties and hospitals. In this part of our chapter, we zoom in on some of the 
differences made by these rankings after their introduction in the past two 
decades. We describe rankings as tools for governance that revolve mostly 
around competition and ‘commensuration’ – social mechanisms through 
which highly diverse entities (countries, institutions, people) are rendered 
measurable and comparable through quantitative means (Espeland and Stevens 
1998). Second, by drawing on a comparison between university and hospital 
ranking practices, we analyse how ranking contributes to making organisa-
tions auditable and comparable. We examine some of the differences and 
similarities of ranking practices in universities and hospitals by focusing on 
three themes that emerged from our comparative work: 1) the ambivalence 
of ranking; 2) the performativity of ranking; and 3) coordinating ranking 
practices. We link these themes to the literature on comparisons. Third, we 
reflect on how we as analysts have ‘practised comparison’ by expounding 
on how we enacted ranking in our comparative work (see Urry and Law 
2006), and on some of the costs and benefits involved in our comparative 
endeavour.
The chapter is based on two distinct research projects in which we analyse 
contemporary practices of university and hospital ranking in the Netherlands. 
Our cooperation was triggered by similarities we observed in approach and 
empirical material. The projects share a theoretical focus in the sense that 
both projects zoom in on the enactment (or the daily work of ‘doing’ (see Mol 
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2002) rankings) in ‘real’ organisational practices. The modest empirical research 
done by others thus far mainly focuses on higher management levels, and/or on 
large institutional infrastructures. Instead, we analyse hospital and university 
ranking practices from a whole-organisation perspective. Both projects look 
at how rankings translate, purify, and simplify heterogeneity into ordered lists 
of comparable units, and the kinds of realities that come into being through 
these ranking practices. Among other things, we are interested in the consti-
tutive effects of ranking (see Dahler-Larsen 2012) and the kinds of ordering 
mechanisms (Felt 2009) that ranking brings about on multiple organisational 
levels – ranging from the managers’ office and the offices of coding staff to the 
lab benches and hospital beds.
Both research designs were comparative, and both projects performed 
ethnographic work in three places. Sarah de Rijcke (SdR) and Paul Wouters 
(PW) conducted research with three biomedical research groups (a lab, a 
group of medical statisticians, and a clinical research group) in a Dutch 
university medical centre. Their project focused on the implications of 
research assessment and ranking on biomedical knowledge production. The 
rationale for having three places of investigation in this project emerged 
in part from institutionalised distinctions between basic, translational, and 
clinical research at the centre. These boundaries not only related to differ-
ences in epistemic cultures, but they were also quite literally felt in terms 
of institutional architecture (the laboratories were, for instance, located in a 
separate building). We took it as part of the ethnographic work to analyse 
the enactment of these epistemic and material differences in the research 
practices under study.
For each group, we held interviews with researchers at different career 
stages – with technicians, group leaders, heads of departments, and quality 
managers. In addition, we performed observations during work-in-progress 
meetings, seminars, appraisal meetings, and interactions with companies and 
other stakeholders. SdR had full-time access for a month at each group. The 
access was granted by the research groups and the dean of the institute, who 
is also one of the drivers behind a project on ‘systemic failure in medical 
research’ at the Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and Development 
255
coMparing coMparisons
(ZonMW) (Groen 2013). This ZonMW project was triggered (among other 
things) by a perceived increase in publication pressure in biomedicine, a lack 
of interdisciplinary cooperation, and a responsiveness to the ‘societal relevance’ 
of research (Ibid. 1).
In the study on hospital rankings, Iris Wallenburg (IW) and Roland Bal 
(RB) compared three Dutch hospitals.1 Hospital selection was done by looking 
at similar sized hospitals but in different competitive environments, due to an 
expectation that the level of competition hospitals find themselves in would 
influence the way rankings affect hospitals. More competitive regions show 
higher levels of tight coupling, emphasising strong hierarchical coordination 
between managerial and professional departments (whereas loosely coupled 
organisations allow for more professional autonomy).
For this project, interviews with a multitude of actors implicated in hospital 
ranking were held, and observations were performed in meetings of quality 
of care committees, meetings of hospital managers with outside actors (like 
insurers and regulators), and during administrative work in the hospital (both 
in clinical settings and information departments). As rankings are increasingly 
being used in the governance of Dutch hospitals (and policy actors expect much 
from them), the aim of this project was to get a better understanding of how 
ranking affects hospital organisations and care practices.2
In most rankings, the work of commensuration and classification is black 
boxed. The same holds for a lot of comparative research in the social sciences; 
for example, when it is assumed that comparative research designs by definition 
provide more robust forms of knowledge. As well as analysing the comparative 
effects of rankings, our aim for this chapter is to be more open about how we 
enacted comparison, leaving room for reflections on our own classification 
work. That is, we mobilise observations in one project to discuss findings in the 
other, and vice versa. This way of creating ‘rapport’ (Stengers 2011, in Akrich 
and Rabeharisoa, this volume) played an important role in drawing conclu-
sions from our respective field notes. As a result, comparison turned out to 
be far messier – both in ranking practices and in our own work – than is often 
assumed. We think that this is not a deficit but a consequence of the grounded 
nature of all comparative practices.
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Hop :  The  Growth of  Rank ing in  Un ivers i t i e s  and 
Hos p i ta l s
How did it come to be that we now inhabit a world in which rankings seem 
to be inevitable? Sociologists and anthropologists contextualise the popularity 
of ranking as a broader manifestation of audit processes in an increasingly 
wide variety of societal sectors and professional fields. Audit processes now 
range from the online rating of movies, books, and restaurants, to assessing 
professional performance in sectors such as healthcare and higher education. 
Today, there are virtually no areas in which professionals are not – in one 
form or another – invited to respond to regular assessment exercises. The rise 
of performance-based funding schemes is one of the driving forces behind 
the increased interest in university and hospital rankings. Some studies sug-
gest that shrinking governmental research funding from the 1980s onwards 
has resulted in ‘academic capitalism’ (see Slaughter and Lesly 1997). By 
now, universities have set up special organisational units and devised spe-
cific policy measures in response to ranking systems. Recent studies point 
to the normalising and disciplining powers associated with ranking and to 
the response to ‘reputational risk’ as explanations for organisational change 
(Burrows 2012; Espeland and Sauder 2007; Power et al. 2009; Sauder and 
Espeland 2009).
The first university rankings were published at the beginning of this mil-
lennium (Hazelkorn 2011), roughly two decades after the first signs of an 
unprecedented growth of evaluation institutions and procedures emerged in the 
1980s. This growth was due to (among other things) the increased economic 
and social role of science and technology; an increase in the scale of research 
institutes; a general move towards formal evaluation of professional work; and 
limitations and costs of peer review procedures. Today, universities routinely 
monitor the publication of national and international league tables, and promote 
their position on websites, in newsletters, and in advertisements that target new 
students and staff. There is a growing emphasis on ‘reputation management’, and 
the use of quantitative performance indicators in quality assessment policies is 
steadily increasing. In short, quantitative indicators of science and technology 
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are applied from the most ‘macro’ to the most ‘micro’ by governing bodies and 
agents across those levels.
In Dutch healthcare, performance measurement was introduced at roughly 
the same time.3 Healthcare had routinely been characterised by a ‘closed shop 
model’ in which physicians decided upon the processes of healthcare delivery – 
only being accountable to knowledgeable colleague physicians (Harrison and 
McDonald 2008). However, since the 1990s, medical professional autonomy has 
gradually eroded, and professional self-regulating principles have intermingled 
with principles of performance management (Wallenburg et al. 2012; Waring 
2007). Generally, the rise of performance management is a consequence of 
two intertwining developments. First is a shift in healthcare policy. Due to the 
introduction of New Public Management policies in the early 1990s, healthcare 
workers are increasingly being held accountable for the care delivered, and as 
part of this are obliged to provide insight into their work and performance. 
In the Netherlands, the shift to this ideal of transparency became even more 
prominent with the introduction of the system of regulated competition in the 
mid-2000s (Bal and Zuiderent-Jerak 2011).
The second main development is a shift in the regulation of professional 
work. The medical profession has been confronted with a sharp decline of 
public trust in medical expertise and ‘medicine’s good work’ (Freidson 2001; 
Dixon-Woods et al. 2011). Together with the growing specialisation within 
medicine, the introduction of information technologies, and the regulation 
of working hours, medical work has become increasingly ‘normalised’ and 
regulated (Nettleton et al. 2008; Wallenburg et al. 2013). The comparison 
of hospital performance by ranking has been made possible as part of (and 
due to) these changes in healthcare governance. In the Netherlands, the most 
well-known are the rankings of the popular newspaper Algemeen Dagblad, and 
the weekly magazine, Elsevier. Yet in the past few years, healthcare insurers, 
patient organisations, and social entrepreneurs have created many more rank-
ings. These rankings are, amongst others, based on patient experiences, and on 
the organisation and the outcomes of care – for instance, as seen in mortality 




Though ranking has become increasingly important in public service sec-
tors, not much research has been done as of yet on the ways in which these 
comparative processes affect these sectors. The little evidence that exists tends 
to focus on universities. Here, an interest in ranking indeed seems mainly 
driven by a competition in which universities are being made comparable on 
the basis of ‘quality’ and ‘impact’. One of the most obvious manifestations of 
the increased popularity of ranking practices is apparent in the way universities 
have started to routinely monitor the publication of global league tables, and 
in how they advertise their position in these tables on websites, in newsletters, 
and in advertisements that target new students and staff. This responsiveness 
is telling of the importance ascribed to rankings, though the rationales behind 
their construction tend to be disregarded.  All measurements are of course 
preceded by decisions pertaining to the object(s) and focus of measurement. 
Certain factors are labelled as relevant in this categorisation process, and others 
as less relevant (or even irrelevant). Decisions will be made pertaining to the 
parameters of the categories that will be taken into account. These decisions 
fundamentally shape the subsequent measurements.
First of all, every form of ranking is based on data about a limited number 
of features which are subsequently made measurable. Global university rank-
ings, for example, will focus on the 1,000 or so universities that are visible at 
the international level while ignoring the other 16,000, because these only play 
a role at the local level. They also tend to focus on research performance since 
this can more easily be made comparable at the international level (by way 
of citation analysis). Hospital rankings, in their turn, are criticised for using 
quickly changing performance indicators that underlie the rankings, rendering 
it difficult for hospitals to meet the criteria that are being set. Moreover, they are 
targeted at easily measurable aspects of care such as mortality, while ignoring 
other aspects – which are sometimes deemed more important – like diagnostic 
accuracy or empathy for patients. At the same time, the kinds of parameters that 
are used fundamentally shape the outcomes. Some rankings strongly favour 
large universities or ones with long-established reputations, or they give more 
weight to publications in certain types of journals (e.g. Nature, Science), thereby 
implicitly leaning towards the devaluation of certain types of research (e.g. 
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humanities, social sciences). In addition, composite rankings like the Shanghai 
University ranking or the Dutch hospital rankings will merge different aspects 
of university performance (e.g. research, teaching, valorisation, social impact) 
or hospital performance (e.g. mortality, infection rates) into one number. How 
this composite number is calculated is rather arbitrary, not always transpar-
ent, and changes over time. It is therefore unclear as to what extent a change 
in position has on an actual change in performance, or if it should be ascribed 
to an insignificant fluctuation. In addition, even individual outliers can cause 
seemingly robust improvements of the performance of universities or hospitals.
Sk i p :  Compar ing Un ivers i ty  and Hosp ital  Rank ing 
P ract i c e s
As discussed above, rankings in hospitals and universities show some similar 
characteristics in that they are embedded in, and form an infrastructure for, com-
petition on a ‘market’ for public services (in this case, healthcare and research/
education). They are also developed against a background of increasing demands 
for accountability of elite professions, and tap into a neoliberal agenda where 
auditing is seen as a practice of soft regulation.
One of the goals of our own comparison was to gain more insight into how 
rankings are enacted in day-to-day university and hospital practices (more 
than would have been possible without the comparison). We therefore started 
to compare some of the outcomes of our research projects. In comparing our 
findings, we developed three themes that we further discuss below: 1) the 
ambivalence of rankings; 2) the performativity of rankings; and 3) coordinat-
ing ranking practices.
The Ambivalence of Ranking
In the ranking literature, the adequacy of indicators or their composites is gen-
erally critiqued (see Jacobs et al. 2005; van Dishoeck et al. 2011; Marginson 
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2012; Rauhvargers 2011, 2013). This literature questions the validity of rank-
ings, and argues that using rankings in regulation and funding decisions should 
generally be avoided. Similarly, in our case studies, rankings induced ambivalent 
responses. Regarding hospital rankings, our respondents commonly felt that 
rankings are not important for the ways in which organisations operate. They 
stressed the lack of validity and the volatility of rankings, arguing that they are 
‘lotteries’ and are unpredictable. It was argued that rankings do not appear to 
have any consequences in terms of patient choice or insurer commissioning of 
care. Other respondents, particularly physicians, pointed out that indicator-
based performance measurement directs attention to measurable agendas, while 
the most difficult agendas with regard to performance in the domain of quality 
and safety are related to the tacit expertise of professionals (such as diagnostic 
interpretations).
In our fieldwork in universities, we noticed that an interest in global university 
rankings and the development of adaptive strategies seemed mainly relevant 
at the level of deans and other research managers. The researchers who acted 
as informants seemed mainly involved with their own performance and that of 
their colleagues. As noted in the dialogue below, their commitment with their 
institution’s ranking scores was rather low:
SdR : Do you think that university rankings affect trust relations between 
different academic medical hospitals?
Professor [switches to 3rd person plural]: Well, when they go up in 
the ranking, this leads to a celebratory announcement on our intranet. It 
is much like what happens when the Dutch national football team wins an 
important match’ (4 November 2012).
Perhaps this lack of commitment to institutional ranking scores makes sense if 
we take into account how academic careers currently take shape. Job insecurity 
may trigger researchers (as members of an increasingly flexible ‘workforce’) to 
be more committed to pursuing the next step in their career than to the perfor-
mance of the organisation they are affiliated with. Similarly, in hospitals, medical 
specialists were usually more interested in their relations to the same speciality 
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in other organisations than to the performance of the hospital in which they 
work. Yet, at the same time, it was felt that rankings had to be taken seriously, as 
they were one of the drivers of the increasingly important reputation of hospitals 
and universities. For example, during an interview, the quality manager from 
hospital A pointed towards the limited usefulness of rankings, and continued 
her argument by saying
[w]e still want to end high. When we dropped from the top 25 to place 60, 
that wasn’t liked much (12 November 2012).
During interviews, informal conversations, and meetings, rankings were often 
criticised. Yet we noted this did not impede managers and practitioners in 
actively engaging with ranking practices:
During one of our [IW and RB] interviews, a hospital administrator criti-
cised current measurement policies that, according to him, did not reflect 
reality: ‘According to the numbers we were a kind of “death hospital”, 
but it all depends on how you measure mortality rates’. According to this 
administrator, hospitals are heavily disciplined by ranking policies, clearly 
objecting to the practice and even lecturing us on Foucault’s notions of 
discipline. After having said this, he turns to a pile of papers on his desk, 
showing us the figures of the performances of the different hospital wards: 
‘You see, ward Z did an excellent job, they will have cake and a picture with 
me on the intranet next Monday! [smiling] They love it if we celebrate good 
performance’ (Observation notes, 22 June 2012).
SdR and PW made a somewhat similar observation when they discussed the 
possibilities for ethnographic research in a large medical research centre:
The present and future dean, the director of research, and a quality manager 
hosted the meeting. On the basis of our research proposal, all of us reflected 
on adverse effects of the increasing use of quantitative performance indica-
tors. Until the quality manager received an e-mail, which he read on his 
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iPad, containing bibliometric data on the centre’s performance (as measured 
through citation analysis). Compared to the year before, the institute had 
‘gone up’ on all bibliometric indicators, a fact he immediately shared with the 
present dean by handing him the iPad. The dean was quick to ask whether 
‘his’ institute was now ‘first’, and began to fantasise about presenting a list 
of the scores of all competing medical research centres at his farewell party 
a couple of weeks later (Observation notes, 1 March 2012).
This meeting to establish researchers’ access (along with the meeting with the 
CEO in one of the hospitals) revealed how indicators and rankings were both 
criticised and embraced, depending on the specific ‘partial connections’ that were 
made (Strathern 2000). Although our respondents express their experiences 
of how rankings may be critiqued in a variety of ways, they cannot escape from 
rankings. Essentially, rankings are actively used to enhance organisational perfor-
mance. In the above extract from our fieldwork at the university medical centre, 
a complex set of bibliometric measures was translated into a ‘simple’ ranking by 
one of the deans. This ‘responsive’ or ‘implied’ ranking practice affords this dean 
strategic use of a more intuitive comparison between organisations than would 
be possible if he were to draw on the entire bibliometric assemblage that was 
presented to him by the quality manager. The hospital manager, in turn, used 
the ranking to encourage nursing wards to enhance their performance. Nursing 
wards that performed well were displayed on the intranet, with the CEO being 
part of them. Yet in the same ‘moment’, ranking also induced a deep criticism 
and a feeling of discomfort, as these managers (both also professionals) were 
highly sceptical about the practices underlying the rankings.
As researchers, this two-sided picture of resistance and engagement surprised 
us. Although our ethnographic methodology does not allow for strict causal 
analysis, we did wonder why this experience was so strong. Rankings seem to 
perform comparison in ways that tie in with deeply embedded cultural notions 
of performance and competition (i.e. ‘who is the best’ is a notion which already 
starts at pre-school). The tighter coupling between perceived performance and 
distribution of resources since the 1980s has further strengthened the effects of 
rankings. In addition, ‘to rank’ comes naturally for professions that have become 
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highly competitive amongst themselves. Many researchers and medical special-
ists seem driven by the urge to outperform their colleagues, and the ranking 
mechanisms we encountered make this quite visible. We suggest that it is this 
simple visibility of an ordered list that makes rankings stand out compared to 
more complex forms of comparison.
To us researchers, the excerpts above were exemplars of what Marilyn 
Strathern has pointed out as ‘ethnographic moments’ – a relation that joins the 
understood (i.e. what is analysed at the moment of observation) to the need to 
understand (i.e. what is observed at the moment of analysis) (Strathern 1980; 
Mol 2011). In our situations, with more or less overlapping observations in both 
research projects, these ‘moments’ acted as points of recognition and of shared 
surprise and feelings of discomfort. It was stimulating to have long repeated 
debates about the ambivalence of ranking and about its contesting values and 
ethics (e.g. ‘good practice is much more complex and thus not easily measure-
able’ versus ‘we want to be outstanding, and measurement and ranking may 
help to achieve this’) and all other ambivalences involved. It made us realise that 
criticising ranking is (too) easy, just like understanding ranking as a practice of 
‘gaming’ or creating a well-cut and organised world next to a much more fuzzy 
world of professional work. Instead, ranking involves both conflicting ideas and 
ways of acting; it is both order and mess, and these go hand in hand.
Performativity of Ranking
In the sociological literature, university rankings are associated with competi-
tion at the level of the entire organisation. We also noticed how rankings were 
used to police work processes and enhance organisational performance. In one 
of the hospitals, for instance, the clinical pathway for breast cancer treatment 
was revised to reduce waiting times for surgery in order to obtain higher scores 
on the national ranking of best hospitals. However, our comparative approach 
revealed that rankings enacted organisational practices that went beyond this 
competitive aspect. Ranking was also used to create or enhance group identity 
(e.g. by displaying the medical research centre as the best), to reform routine 
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practices, and to encourage individual workers to excel. Within the translation 
of rankings to everyday work processes, the complex metrics that underlies a 
ranking were reconfigured to simplified lists of factors that made performance 
measurable and comparable. The presence of such ‘implied’ ranking practices 
points to the performativity of ranking – that is, a reinforcing loop that redefines 
organisations, individuals, and also projects, in terms of a ranking:
Professor D is preparing a funding application for Cardiovascular Onderzoek 
Nederland (CVON) as one of the Principal Investigators (PI) in a larger 
consortium; his institute is the prospective ‘coordinating group’. Funding 
schemes such as this one explicitly use the ‘H-index’ as an indicator for 
the aptness and ‘proven track record’ of PIs (CVON call 2012, p. 5).4 The 
calculation of this index is relatively simple: an H-index of X means that 
the researcher has published X articles that have each been cited at least 
X times. Consortia need at least one PI with a high H-index for a proposal 
to be eligible for funding at all. These PI’s can take part in maximum one 
proposal a year. Combined, these two criteria create a lot of lobbying and a 
‘run’ on PI’s with a high H-index (Observation notes, pre-clinical research 
group, September 2012).
In this frame of comparison, an increasingly competitive funding landscape 
forms the background for situations in which project proposals are being made 
comparable on the basis of how the PIs in the consortia score on the H-index. 
This ratio of published articles/number of citations homogenises, simplifies, and 
enables funding agencies to rank consortia and prioritise proposals by ‘enlisting’ 
PIs via their proven track record (as expressed in their H-index). Recognising 
the importance of the H-index encourages scientists to use it even if this is not 
officially required. One of our informants mentioned taking part in a ‘grant pro-
posal preparation class’ at his institute. The institutional research policy advisor 
(and host of the workshop) advised participants to mention their H-index if 
they felt it could help them stand out in the ranking of research proposals and 
researchers during the prioritisation work done by review committees. These 
ways in which researchers and policy officers act strategically with performance 
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indicators are not (yet) part of the official evaluation criteria. However, these 
actors play an active role in these evaluation systems. The scientific system is 
highly competitive. Therefore, it is in the interest of institutions and research-
ers if high-scoring individuals actively display their scores, thereby fuelling the 
further development of indicator-based research assessment (Wouters 2014).
Similarly, hospitals tend to focus their quality policies on those areas which 
are important for their score on rankings. For this purpose, hospitals benchmark 
themselves on underlying performance indicators, taking particular notice of 
hospitals in their direct environment. Programmes that focus both on registra-
tion work and quality improvement are set up especially in those areas where 
hospitals score relatively low. For instance, one of the hospitals we studied did 
rather poorly on the performance indicator for malnutrition. The quality manager 
was requested to investigate the causes of the low score. It appeared that the 
hospital failed in measuring the nutrition status of elderly patients at their fourth 
day of admission, as was required by the performance indicator. Subsequently, 
nutrition assistants were trained to conduct these measurements. From the 
interviews with healthcare professionals, it appeared that this reorganising of 
care goes against areas of care that are not represented in the rankings, or that 
are not made measurable. Similarly, as discussed above in the example of the 
pressure ulcer scores, ranking practices became embedded in the hospitals to 
stimulate professionals to do registration work.
Again, we see similar processes in universities and hospitals. In both institu-
tions, strategic behaviour is induced through the reputation game of the rank-
ing practices. Ranking practices direct focus and activities, even though – in 
the same ‘moment’ – they also elicit criticism. The organisations under study 
seemed increasingly embedded in responsive ranking practices. On a number 
of levels, the organisations and individuals within them defined themselves 
in terms of a ranking (for instance, when they tried to get a handle on more 
complex comparative mechanisms at play).
When comparing our findings, we had room (both intellectually and meth-
odologically) to move back and forth between our joint discussions and our 
research sites. In developing this collective comparative space, the performa-
tivity of rankings became a much-debated topic. We ended up constructing 
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similarities that related, for example, to an equal emphasis on ‘good scores’ and 
the policing of existing organisational and working routines to enhance these 
scores. Simultaneously, our focus on similarities also enacted and underscored 
differences. For instance, in the academic context we found that performance 
was increasingly related to individual performance (think about the H-index 
mentioned above). While IW and RB translated this outcome to the hospital 
setting – attempting (perhaps expecting) to discern a similar shift to individual 
performance in medical work – they did not find this result. Discussing our 
ethnographic moments, surprises, and expectations helped create new lenses to 
reconsider our data and research fields. In the end, transparency about individual 
performance seemed in conflict with medicine’s emphasis on socialisation and 
moral protection of physician-colleagues (Bosk 2003 (1979); Wallenburg et 
al. 2013).
Coordinating Ranking Practices
On a strategic level, rankings seem to affect university and hospital policies in 
a number of ways (Marginson 2012; Rauhvargers 2011; 2013). These include 
the bringing in of new types of knowledge like reputation management and 
marketing; the realignment of administrative processes and the development 
of new types of research/care and accountability processes; the ‘buying of CVs’ 
to enhance measured performance; and the responsive ranking practices that 
our informants resorted to in order to make sense of more complex compara-
tive strategies for the purpose of performance measurements. These and other 
feedback mechanisms co-define how researchers, healthcare professionals, 
and policymakers operationalise the notion of ‘high quality’. Interestingly, 
these feedback mechanisms may result in strategic behaviour which potentially 
undermines the validity of the performance indicators that ranking practices are 
based on at large. This is not merely the result of top-down criteria that ‘trickle 
down’ to local research practices. Interactions from the bottom up between 
people involved at different levels within the organisation are equally relevant. 
Let us take a closer look at the fieldwork in the hospital sector.
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The hospitals studied went through great changes in terms of the organisa-
tion of administrative processes. What is euphemistically called an ‘uitvraag’ (an 
information demand by an external party) sometimes involved many months 
of work for the quality and information departments in collecting information 
from different sources in the hospital. This administrative work entailed many 
‘investments in form’ to bring the information together (Thévenot 1984), includ-
ing the involvement of health professionals to collect and register indicator 
information and the standardisation of care processes to enable data collection. 
Apart from information guiding the treatment process, health professionals 
had to collect data on all kinds of scores necessary for performance indicators. 
Nurses, for example, had to do risk assessment for pressure ulcers, delirium, 
and malnourishment, and had to regularly check whether a patient was in 
pain. The hospitals we studied had all installed different methods to make sure 
registration of care was actually done. These included building indicators in the 
electronic patient record, disciplining professionals by publishing information on 
registration, and ‘policing’ professionals to make sure registration was actually 
done. However, as one of the doctors we interviewed indicated, such policing 
is sometimes hardly possible:
The urologist argues that every time new measures come up ‘the hospital 
board wants us to participate in that’. He goes on to say ‘I just give the desired 
scores. Taking a biopt in one day is impossible, but I just indicate that we do 
it nonetheless. I don’t spend more than five minutes on this. It is uncontrol-
lable’ (12 December 2012).
While hospital administrators and quality managers aim to standardise health-
care processes (and with that, the collection of data as much as possible), 
health professionals work around the system by enacting a form of ‘pragmatic 
compliance’. They just ‘tick a box’, as the urologist above points out. In this 
way, he complies with the demands put on him through the rankings while not 
changing his work practices, as he is aware that not ticking the box might have 
more serious consequences, if only to be publicly displayed within the hospi-
tal to be a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ performing ward (as was the case with the pressure 
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ulcer scores of nurses). This does not mean, however, that indicators are not 
taken seriously. The same urologist participated in several working groups both 
within the hospital, and in his medical association, developing performance 
indicators and related policies. A surgeon stressed the increasing importance 
of performance indicators developed by the medical professional associations:
Surgeon: The Netherlands Association of Surgeons (Nederlandse 
Vereniging van Heelkunde [NVvH]) possesses a complication registry. For 
an honest registration it’s crucial that this information is not made public […] 
Two years ago, Hospital X [a neighbouring hospital] had many reoperations 
for colon surgery. A delegation of the NVvH visited the surgeons. This all 
went quite harmoniously, you know, they came to see what happened and 
how things could be improved.
IW: Yet, I can imagine that such a visit says something; they aren’t there 
for nothing.
Surgeon: Of course, of course, they [the surgeons of hospital X] were 
fed up. They knew something was wrong. They had to act (2 November 
2013).
The excerpts of both the surgeon and the urologist reveal medicine’s ambiva-
lence towards performance indicators and rankings. Physicians feel a certain 
resistance towards external monitoring, but at the same time are driven by an 
interest in legitimising and developing their professional work. This results 
in what Levay and Waks (2009) have pointed out as ‘soft autonomy’, which 
combines professional internalisation of originally non-professional auditing 
practices with maintaining professional control over evaluation criteria. However, 
whereas Levay and Waks (along with other scholars studying changing profes-
sionalism) have emphasised the medical profession’s creative capabilities to 
capture external attempts to regulate their work (e.g. Waring 2007; Currie et al. 
2012; Kuhlmann 2008), our research shows that despite the incorporation of 
performance indicators by the medical profession, they also act as a tin opener, 




We observed a similar dynamic in the university context. As part of the 
fieldwork at a cell biology laboratory, we were granted access to the yearly 
appraisal of one of the four group leaders with the head of the department. 
The meeting was held a couple of months after the institutional research 
assessment (held every six years) had taken place, and when the institute 
was in the middle of processing the results. The international committee 
performing the evaluation had followed procedures laid out in the Dutch 
‘Standard Evaluation Protocol’ (SEP), and had used ‘informed peer review’ 
(see Colwell et al. 2012). This is a system in which peer review provides the 
overall framework for evaluation, but statistical data and citation indicators 
play a specific, often obligatory, role. Heads of departments are being held 
accountable on the basis of these assessments of their groups. Some managers 
use the numerical information to help make decisions about departmental 
research priorities, the use of lab space, and the distribution of other mate-
rial and financial resources. In the yearly appraisal, the group leaders seemed 
well aware of these numerically driven decision-making processes. However, 
as seen below, Professor P’s own presentation in the appraisal, for instance, 
was also saturated with other indicators (particularly the number of articles 
and the Journal Impact Factor):
Professor (P): We have published nearly fifty articles, that means nearly 
one a week, and this is for the entire section; it is really unbelievable, two of 
them are really breakthrough papers. When I go somewhere […] they have 
all read it; it attracts a lot of attention […] I am currently working with [two 
Chinese postdocs] on a couple of very good papers. We will be able to send 
them to top [i.e. high impact factor] journals […]
Head of the department (H): I know you’re charmed with the 
Chinese, they score high, but they do leave afterwards.
P: Yes, but they do not need much supervision; I see them briefly during 
the weekend.
H: But there will be polarisation in your group if not everyone can live up 
to that level.
P: Yes, but what do you want? We score ‘very good’, not ‘excellent’.
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[Here he refers to scores on the institutional evaluation]
H: You would have scored excellent if the past two years would have been 
taken into account [in the bibliometric analysis].
P: This did happen with other departments!
H: No, we stuck to that rule. If other departments were sloppy they were 
reproached for that […] These numbers are slow; it takes a long time before 
you get above a ‘2’.
[Here, H points his finger at one of the indicators in the bibliometric report, 
the group’s ‘Mean Normalised Citation Score’ (MNCS). The bibliometric 
analysis uses a relatively long citation window of five years and did not include 
the last two years. Calculation of the Journal Impact Factor is ‘faster’ because 
it is done on the basis of a two-year citation window.]
P: I am interested in excellence. If the assessment procedures do not 
match the work done, things will become difficult (Observation notes, 26 
September 2013).
In the yearly appraisal, two indicators are drawn on to arrive at: 1) an ‘implied’ 
ranking of the professor’s group compared to other groups in the department, 
and 2) a reputational ranking of the journals that the group targets as outlets 
for their articles. In the former case, it is striking how a complex assemblage of 
indicators that forms the basis of the institutional evaluation is simplified, and 
now only revolves around this one indicator (the MNCS). In the appraisal, two 
ranking practices come together: institutional (via the MNCS) and disciplinary 
(via the Journal Impact Factor). Again, the measures act as ‘tin openers’. For 
instance, they enable the group leader to make a point about the other ranking 
game he is involved in (a comparative practice within molecular cell biology in 
which excellence is measured mainly through the impact factor). The profes-
sor celebrates the performance of his Chinese postdocs who have succeeded 
in publishing a ‘Nature, Cell or Science’ (NCS) paper. The reputation of his 
group is defined in part through the reputational ranking of the journals its 
members publish in. A reputational ranking of journals makes perfect sense for 
the PI, because it also helps him make decisions about managing his group (e.g. 
through the amount of ‘work’ they have done in relation to their performance), 
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or about how to ‘rank’ his employees in relation to where to allocate specific 
resources. Such ranking practices seem to form a routine part of peer review 
in his discipline. These processes take place on a global scale and are shaped in 
interactions between thousands of labs.
Institutional-level rankings are not that relevant in this process. As such, 
the excerpt above nicely reveals differences in ‘accountability repertoires’ (see 
Moreira 2005). That is, the indicators also enable the head of the department 
to caution the professor about his leadership style (which he draws in as a 
corollary of the reputational ranking of journals’ dynamics and says is creating 
pressure in the PI’s group). Accountability repertoires appear in different forms 
and pursue different goals. They are thus all considered valid and important. 
The actors involved need to make sense of these various co-existing repertoires, 
and attempt to find ways to combine them.
These different repertoires were also visible in the hospital context. Here, 
too, rankings and indicators not only operated through processes of self-control, 
but they were also opened up to new types of interactions (including with 
other actors), making negotiations on professional work possible. As one care 
manager noted,
[a]nd the other thing is that we of course use [rankings and indicators] 
as a management tool to get through to medical specialists […] [to get 
towards] particular improvement practices in the care process that have to 
be done. Step one, the ranking enters [the hospital]. In the following […] 
[For example], cardiologists score badly. As a consequence I go and see the 
medical manager, or do sometimes even visit the whole group of specialists, 
and I tell them:
‘Guys, this is really going badly here’.
Then they would tell me: ‘The numbers are not correct’.
Then we first look at the numbers together which they delivered […] 
And I tell them: ‘This number was delivered, and you signed it. How come 
they are not correct nevertheless? What is the reason?’
Then they say that the case mix is […] different.5
Then you check this out.
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Then you tell them: ‘From the benchmark it seems that that is not the 
case’ [i.e. incorrect case mix].
Then you approach the core and say: ‘Guys, you still score low, we took 
away variability, and now we have to discuss what we can do in our organisa-
tion, in our work process, in our medical policy, in our care process in order 
to make sure that there are better outcomes next time.’
But then, nevertheless, the ranking is for me still an instrument in order 
to effect change. Rankings are not a goal in themselves (2 May 2013).
In their internal use, indicators, and the ranking practices they support, increase 
the power for executives because they open up the primary process of care or 
knowledge creation for strategic criteria. In other words, they serve as tactical 
means to enable managers to negotiate and shape performance improvement 
agendas with professionals and researchers. Managers thus act as the ones 
undertaking the comparative work. Although health care practitioners and 
scientists conduct comparative work as well, in the end the managers brought 
the collective comparative work together and were accountable to external 
regulators assessing their organisation (whether these were the health care 
inspectorate and health insurers in the hospital case, or the heads of department 
in the university case). This also encouraged practitioners to streamline work 
processes or reduce the number of medical complications (as in the excerpt 
above). Therefore, ranking may act as a ‘tin opener’, but it also induces a new 
coordinating role to managers.
Considering our own comparative work, we (unconsciously) enacted a 
third comparative strategy. Besides studying shared research moments and 
seeing our research projects through the lenses of the other, we also grap-
pled with the heterogeneity of ranking practices and observed how these are 
coordinated in everyday organisational work. Much more than trying to learn 
from ‘the other research project’, here we brought our findings together and 
considered them as one pool of data. We searched for relevant lines in this 
data that taught us about how ranking practices are coordinated and how this 
‘coordination work’ (Mol 2002) influences debates about accountability and 
evaluation of ‘good practice’.
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J ump :  Enact ing  Compar i sons
In this final part of our ‘hop-skip-jump’ approach, we discuss some elements 
of the ‘production process’ of the comparison between the hospital and uni-
versity rankings we described above. By analysing how we approached the 
comparison and what it brought us, we aim to contribute to recent theoretical 
work on comparative methods in qualitative social science (see Niewöhner 
and Scheffer 2010). Above, we have ‘practised comparison’ by conceiving 
hospital and academic ranking practices through the lens of the other, and by 
subsequently searching for connections. These lenses helped us to understand 
the dominance of ‘measurability’ within the organisations we studied. We also 
described the heterogeneity of ranking practices and how actors have to work 
to align the different ways in which they are enlisted.
Comparison often entails ‘commensuration’ (see Espeland and Stevens 
1998), and that was also the case in our own comparative practice. For example, 
although hospitals and universities are more like nodes in networks than ‘organi-
sations’, in a confined sense (Clegg, Kornberger, and Rhodes 2005), we created 
a correspondence between them by approaching hospitals and universities as 
bounded entities. In doing so, we revealed some of the politics of tabulation and 
differentiation intrinsic to rankings, and zoomed in on their particular enact-
ments in university and hospital contexts. One of the intellectual driving forces 
behind our comparison was that we were slightly dissatisfied with the crudeness 
of some recent analyses that point to the normalising and disciplining effects of 
rankings (see Power et al. 2009; Espeland and Sauder 2007). It was our ambi-
tion to come up with a more differentiated understanding of the workings of 
rankings. It is not enough to explain the popularity of ranking by pointing to an 
increasing drive for ‘competition’ in neo-liberal ‘audit societies’. Rather, we found 
the importance of competition to be an emergent property of highly situated 
ranking practices. The main purpose of both of our ethnographically driven 
research designs was to render visible the enactment or daily work of ‘doing’ 
rankings in real organisational practices, from an in-depth, whole-organisation 
perspective. Among other things, our comparison showed that rankings tend 
to evoke ambivalences as a result of their ‘decentredness’. That is, they are held 
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together through their fluidity; ranking is an effective comparative technology 
precisely because it is responsive, flexible, and capable of engaging multiple 
worlds (see De Laet and Mol 2000).
The performativity of our ethnographic mode of comparison was also visible 
in how we enacted a classical comparison between professional and managerial 
work, often employed in the analysis of quantitative comparative techniques 
(Triantafillou 2007; Sauder and Espeland 2009). As analysts, we differenti-
ated between the types of work connected to research and care on the one 
hand, and organising work on the other, by studying the interaction between 
the types of activities that we saw, for example, in the practice of ‘pragmatic 
compliance’. However, we also noted that ranking became part of professional 
practices themselves, thus opening up new ways of interactions between the 
different types of work, which in a way transcended distinctions which were 
often made (also by us) between organisations, epistemic cultures, and work 
practices. For example, the observation of the meeting between the professor 
and his boss showed the intricate intertwinement between managerial and 
research work, where the question of who is comparing whom, or to what 
effect, is no longer obvious.
How did we involve ourselves in this comparative process? We sat together (a 
lot) to share fieldwork experiences in offices and conveniently located teashops; 
we engaged with the respective material from the two projects by exchanging 
draft texts, and sat down together again to discuss similarities and differences. 
Importantly, our comparison was shaped through a combined background 
in STS. We drew from a shared reservoir of sociological and anthropological 
literature on classification, governance, quantification, and accountability. 
Clearly, this shared background also shaped our own classifications and the 
categories we drew up in combining the empirical material. Our background 
in STS is, for instance, very visible in our description of the ‘performativity of 
rankings’ section (above). This particular classification was certainly influenced 
by a ‘turn to performativity’ in STS – a mode of analysis and description that 
has been used to counter representationalist world views (see Pickering 1995) 
by demonstrating how descriptions, theories, and models become involved in 
the constitution of research objects they set out to represent.
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But our training in STS is not the only reason for wanting to problematise 
ranking practices. Our comparative analysis (and an input into our analysis) was 
certainly also driven by our own mixed reactions to being ranked. So, whereas 
in our academic environments our performance gets measured through our 
publications, we also share a commitment to engaged research (Wouters and 
Beaulieu 2006; Bal and Mastboom 2007) and try to contribute to discussions 
in the Netherlands on care and research systems by giving lectures, participat-
ing in public debates, and writing publications in Dutch that are less visible 
in ranking practices. In addition, we are implicated in ranking practices in a 
more direct sense. We relate to the fieldwork material as researchers do to their 
empirical ‘data’, but in the case of the university rankings there is also another 
relationship. SdR and PW work at the Centre for Science and Technology 
Studies (CWTS), a research institute that not only hosts researchers who 
critically examine the impact of evaluation on knowledge production, but that 
also produces bibliometric analyses, including the ‘Leiden Ranking’. As such, 
the ethnographic work could have onto-political purposes in questioning how 
our colleagues practice bibliometrics, and how certain norms about knowledge 
production and ‘excellence’ are inscribed into citation databases and enlisted 
in rankings. The statistical experience of our colleagues rests on a great – yet 
positivistically inclined – sensitivity to category construction and classification. 
Questions of how ‘users’ are interpellated in bibliometric analyses, for instance, 
are not part of their acknowledged spectrum of analytic challenges. But like 
Stockelova (this volume), we find it unproductive to simply rebel against these 
prevailing frames of reference. Instead, we look for opportunities to carefully 
reinforce certain frames and challenge others. One opening we have is that 
there is an increasing need in the field for ethically responsible metrics, and 
for handles on how to generate productive feedback with ‘users’ about the 
‘misuse’ of bibliometrics. We recently contributed to these discussions in an 
opinion piece for one of the leading information science journals (De Rijcke 
and Rushforth, forthcoming) at dedicated workshops and plenary sessions 
at scientometric conferences that we co-organised.6 The great asset of being 
located at one of the leading scientometric centres is that both practices (the 
scientometric and the ethnographic) are forced to interrogate each other. We 
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expect that this will lead to a better form of scientometrics (in terms of political 
as well as intellectual goals) and to a more informed ethnographic sensitivity.
IW and RB also work in a place heavily infused with benchmarking and 
cost-effectiveness research, and they collaborate in those kinds of projects. 
The original performance indicators of the Healthcare Inspectorate on which 
some of the rankings of hospitals are based were, for example, designed at 
the institute (Berg et al. 2005). Moreover, RB regularly sits on governmental 
committees discussing performance management systems in health care, and 
is involved to some extent in the ranking business. By being part of ranking 
practices in these diverse ways, and being attuned to STS types of analyses 
of quantification and commensuration, the projects we engaged in are in a 
way attempts to reflect on our own work and experiences. It made us aware 
of the pragmatic use of such comparative techniques on the one hand, and 
critically aware of their problematic nature on the other. This refrained us 
from becoming critical in a classical sociological sense of rankings, which – 
we like to think – has allowed us to do a more symmetrical analysis of them. 
However, as the above arguments on the consequences of our own analysis 
shows (i.e. bounding organisations and differentiating between managerial 
and professional work), such symmetry also came with a cost: in order to 
perform our symmetrical analysis, we had to engage in commensuration 
ourselves.
Our ambitions for this chapter are of course relative to the overlapping space 
we created between the findings of our individual projects.7 By being explicit 
about our approaches, we wanted to ‘thicken our ethnographic explication’ 
(Niewöhner and Scheffer 2010: 10) by searching for concrete interactions in 
‘noncoherent practices’ (Mol 2011) – both at the level of the ethnographic 
material, and at the level of our own cooperation. We worked out this over-
lapping space in an attempt to follow unfolding relations in the situations 
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Note s
1 A third researcher, Julia Quartz ( JQ), was later added to the team, but after we started 
working on this publication. See Quartz et al. (2013) for a full account of the hospital 
study.
2 The research was funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and 
Development (ZonMw).
3 There are international differences in the introduction of rankings and other comparative 
techniques; in the UK, hospital rankings were introduced in 1983, while in the US the first 
rankings appeared in the early 1990s. In the Netherlands, the first ranking was published 
in 2004 (see Pollitt et al. 2010 for a comparative analysis of Dutch and English hospital 
ranking systems).
4 http://www.cvon.eu/cvoncms/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/nhs_cvon_call2012.
pdf [accessed 12 September 2012]
See p. 5. In this comparative framework, Prof D is expected to be highly competitive; his 
H-index was 91 at the time of applying for funding [E-mail from one of his postdocs, 17 
September 2012, in which the postdoc used Google Scholar for the calculation of the 
H-index]. This is quite high in his own field (basic research). The number will certainly stand 
out when compared to more clinically oriented medical scientists in the funding scheme.
5 Case mix refers to the characteristics of patients treated on the ward in terms of age, 
sex, co-morbidities, and the like, which might affect outcomes of clinical work.
6 International workshop on ‘Guidelines and Good Practices of Quantitative Assessments 
of Research,’ held on 12 May 2014 at the Observatoire des Sciences et des Techniques 
in Paris (http://www.obs-ost.fr/fractivit%C3%A9s/workshop_international). Special 
session ‘Quality standards for evaluation indicators: Any chance of a dream come true?’ 
at the 19th international Conference on Science and Technology Indicators (STI) in 
Leiden, 6–8 September 2014 (http://sti2014.cwts.nl/Program).
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I n troduct ion
in this paper, i Want to reFlect and shed neW light on one oF My 
current research topics: biohacking. While I have been researching biohacking 
for a few years now, to date I have not yet examined its comparative dimension. 
The themes I have investigated thus far revolve around the materiality, bounda-
ries, and ethics of biohacking. However, so far I have not problematised or made 
visible the issue of comparison, despite the fact that comparisons abound in 
discussions about biohackers. This article is thus an opportunity to use a com-
parative optics to ‘make new discoveries’ (Yengoyan 2006) on a subject that I 
felt I already knew well.
Biohackers are people who hack and tinker with biology. On the one hand, 
the phenomenon of biohacking can be easily localised (both temporally and 
spatially). The movement emerged in 2007/2008 and has largely developed in 
large US and European cities. On the other hand, in order to understand and 
analyse the phenomenon, comparisons with a wide and heterogeneous set of 
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figures are made by science journalists and practitioners alike. For example, 
biohackers are concurrently compared to the following: seventeenth-century 
gentlemen amateurs; terrorists (whom Western powers usually locate in the 
East); the punk movement that emerged in the 1970s and their do-it-yourself 
ethics; and Steve Jobs and the Homebrew Computer Club.
The term biohacking is used today to designate a wide array of practices 
including the hacking of expensive scientific equipment by building cheaper 
alternatives; producing biosensors to detect pollutants in food and in the 
environment; and genetically re-engineering yoghurt to alter its taste, make 
it fluorescent, or produce vitamin C. Biohacking mobilises and transforms 
both molecular biology techniques and the ethics of hacking/open source. As 
such, it can be seen as a recent phenomenon. Its emergence as a distinct and 
visible movement can be traced back to the past eight or nine years. In 2008, 
for instance, DIYbio (the first association dedicated to do-it-yourself biology) 
was created.1 Two years later, the Biopunk Manifesto (2010) was written by 
Meredith Patterson, one of the leading figures in the biohacking movement. In 
addition, at the time of writing this paper, there are a number of associations, 
laboratories, wikis, websites, and so on, dedicated to biohacking.
The rise of the biohacker movement has caught the attention of journalists 
and academics alike. Academics have followed and analysed the movement 
since around 2008 (see Schmidt 2008a; Bennet et al. 2009; Ledford 2010), and 
two books dedicated to the subject have recently been published: Biohackers: 
The Politics of Open Science (2013), by science and technology studies (STS) 
scholar Alessandro Delfanti, and Biopunk: DIY Scientists Hack the Software of 
Life (2011), by science journalist Marcus Wohlsen. In one way or another, this 
body of work has examined the ethics, risks, potentials, and openness of the 
movement.
The geographical spread of biohacking – like its temporal emergence – can 
also be delineated. According to the main website in the field (DIYbio.org), 
there are currently eighty-five DIY biology laboratories in the world, of which 
twenty-eight are located in Europe, and thirty-five are in the US on either the 
east or west coast. There are now biohacker labs and biohackers in cities like 
New York, Boston, Paris, San Francisco, Manchester, Vienna, and in recent years, 
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initiatives have developed in places like Japan, Indonesia, and Singapore. The 
political geography of biohacking (and consequently, the arguments developed 
in this paper) thus needs to be emphasised. The biohacker movement is devel-
oping in Western and Westernised countries; laboratories are usually located in 
urban or suburban settings; and English is the lingua franca for the majority of 
the websites, articles, mailing lists, discussions, and wikis devoted to biohacking.
This paper focuses on how, and to what, biohackers are compared. This is 
a challenging question, for as we will see below, biohackers are compared to 
rather unlikely bedfellows. Not only are plentiful comparisons being made, but 
they are also drawn between different cultures and times, and between differ-
ent – sometimes opposing – values and ethics. Unlike the ‘comparator’ which 
needs to be actively assembled, fed, and calibrated in order to provide compari-
sons (Deville, Guggenheim, and Hrdličková 2013), in the case of biohackers, 
comparisons are ‘already there’ and they are omnipresent. The frequency and 
disparity of these comparisons are what caught my interest in comparison and 
what compelled me to write this chapter. Why are such comparisons mobilised 
and why are such unlikely figures put side by side? What kinds of effects do such 
comparisons afford? How should we analyse these comparisons?
It is not unusual for hackers and computer programmers to be compared. 
Computer hackers, for instance, have been compared to public watchdogs, 
whistle-blowers, elite corps of computer programmers, artists, vandals, and 
criminals (see Jordan and Taylor 1998), while recent hacker networks like the 
Anonymous group have been compared to industrial machine breakers, and to 
Luddites (Deseriis 2013). The Homebrew Computer Club (initially a group 
of ‘hobbyists’) eventually became a group of ‘business entrepreneurs’ (see 
Coleman 2012), and Steve Jobs is today being compared to people like Thomas 
Edison or Walt Disney.
Using biohacking as a case study, I will reflect upon and problematise 
comparison. The list of potential benefits of comparison is long, and it is 
worth mentioning a few, such as how they help to explore new, unanticipated 
routes; move beyond national frameworks by varying scales of analysis; and 
identify social patterns while highlighting the singularity of the cases studied 
(de Verdalle et al. 2012). The practices, methods, and problems of comparison 
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have been discussed in a number of academic texts over the past decade or so. 
For instance, Richard Fox and Andre Gingrich (2002) have made an important 
contribution by revisiting and (re)theorising comparison. Arguing that com-
parison is a basic human activity that deserves academic scrutiny, they lay out a 
specific programme for comparative approaches. Differentiating between weak 
or implicit comparison, and strong and explicit comparison, Fox and Gingrich 
push especially for the latter and highlight their plural nature (2002: 20). The 
explicit focus on comparison has now become increasingly common, so that 
people talk of a ‘comparative turn’ in the social sciences (see Ward 2010). In 
this sense, comparison is actively engaged with, problematised, and theorised. 
This interest is visible beyond the Anglo-Saxon world as well. In France, for 
instance, two collections of essays on comparison have been published in 
2012 alone: one is in the journal Terrains et Travaux (featuring on its cover 
an orange and an apple – a classic image that at once depicts sameness and 
difference, and is one of the chief challenges of comparison). The other is in 
an edited book called Faire des Sciences Sociales: Comparer (Remaud, Schaub, 
and Thireau 2012).
In this article, I want to draw on this body of work in several ways. First, I 
am interested in several authors’ emphases on ‘thick’ and multidimensional 
comparisons. Ana Barro, Shirley Jordan, and Celia Roberts (1998) have argued 
that comparison should be explorative, thick, and multidimensional. Jörg 
Niewöhner and Thomas Scheffer – who also argue for a ‘thick’ comparison – 
further emphasise that comparisons are performative in that ‘they connect what 
would otherwise remain unconnected, specify what would otherwise remain 
unspecified, and emphasise what would otherwise remain unrecognised’ (2008: 
281). In a related way, Joe Deville, Michael Guggenheim, and Zuzana Hrdličková 
(this volume) talk about approaches that actively ‘provoke’ comparisons, while 
Tim Choy (2011) examines what comparisons do.
Second, I do not want to ‘solve’ the issue of comparison, nor tell a coherent 
account of what biohackers are and what they are not. I am, rather, exploring 
the problems that biohackers and their identities entail. In this sense, I follow 
Adam Kuper (2002) who reminds us that we have to ‘begin with a problem, a 
question, an intuition’ (2002: 161). He further writes:
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I remain convinced that methodological difficulties are the least of our prob-
lems […] We lack questions rather than the means to answer them. What 
we need in order to revive the comparative enterprise is not new methods 
but new ideas, or perhaps simply fresh problems (Ibid. 162).
I hold that biohackers are possibly such a ‘fresh problem’ since their identity 
is somewhat ambiguous and unclear, and since the probable risks and innova-
tive potential of their activities are currently being debated. Discussions about 
biohacking reveal that there are many uncertainties and that it seems difficult 
to put their identity into neat categories. The questions that seem to drive most 
biohacking comparisons – Who are they? How can we make sense of them? 
Are they to be feared or hailed? – seem to have no clear answer.
Third, I also draw on Donna Haraway’s and Marilyn Strathern’s ideas around 
‘partial connections’ and positionality. In her discussion about situated knowl-
edge, Haraway writes:
[h]ere is the promise of objectivity: a scientific knower seeks the subject 
position, not of identity, but of objectivity, that is, partial connection. There 
is no way to ‘be’ simultaneously in all, or wholly in any, of the privileged (i.e. 
subjugated) positions (1988: 586).
She continues:
I am arguing for politics and epistemologies of location, positioning, and 
situating, where partiality and not universality is the condition of being 
heard to make rational knowledge claims […] Feminism loves another 
science: the sciences and politics of interpretation, translation, stuttering, 
and the partly understood (Ibid. 589).
In her book Partial Connections (1991), Strathern further draws on Haraway’s 
work and uses the term ‘partial’ to say that ‘for not only is there no totality, each 
part also defines a partisan position’ (1991: 39). The trope of ‘partial connec-
tions’ can be – and already has been – engaged with in work on comparisons. 
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For instance, Endre Dányi, Lucy Suchman and Laura Watts (cited in Witmore 
2009) have compared seemingly incompatible field sites (a renewable energy 
industry, the Hungarian Parliament, and a research centre in Silicon Valley) 
and noted that there can be a ‘remarkable repetitiveness’ when these sites are 
connected through specific themes (such as newness, centres/peripheries, 
place, and landscape). Others have talked about ‘partial comparisons’ ( Jensen 
et al. 2011) as a way to think about multiplicities while still recognising that 
‘there exists no single, stable, underlying nature on which all actors have their 
perspectives’ (Ibid. 15). In this paper, I want to use these ideas in order to 
avoid one pitfall: the depiction of biohackers as a coherent whole that is able 
to be summated according to the different parts and comparisons reported 
in this article. In other words, the comparisons made can only be ‘partially 
connected’. I will thus refrain from taking an analytical view ‘from above’, one 
that is detached from what takes place ‘on the ground’. Instead, I will follow 
the actors themselves and consider their comparisons and knowledge claims 
to be valid and legitimate. In the remainder of this paper, I look in turn at four 
comparisons of biohackers (Steve Jobs, punks, amateurs, and terrorists). I will 
think with biohackers about comparison, rather than think about biohackers’ 
comparisons. In doing so, I not only seek to examine what comparisons do 
and produce, but I will also be reflexive and critical about my own previous 
research.
Four  Compar i sons  o f  B iohacker s
Comparison One: Steve Jobs and the Homebrew Computer Club
At the first meeting of the DIYbio group in Boston in 2008, the comparison 
between do-it-yourself biology and the Homebrew Computer Club had already 
been explicitly made. Jason Bobe (2008), one of the founders of the movement, 
asked: ‘Can DIYbio.org be the Homebrew Computer Club of biology?’ While 
the relation was posed as a question, it did not take long for practitioners to talk 
more boldly about ‘promises’ and ‘potentials’:
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[T]he promise of [the] DIY Biology movement opens up biology to poten-
tially create the next Silicon Valley. They are Steve Jobs and Bill Gates of the 
mid-1970’s or the Mark Zuckerberg of early 2000’s. Imagine just before the 
PC or social media explosions (OpenWetWare 2014).
DIY biology has been featured in a great number of articles in the news media, 
including Le Monde and Libération (France), the Guardian and Sky News (UK), 
Die Zeit (Germany), and the New York Times (US). A large number of these 
articles mention Steve Jobs along with biohacking. In a report about DIY biol-
ogy on the BBC, we read, for instance, that
[t]he organiser […] believes in the value of the amateur. He says the 
industrial revolutions brought about by steam and computing were driven 
by creative individuals – think Bill Gates and Steve Jobs in California in the 
70s, toiling in garages, changing the world. The coming revolution will be 
biological and DIY will play a key role (Shukman 2012)
In a recent survey on DIY biology, one practitioner asked the following rhetori-
cal question:
[w]hat if government had told Steve Jobs that he couldn’t play around with 
microprocessors because they could be used for missile guidance systems? 
(DIYbio community survey 2013)
In my research on biohacking, I have come across such comparisons many 
times. However, until writing this article, I never really considered them as 
such. Despite their frequency and the fact that they were articulated by prac-
titioners themselves, the comparisons somehow seemed to be filtered out by 
my own theoretical and methodological grid. Why? Perhaps it was due to their 
hypothetical nature and overtly optimistic tone and claims. Perhaps it was also 
because innovation in the ICT domain is not my research area. Perhaps it was a 
combination of both of these elements. This is the first lesson that I have learnt 
in writing this chapter: there are some comparisons I feel more comfortable with 
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than others, and some I more readily engage with. This first lesson leads me to 
formulate some questions to keep in mind for my own future work: Why do I 
follow some threads and not others? Can I be more symmetrical in following 
a wider array of comparative tropes (if not all of them) which are visible in my 
empirical material? Or, conversely, should I be selective and only follow some 
comparisons?
The pertinence (or robustness) of a comparison between DIY biology 
and Steve Jobs could be dissected and criticised. Yet, with others (e.g. Schmit 
2008b), I argue that this issue needs to be left aside here, for this would dis-
tract us from a key aspect of such a comparison: understanding what such 
a comparison does. Linking DIY biology to Steve Jobs produces a promise; 
it is a promissory comparison. It places a familiar success story side by side 
with a far less known story – a story-in-the-making. It offers a narrative of 
expansion – from a garage to a company, from a small group of individuals to 
a large corporation. And it offers a narrative of change, innovation, and revolu-
tion. Such a comparison, in other words, produces a folding of temporality 
(past, present and future), scale (local and global), and notoriety (unknown 
and famous).
Let me reformulate my question: What does this comparison do to the identity 
of biohackers? In order to find an answer, a quote from biologist Robert Carlson 
(2007) – one of the first persons to have talked about ‘garage biology’ – proves 
insightful. He wrote: ‘[w]hether at the hands of Michael Dell, Steve Jobs and 
Steve Wozniak, the Wright Brothers, Otto Lilienthal, William Boeing, or the 
yet-to-be-named transformative individuals working in biology, successful 
innovation requires wide access to both technology and a multitude of parts’ 
(Carlson 2007: 116). Carlson offers, en passant, an interesting and intriguing 
category: ‘the yet-to-be-named transformative individuals working in biology’ 
(Ibid.). Programmer and venture capitalist Paul Graham (2012) made a some-
what similar statement:
We know there’s room for the next Steve Jobs. But there’s almost certainly 
also room for the first <Your Name Here>.
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Comparing biohackers to Steve Jobs does something very specific: it produces a 
category for biohackers – a category that is open and future-oriented. This first 
comparison demonstrates that biologists can help us in our sociological analyses. 
It therefore makes sense for scholars to ‘follow the actors’ on the ground, and 
to take their descriptions and discourses seriously and be open to the analyses 
they provide. My position here is not only that we need to follow the actors, but 
also that we need to ‘follow the comparison’ from where it is made.
Comparison Two: Punks
The next comparison I want to explore is the one between the biohacker move-
ment and the punk movement. A first observation is that the terms ‘biopunk’ 
and ‘biohacking’ are sometimes both used to describe one and the same thing. 
For instance, in her Biopunk Manifesto, Patterson (2010) alternatively uses the 
terms biohackers and biopunks. She writes that ‘[w]e the biopunks are dedi-
cated to putting the tools of scientific investigation into the hands of anyone 
who wants them’ and that biopunks ‘experiment’ and ‘deplore restrictions’ on 
research. At the same time, she writes that biohackers are committed to involving 
themselves in the political world and that they aim at ‘creating new scientists 
out of everyone we meet’. Science journalist Markus Wohlsen’s book, Biopunk: 
DIY Scientists Hack the Software of Life, contains the term ‘punk’ in the title, but 
rather uses the terms ‘DIY biology’ and ‘hacking’ throughout the book. In both 
of these texts, the terms are used on equal grounds: biohackers are biopunks, 
biopunks are biohackers. Actual comparisons can be found in the texts of two 
STS scholars. Delgado, for instance, writes that
[i]n a DIYbio context, the use of tinkering seems to point to unruly and punk 
combinations […] In their punk, unruly, domestic, and unfinished charac-
ter, DIYbio designs hail heterogeneity and precariousness (2013: 69–70).




The infamous album Never Mind the Bollocks, Here’s the Sex Pistols (1977) 
can actually offer us some food for thought for reflecting about biohack-
ers and biopunks […] Never Mind turned out to be a highly influential 
album, a milestone in punk and rock music. It changed music. Punks, 
nowadays, are a recognisable figure in terms of music, fashion, revolts, and 
anti-establishment attitude. Will biopunks bring about a similar cultural 
revolution in science and technology? Will biohackers change, and have a 
tangible influence on, scientific practice, scientific institutions, and tech-
nologies? (Meyer 2012).
Both Delgado’s comparisons, and my own, are rather tentative. While we both 
highlight the comparability between biohacking and punk, we are rather cautious 
in doing so (things ‘seem to point to’, and questions, rather than assertions, are 
formulated). Compared to the comparison with Steve Jobs – which is promis-
sory and produces a (future) category – this comparison seeks to do something 
else: it is an analytic comparison. It tries to compare qualities and characteristics 
between two movements and thereby holds that a comparison sheds interesting 
light on an issue. What we both missed in our texts, however, is that punk can 
also be conceived as a counterpart. DIYbio co-founder Bobe, for instance, argued 
for the need to be transparent, friendly, and open to dialogue, and stressed that 
‘we want to encourage people not to be punk’ (Delfanti 2013: 127). In other 
words, Bobe highlights difference, contrast, and non-comparability.
A noteworthy episode here is a forum discussion titled ‘Wikipedia clean 
up’, that took place in September 2012 (DIYbio discussion forum 2012/13). 
The first post opening the discussion stated that three Wikipedia articles – the 
ones on biohacking, DIYbio, and biopunk – were ‘awful’, and asked whether 
anyone wanted to do ‘clean-up duty’. During the discussion that followed, several 
issues were raised and various comments were made. On the one hand, it was 
suggested that the articles could be merged for they were seen as ‘synonyms’, 
as ‘intertwingled’, or as ‘the same thing’(DIYbio discussion forum 2012/13). 
One author asked: ‘How about a merging of the articles “biopunk” and “bio-
hacking,” with a redirect from biopunk to biohacking?’ (Ibid.). On the other 
hand, the point was also repeatedly made that biohacking and biopunk are 
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‘not interchangeable’, ‘should not be synonymous’, and that ‘[s]uffixes [such 
as] “-hacking” and “-punk” can have significant effects on discourse’ (Ibid.). In 
one post, the following proposal was made: ‘Biopunk’s article should discuss 
the fictional and real-world dimensions of offgrid/outlaw/antiestablishment 
biotechnology, Biohacking/DIYbio articles should concern themselves with 
activities, methods, individuals and events’ (Ibid.). In the end, no merger was 
made – ‘Anyway, I’ve taken down the “merge” tag for the biopunk article’, the 
penultimate post announces – and Wikipedia still has an entry on biopunk at 
the time of writing this article.
What are we to do with equality, comparability, and difference – these three 
possible relationships between biohacking and (bio)punk? Perhaps a better 
question to ask first is: what are we not to do in our analysis? Trying to ‘solve’ 
the comparison (by either choosing one relationship or trying to summarise 
all three of them) would not do justice to empirical complexity. One might also 
want to say that it is ‘ambiguous’ or ‘multiple’ or ‘contrasting’. But this would 
yield another problem – that of reducing three relationships by using one over-
arching qualification. What not to do, as Haraway pointed out, is to try ‘to “be” 
simultaneously in all, or wholly in any, of the […] positions’ (1988: 589), or, 
as Strathern (1991) reminds us, to seek ‘totality’.
So we know what not to do. But what (to ask the question again) are we 
to do analytically with these three relationships? What more can we say? The 
answer that I want to propose is that we need to ‘leave it there’. This English 
expression perfectly catches what we need to do analytically. We must refrain 
from any analytical move that would ‘bring us back’ to a central, singular, or total 
position; comparative moves do need to end. Like the end of a debate that does 
not lead to a consensus, we must recognise and accept that each side cannot be 
reconciled. We need to leave it there: talking about punks leads us into different 
directions and places, and we have to stay in these places. We need to stay ‘on 
the ground’ with the actors’ various comparisons, and try not to move to an 
analytical position ‘from above’ where we would say something different about 
these comparisons. I thus refrain here from trying to summarise or conclude the 
above comparison between biohacking and punk (and from trying to contain 
the preceding paragraphs in only a couple of words). I rather want to propose 
292
practising coMparison
a more modest move. While the comparison between biohacking and punk 
cannot be summarised in terms of its content, it can nevertheless lead to an 
insight regarding our methods: we sometimes need to ‘leave it there’.
Comparison Three: Gentleman Amateurs
The third comparison I turn to is the one between biohackers and amateurs. Let 
us start with anthropologist/STS scholar Chris Kelty, who writes in an article 
on ‘outlaw science’ and public participation that
it helps to have a figure to work with in order to understand how our world 
is changing. Terms like ‘the public’ and ‘mainstream science’ mean very 
little to most people, but thinking with figures whose features bring out 
some aspects and hide others can be a much more revealing enterprise 
(2010:1).
The author goes on to argue that ‘Victorian gentleman scientists’ are one such 
figure. In a similar way, I write in a paper of mine that
[i]n order to understand DIY biology historically, sociologically and techni-
cally, we need to briefly come back to […] the place of amateurs in science 
(Meyer 2015: 143).
I also make this link in another article, arguing that there is a ‘long tradition’ of 
amateur involvement – and I take amateurs in natural history as an example (Ibid 
2013: 119–20). So what do comparisons like this aim to do? In a nutshell, they 
provide a broader picture by historicising a specific phenomenon. This is one 
of the requirements of academic texts: that one must provide a ‘bigger picture’ 
and make reference to similar/comparable/related works.
Yet, despite the conventional nature of such comparisons in academic texts, 
what catches my eye here are expressions such as ‘it helps to’, ‘we need to’, and 
‘we might gain’. Both cited texts pose comparability as evident: while there is 
293
steve JoBs, terrorists, gentleMen, and punks
a claim for the legitimacy of a move between fields and times, the validity or 
partiality of this move is not problematised.
Other texts that have delved into the comparison between DIY biology and 
amateurs include a paper by historian of science Helen Curry (2013), and Sophia 
Roosth’s PhD (2010) in STS. Curry argues that both ‘share characteristics’ and 
that ‘parallels can be found’ (2013: 539, 563). Her text stresses likeness and 
historical continuity, while discontinuities and differences are not highlighted. 
Roosth, on the other hand, argues for a strict difference between DIY biology 
and amateurs: ‘Unlike Victorian gentlemen amateurs, biohackers do not pursue 
or promote science as a path to personal improvement or refinement, but as 
a pleasure and a kind of political speech’ (2010: 112). She further argues that 
the difference lies in ‘observation’ as opposed to ‘making new things, building, 
tinkering, modifying’ (Ibid. 119). Further arguments about discontinuity (as 
well as continuity) can be found in practitioners’ accounts. DIY biologist and 
informatics student Lisa Thalheim argues that
[a]mateur biology, in particular, is much older than biohacking or DIYBio. 
It’s a fairly different culture made up of fairly different people, and is rooted 
more in the Victorian idea of the ‘gentleman scientist’ rather than the 20th 
century’s hacker culture. I also don’t see flocks of amateur ornithologists 
and amateur entomologists scrambling to join up with the biohackers. 
Apart from the fact that amateur biology and biohacking have very differ-
ent underpinnings – socially, historically, and culturally – I’d find it a little 
distasteful to unilaterally appropriate this culture (DIYbio discussion forum, 
26 September 2012).
Other practitioners, when questioned about the role of the movement in the 
future of innovation, for instance, have said that DIY biology represents
[a] return to the ‘gentlemen scientists’ of the 19th century (Ibid 2013);
It creates freedom for innovators to work on their projects on their own time 
and try methods and techniques that may not be used by the established 
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industry. Science was perpetuated by amateur scientists […] why can it not 
be continued by such? (Ibid 2013)
Moreover, Meredith Patterson, author of the Biopunk Manifesto (see above), 
argued:
Western culture has a long and exciting tradition of talented amateurs con-
tributing to the progress of science, and I hope people remember that we’re 
following in the steps of people like John James Audubon […] as well as 
Edward Jenner […] and [ Jenner] was an amateur just like we are (interview 
with Patterson, cited in Anderson 2009).
Practitioners do provide historical readings about their own movement. A 
closer look at the suggested links with the history of amateur science shows 
that two slightly different arguments are made: while words such as ‘following’, 
‘tradition’, or ‘continuing’ point to historical continuity (‘DIY history is full 
of citizen science’, as one person put it [DIYbio discussion forum, 2014]), 
talking of a ‘return’ and of getting innovation ‘back into our hands’ rather 
narrates a present that reconnects with the past. Practitioners’ self-definition 
and writing of history therefore needs to be considered in academic texts. 
Considering that academics (be they sociologists or historians of science) 
have the monopoly in making historical connections and disconnections, 
this would be at odds with the position (of symmetry) that I have chosen 
to adopt in this article. There is a similarity between the scholarly compari-
sons and the ones done by the practitioners cited in this section: both either 
argue that there are similarities and continuities between DIY biology and 
other amateur sciences, or that there are not – and both comparisons are 
‘historicising’ ones.
Regarding my own research, I have come to realise that there is a discrepancy 
between the comparison I drew in my previous work (biohacking-amateurs) 
and the comparisons I had not made until now (all the others). Why was 
the comparison between biohacking and amateurs evident for me? Because 
I could thereby connect biohacking (which I have only recently started to 
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follow since 2011) to the theme of amateur science, a theme I am much 
more familiar with and that I have been working on for more than ten years. 
Amateur science therefore represents my own ‘comfort zone’ (see Strathern 
2002). Thus, unsurprisingly, I have privileged this comparison at the expense 
of other comparisons (with terrorists and Steve Jobs, for instance). My third 
comparison leads me to a personal insight: I need to ‘get out more’… out of 
my own comfort zones.
Comparison Four: Terrorists
The fourth and final comparison that I want to discuss is the one between bio-
hacking and terrorists. Both of these are not compared per se, but rather linked 
through a ‘hypothetical comparison’ (see Krause, this volume). Discussions 
frequently refer to terrorists when the potential risks and dangers of biohack-
ing are examined. One of the writers for the journal Nature explains that 
the DIY biology movement ‘has been alternately hyped and decried as the 
solution to society’s ills or the nursery for a bioterrorist scourge’ (Ledford 
2010: 652).
In a paper about biosecurity, legal scholar Brian Gorman reports about the 
‘intentional threat from terrorists or criminals seeking to exploit the improved 
access to lethal biotechnology in garages or community based hacker spaces’ 
(2011: 426). Moreover, an article titled ‘Garage-lab Bugs: Spread of Bioscience 
increases Bioterrorism Risks’ reports that ‘[r]apid advances in bioscience are 
raising alarms among terrorism experts that amateur scientists will soon be able 
to gin up deadly pathogens for nefarious uses’ (Anonymous 2010).
The common line of reasoning is this one: biohacking opens up science and 
technology to non-professionals. Therefore, science can be used and misused 
by these non-scientists: if it falls into the wrong hands (such as terrorists), the 
consequences of this can be dramatic. The link with terrorists does one thing 
very clearly: it crystallises and epitomises the danger of biohacking. The figure 
of the terrorist is used to represent evilness and unpredictable danger in a 
clear-cut way. In contrast to the promissory comparison with Steve Jobs, the 
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comparison with terrorists is about threat. But like the comparison with Steve 
Jobs – producing the ‘yet-to-be-named’ individual – it also produces a vague, 
nameless social identity: the label of ‘bioterrorist’. The location of the figure of 
the terrorist (or, in a sense, its ‘geography’) is also interesting to be spelled out. 
The terrorist is a figure that occupies several places: it is articulated, above all, 
in the US and in Western countries; it is often used to refer to countries in the 
East; and unlike Steve Jobs’ ‘success story’ that can be easily localised, terrorists 
are portrayed as diffuse and potentially ‘everywhere’. Unlike Steve Jobs or Steve 
Wozniak (who are named and thus ‘singled out’), for example, the bioterrorist 
is never named.
These bioterrorists are not like the ‘gentleman’ amateurs seen above. And, 
unlike the complex punk-hacker relationship (which consists of equality, com-
parability, and difference), the only relationship that is asserted is avoidance. 
Whether it comes from public authorities or biohackers themselves, the message 
is the same: biohackers should not be equated with terrorists.
DIY biologists argue, for example, that ‘[b]ioterrorism is not a DIYBIO 
issue’ (Sassaman 2010); that ‘[b]oys will be boys; hackers will be hackers; and 
terrorists will be terrorists’ (eightpennies 2010); and that ‘nobody in the DIY 
community was interested in doing it – and if they were, then they were part of 
the bioterror community and not the DIYbio community’ (EJay 2012). Not 
only do they argue that there is a strict separation, they also argue that it is an 
unlikely association:
A terrorist doesn’t need to go to the DIYbio community. They can just 
enrol in their local community college’ (Patterson, quoted by Bryan Bishop, 
DIYbio discussion forum, 2008).
The idea of a terrorist somehow synthesising the next superbug is sort of 
beyond ‘kind of far-fetched’. I mean, say you were a terrorist – do you some-
how acquire the incredible, field-leading technical know-how and facilities 
to actually custom-make an all-new superbug, or do you get a plane ticket 
to Africa and get some ebola, and then breathe on people’ (Bacter, DIYbio 
discussion forum 2011).
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We need to mention here one famous story that has been widely circulated 
among biohackers: that of Steve Kurtz’s arrest. Kurtz is the founder of Critical 
Art Ensemble, as well as a university professor and artist who uses biotechnology 
in his artwork. One morning, in May 2004, he found his wife dead at home. He 
rang the police, who upon seeing his laboratory equipment and Petri dishes, 
called in the Joint Terrorism Task Force. The rest reads like a plot for a movie: 
the street was sealed off, agents in biohazard suits seized his equipment, and 
Kurtz was arrested and detained on suspicion of bioterrorism. It became quickly 
clear that his wife had died of natural causes, but it took four years for all of the 
charges against Kurtz to eventually be dropped. This story has been reported in 
biohacker circles and has become, in a sense, the opposite of a ‘success story’; 
Kurtz’s arrest and the charges against him represent a kind of worst-case sce-
nario for any future relationship between biohackers and authorities like the 
FBI. As Ledford writes in her piece in Nature, ‘Biohackers are wary. They recall 
what happened to Steve Kurtz’ (2010: 651). In more recent years, the FBI has 
subsequently developed a more open and communicative attitude – present-
ing itself as the ‘new FBI’. For instance, at the FBI DIYbio outreach conference 
(organised in June 2012), the FBI declared that it ‘cares about’ and wants to 
‘work with’ DIY biology practitioners, and that it sees them as ‘partners’ in a 
‘positive relationship’.2 While repeatedly arguing that safety and responsibility 
were its main concerns, the FBI stated that its objectives were to be able to 
distinguish between ‘white hats’ and ‘black hats’ and to make sure the DIY bio 
community protects itself from ‘nefarious actors’.
The figure of the terrorist is used to draw a clear boundary between good 
and evil, and between security and danger. It maximises difference. Yet, while 
maximising difference it also qualifies a potential connection between hackers 
and terrorists: this is a connection to be watched, policed, and prevented – 
both by biohackers and by public authorities. In other words, the comparison 
between biohackers and terrorists is an ‘antonymic’ comparison that works 
through negativity and non-connection. Out of the four comparisons dis-




On  th e  R e lat ion sh i p  b e twe en  Scholar s ’  and 
P ract i t ioner s ’  Compar i sons
Having discussed these four comparisons, I want to come back and reflect upon 
the approach that I took. So far I have followed how, and to what, actors compare 
themselves. In the social sciences, such an approach has been promoted by vari-
ous schools of thought. Ethnomethodological work, for example, seeks to capture 
how people make sense of the(ir) world, while actor-network theorists insist 
that we need to ‘follow the actors themselves’. I have been sympathetic to such 
approaches when I followed actors’ comparisons and I have been symmetrical 
as to whether these comparisons are right or wrong, plausible or implausible, 
or made by practitioners, journalists, or scholars. As such, the relationship 
between scholars’ and practitioners’ comparisons does not, at first sight, seem 
to be an issue. If we talk of a ‘relationship’ between both, we thereby suppose 
that there is a distinction to be made between actors and those who follow and 
study them; but this is arguably the opposite of what following the actors means. 
Following the actors thus also implies treating their comparisons as such, and 
not as mere analogies (or resemblances) or metaphors; that is, comparisons 
that are not literally applicable – or ‘undigested’, as Krause (this volume) calls 
them. There is an empirical and semantic reason for this: in the extracts quoted 
above, the actors have extensively used the verb be (i.e. ‘they are’, ‘will be’, ‘just 
like we are’, ‘is not’, ‘not to be’) along with terms like ‘the same thing’. Another 
reason is methodological: I consider that actors provide accurate and legitimate 
connections a priori through their comparisons, and I do not want to create an 
asymmetry by considering some comparisons as more ‘symbolic’, or less literal, 
or real, than others.
Without going into detail, we can list some of the benefits to an approach 
that follows the actors. First, it forces us to take practitioners seriously and to 
thoroughly examine their categories, their sense-making, and their knowledge 
claims. Second, it provides empirically-rich and grounded accounts of the worlds 
we study. Third, it helps us to move beyond predetermined frames and be open 
to potentially new and unexpected routes. Fourth, it prevents us from making 
normative judgements and from having to take sides.
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But what if I had chosen not to follow actors so closely? What lies beyond the 
frame of this chapter? While a proper answer to these questions would require 
a paper on its own, it is worth providing a few clues. For instance, instead of 
using the bulky category of ‘the yet-to-be-named transformative individuals 
working in biology’, I might have crafted my own category in the section about 
Steve Jobs. Instead of abstaining to summarise and conclude the comparison 
between biohacking and punk (and ‘leaving it there’), I might have taken argu-
ments ‘elsewhere’. Besides contending that there is a match between scholarly 
comparisons and practitioners concerning the similarities/differences between 
DIY biology and amateur sciences, I could have pointed to a discrepancy: that 
‘on the ground’ both arguments are made but that scholars have only made 
one argument in their texts – and that they thus have not properly done their 
job. And finally, rather than presenting the comparison with terrorists as such, 
I could have ‘contextualised’ it by locating it much more in the US by arguing 
that it ‘sells well’ in media articles, and by arguing that practitioners might be 
naïve when dismissing it right away.
Since I have been symmetrical in my approach, I have not differentiated 
between arguments that were made in academic texts, internet forums, media 
reports, interviews, conferences, or blogs. The difference between sociology, 
history, journalism, and biohacking did not preoccupy me. I was also not con-
cerned about the potential difference between the comparison with amateurs 
on the one hand (which can be ‘traced back’ and for which there should be 
‘evidence’), and the comparisons with terrorists or Steve Jobs which are more 
speculative and not based on ‘evidence’ (but rather involve guesswork), on 
the other hand. Those unsympathetic to my approach would argue that what 
is missing here is context, critical distance, ‘hidden’ motives, and the ‘added 
value’ of sociological work.
In response to such criticisms, I would like to defend my position in three 
ways. First, fully developing a more critical and distant analysis would argu-
ably require a paper on its own. It seems unlikely that within one paper, two 
different perspectives can be fully tried out. If we follow Haraway (1988), it is 
not possible to occupy two frames, two approaches, or two positions simulta-
neously when making knowledge claims. Our analysis is therefore necessarily 
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situated. Second, given my own methodological and theoretical preferences 
and choices, it would be very difficult for me to write from a position I have 
never occupied before – one that would be ‘above’ my material and provide a 
‘contextualisation’, and one that would ignore that classical modes of contex-
tualisation have routinely been criticised in STS and related disciplines (see 
Morita forthcoming). Third, ‘following actors themselves’ does not at all mean 
that sociological analysis and theorising thereby becomes impossible. Even 
though I have refrained from judging comparisons, I have still characterised them 
by calling them promissory, analytical, historicising, and antonymic. While I 
presented how people compare and to what they compare, I have also examined 
what these comparisons do in terms of identity. Rather than follow individual 
actors, I have followed how comparisons  hold together different practices, 
places, and temporalities, and consider what these comparisons are supposed 
to produce, define or specify. And I not only listed four sets of comparisons, I 
also contrasted these comparisons amongst each other – something that is not 
done by the actors I study. In the empirical material presented we have seen 
comparisons being made, but these were not reflected upon and problematised 
in the way I have done in this paper. It therefore does make sense to talk about 
a relationship between scholarly and practitioners’ comparisons. While I did 
closely follow various actors’ comparisons, I also used new terms, provided 
additional comparisons, and juxtaposed various actors. While this paper is not 
substantially different from the empirical material of my case study, it nonethe-
less adds connections to this material.
Conclu s ion :  th e  B iohacker  Mult i p l e
In this paper, I have discussed four sets of comparisons. These comparisons 
produce several outcomes. They render a new and unfamiliar identity more famil-
iar, and thereby do ‘identity-work’. They do so by offering spatial, cultural, and 
temporal genealogies and frames of reference. In addition, such heterogeneous 
comparisons provide a variety of interpretational registers which are sometimes 
related, but are often also dualistic and oppositional. This, then, renders the 
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figure of biohackers as particularly intriguing, ambiguous, controversial, and 
discussable. In other words, such comparisons produce a ‘hot’ topic – one that 
is open in many ways to be flexibly interpreted, to be engaged with, to be ques-
tioned, to be contested, to be feared, or to be hailed. There are several reasons 
why biohacking has become such a ‘hot’ topic and why comparisons proliferate:
• it is a recent and emerging phenomenon;
• it provides good stories for media articles;
• it is a ‘fresh problem’, yet in need of established reference points (on ‘refer-
ence groups’ see Merton and Kitt 1950); and
• the identity of biohackers is multiple and uncertain, and the riskiness and 
innovativeness of their activities are up to debate.
Comparisons do at least two things: they do identity work, and they produce 
topicality. I would like to suggest that there is scope for further analyses of the 
performativity of comparisons. The following hypothesis can be made: while 
comparisons with amateurs and punks are potentially benign, comparisons with 
Steve Jobs are potentially lucrative, and the ones with terrorists are problematic. 
The threat of being linked to terrorists – and the ban, limitation, or policing of 
their activities – is perhaps the most performative comparison for biohackers. 
Further academic work could thus examine if the biohacker-terrorist compari-
son has had an impact on the establishment of the DIYbio code of ethics (first 
drafted in 2011), on the convening of meetings with the FBI (like the one in 
2012), and/or on the writing of articles in response to negative portrayals in 
the media. Another topic could be to study how DIY biologists describe their 
activities as promissory and revolutionary – and compare them to known suc-
cess stories in order to seek public funding or venture capital – and, at the same 
time, to find out whether funders ‘buy’ these promises.
While I discussed a seemingly single entity – biohackers – comparing them 
led me into many directions, spaces, and times. There is (at the end of these 
comparisons and in this conclusion) no ‘unity’ that can be constructed. Rather, 
these different comparisons co-exist (Mol 2011). Since these comparisons are 
multidimensional and refer to figures at varying scales and times, condensing 
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them does not seem to be an analytical option. Thus, while comparisons should 
be ‘thick’, we need additional terms to help us to think about the co-existence of 
these comparisons. The move towards analysing multiple comparisons (e.g. in a 
conclusion), and trying to draw them together and produce coherent arguments, 
should arguably be the opposite of ‘thick’ – if by thick we mean concentrated or 
dense. Analyses and arguments about ‘thick’ comparisons should not condense 
and summarise, but rather they should do the opposite: they should spread out 
and ‘leave it there’. They should acknowledge vague and open social identities, 
and diffuse and decentred geographies.
Rendering comparisons explicit and reflecting on my own work in terms 
of comparison has yielded some new insights for me. In this paper, I did push 
several comparisons much more than I did in the past. Although I encountered 
them in my research, comparisons with terrorists and Steve Jobs, for instance, 
had been totally absent in my writing. The comparison with punks was minimal. 
The only comparison I did consider seriously was the one with amateur science. 
My own comfort zone (the privileged position from where I draw my compari-
sons) has thus become manifest in writing this paper. One implication for my 
own future work is that I need to be more explicit and reflexive about my own 
frames, preferences, and silences when tracing some comparisons and not others.
I want to finish by stressing that scholars should openly and creatively engage 
with comparisons. Comparisons need to be empirically traced and embraced 
by the scholar/comparator. If the actors studied provide comparison (even 
seemingly anachronistic and unlikely ones), scholars should closely follow such 
practices of comparison themselves. They can and should follow what these 
comparisons do and provoke, without a priori assessing their appropriateness. 
The approach that I have adopted and defended here was to follow actors’ com-
parisons and to be symmetrical. Yet this still allowed me to provide an analysis 
that characterised these comparisons, by reflecting upon, problematising, 
juxtaposing, and contrasting them. The act of comparison is therefore useful 
to ‘stretch’ scholars’ analytical arguments and scholarly positions in creative 
ways. They ‘make explicit’ and raise productive questions about scholars’ own 
comfort zones; about their relationship to both empirical material and theory, 
and about their concerns when embarking on unanticipated routes.
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AFTERWORD: SPACES OF 
COMPARISON
Jennifer Robinson
S pac e s
coMparative iMaginations are intrinsically spatial – not in the 
sense that they necessarily deal with different physical spaces as such, although 
they might, but because the imagined spatiality of their functioning is an impor-
tant stake in how they can be put to work. Thus, ‘spatial’ questions arise about 
how different entities can be delimited; how they might be assembled as so 
many ‘cases’; how these might be imagined to relate to the concepts which both 
do the work of demarcating entities and which emerge from the comparative 
encounters. Moreover, the geographical reach of concepts is of issue, including 
how they might be put to work beyond the specific cases considered. Classically, 
for a comparative method, specific cases, whether territorially defined or not, 
are brought into some kind of relationship through shared conceptualisations of 
phenomena – to select from the papers in this collection this might be a social 
characteristic, such as a ‘profession’ like biohacking, or an action like network-
ing amongst patient groups, or an object like building characteristics. They 
might also be brought together through an understanding of shared processes 
which work out differently in each case (like neoliberalised audits of health and 
academia, or care for the elderly in more or less privatised situations), or which 
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empirically tie together specific cases (as with the networks amongst patient 
groups, or architects, or design principles common to different elements of the 
built environment).1
However cases are defined, any conceptualisation involves a reduction (or an 
abbreviation, to follow Lefebvre 2009) of the fullness of empirical reality. This 
is a somewhat pragmatic observation (a concept per thing would be a clumsy 
intellectual world), but also is productive of building shared understandings. 
We can think about this spatially, too, indexing a range of issues surrounding 
how we understand the relationship between concepts and cases, including 
seeing cases as singularities, specificities, concrete totalities, or involving vari-
ous kinds of abstraction (concrete abstraction, universalisation, generalisation, 
concepts). Comparative imaginations thus involve thinking across difference, 
with a number of cases necessarily differently located in relation to each other 
and also potentially differently placed in relation to both wider processes 
and concepts. Moreover, there is a clear spatiality involved in thinking about 
what the entity of comparison might be, how it might be traced, defined, or 
bounded – the territorialisations, figurative or physical, that allow a phenom-
enon or entity to emerge for comparative reflection. We could also be drawn 
to consider the spatiality of the form of comparison itself: that is, to reflect on 
the ways in which ideas and insights might be explored through engagement 
across a number of specific instances. And also to consider the spatiality of 
comparison’s analytical ‘results’: how these insights might turn out to indicate 
a poor fit with encounters with other related instances, or might be able to 
travel productively far beyond the instances or sites of their invention, or even 
to apply everywhere.
The essays in this collection expand our understanding of the spatialities of 
conceptualisation, differentiation, and territorialisation entrained in contem-
porary comparative imaginations. But – and this is to some extent to follow the 
invitation issued by Deville et al. to read both with and against the grain of the sci-
ence studies approaches prevalent in the essays – they also invite us to revisit the 
spatiality of the comparative imagination itself, and to interrogate the processes 
of conceptualisation emergent in comparative practices, both those comparisons 
‘found’ in the world and those invented in the service of academic practice.
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The spatialities of comparisons thus embrace some core methodological 
conundrums in the social sciences, including how to manage the differentiation 
of phenomena resulting from diverse contexts; how to fold concerns with speci-
ficity and singularity into wider narratives and explanations; the geographical 
reach of insights and concepts (universalism, more limited generalisations, or 
simply the usefulness of concepts generated in one situation for others); the 
connections across space which implicate different social outcomes in a shared 
genesis; and not least in relation to this book, the material and imaginative alli-
ances of people, objects, techniques, and practices implicated in the production 
of specific comparative practices (academic or not). This last one is important 
for this book as most authors share the critical insights of a post-representational 
(irreductionist) science and technology studies approach, and place comparison 
as one facet of emergent practices. This is a very generative way to approach 
comparison. It draws us to see comparability across different cases as an achieve-
ment of complex formations of objects, practitioners, and scholars – focusing 
on what is actually done and assembled through comparative practice – rather 
than a formal procedure which can be specified in advance as method. This 
proves to be a very productive way forward to address the now well-rehearsed 
critiques of the scientific approach to comparisons which provides a recipe for 
proceeding with the ‘natural experiments’ that comparisons can work with (for 
example Lijphardt 1971).
Thus, classically, comparison attempts to identify shared variables across 
‘cases’ and to use these to assess the relative importance of different processes 
or phenomena in explaining differentiated outcomes. This has supported many 
concerns and debates about defining commensurable variables across different 
cases, assumptions of causality amongst ‘variables’, and how to demarcate a ‘case’. 
And this is in addition to the endemic problems in social science research with 
small-N comparisons, endogeneity of variables (cases are interconnected) and 
multicausality (how to isolate the effect of different variables – see Lijphardt 
1971 and Franzese 2007 for some discussion of these). Reaching into a different 
idiom of comparative practice, Monika Krause (this volume) focuses in on the 
‘case’ and its conventionalisation within the framework of clinical trials which 
set different groups into a competition to ascertain which ‘works’, or wins. 
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Comparison, she suggests, becomes like the ‘race track’ – the conditions which 
are set in place to be able to draw some analytical conclusions. This emphasis 
on the ways in which scientists or observers create the conditions for the ‘event’ 
(the experiment) emerges out of the Science and Technology studies tradition. 
For example, Isabelle Stengers insists that the achievement of ‘rapport’ across 
different entities is singular, and ‘has the character of an “event” rather than of a 
methodological enterprise’ (2011:49–50). Staging the ‘race’ and inventing the 
‘race-track’ in the clinical trial, then, would be exemplary of this. However, we 
cannot rush too quickly to displace the concern with method, or with what the 
‘scientist’ considers to be a fair or good practice. As Stengers continues, there 
might be a desire to ascribe objectivity to ‘experiments’ which are thought to 
be produced naturally. For example, social comparativists are often reliant on 
the emergence in the world of variation which they can think with: experiments 
prepared by the ubiquity of differentiation in social outcomes. However, Stengers 
is also stringent in bringing the figure of the scientist back in to the production 
and use of these events. As she reminds readers, it is the ‘possibility of a collective 
game to bind colleagues’ (2011: 54), or a common concern, which establishes 
the analytical potential of the methodological event, and its scientific meaning.
P ract i c e s
One way to take forward an interrogation and possible re-invention of com-
parative method, then, is to consider what scientists actually do in the name 
of comparison. So rather than rely on the quaint scientistic narratives which 
are retold in the interests of securing methodological certainty, or complic-
ity, we might ask how meaning or method is part of the ‘event’ of producing 
commensurability. How in practice do comparativists authorise the narratives 
and findings which circulate in the name of that event? In urban studies, for 
example, I found that the work of forging comparability through trying to iso-
late variation in small-N samples led to the selection of relatively similar cities 
for comparison (so, in theory, fewer variables would be diverging across the 
cases). This seriously restricted the range of cities drawn on to inform wider 
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interpretations of urban processes, as only most similar cities could be selected 
for comparison. But by following the actual practices of urban comparativ-
ists, it became clear that in fact what they found most productive for thinking 
with was the inevitable variety of outcomes to be found across different urban 
phenomena which, like most contexts or cases (territorially defined or not), 
are characterised by a rich and inexhaustible multiplicity of processes (Clark 
1995; Kantor and Savitch 2005). The enormous restrictions associated with 
conventions requiring that most similar contexts be selected for comparison 
could easily be reconfigured to work with much more loosely defined ‘shared 
features’ (Robinson 2015).
The value of bringing into view the practices of making comparability has 
even more wide-ranging consequences in the analysis offered by Joe Deville, 
Michael Guggenheim, and Zuzana Hrdličková in this volume. For them, the 
comparator, the agency creating the ‘event’ of comparison, is ‘an assemblage that 
undertakes comparative work’, including the individuals, technologies, institu-
tions, settings, and comparative practices of others. An open, often asymmetric 
and exploratory process of assembling the comparator emerges, as the authors 
‘bounce around’ their cases, ‘feeding the comparator’. Thus what comparativists 
and their socio-technical allies actually do matters – they make the comparator, 
they produce (in)commensurability, they compose the events to think with. 
Thus the spatialities of comparison – the definitions of the entities compared, 
the grounds for comparison, the potential for emergent conceptualisations – are 
not given in methods, or able to be defined a priori, but are generated in the 
practices of working across different cases.
As we follow the other authors in this book through their particular compara-
tive experiments, the different elements of this comparator (science-fiction-like 
in its rumbling multiplicity, ubiquitous presence, its often ill-formation, unpre-
dictability, and attendant emergent disturbances), are exposed and interrogated. 
The power relations and historicities of a number of the elements and events 
contributing to the monstrous ‘rapport’ (Stengers 2011) being generated across 
entities and observations, across time and space, are teased out through reflec-
tions on a range of projects in which comparative experiments were important, 
or required by some or other element.
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We read in a few of the papers in this book, including in the Deville et 
al. piece, of how supranational research institutions have been fabricating 
comparisons in their own image, requiring submissions for financial support 
to map onto the national imagination. Both the human agents of research 
and the empirical processes on which they are reflecting have been drawn in 
to the comparator in this way, pre-formed and at times highly ill-formed for 
the imagined task and shared conventions of the researchers. It could be we 
can read such examples of institutionally inventive framing of the comparator 
(Deville et al.; Akrich and Rabeharisoa; Stöckelová) as generative, giving rise 
to some happy accidents and opening up opportunities which were not there. 
Certainly, the questions which this process poses for European research practice 
are energising. Tereza Stöckelová reflects on her experiences of cross-national 
research projects funded by the EU and the Czech Republic as operating 
within the terms of the ‘enactment […] of the performative effects of the 
Eurobarometers’, reinforcing the ‘nation’ as the point of reference, including in 
the institutional processes for navigating internal conflicts within the research 
team. Different national research styles caused disagreement about whether 
specific quantitative elements of a survey were essential and whether effective 
comparative insights seem to obstruct or even undermine the conventions of 
different researchers. But these sticking points are also generative. They recast 
the comparative exercise in a much looser form, suggesting an approach whereby 
different cases are simply useful for posing questions, interrogating categories, 
fine-tuning descriptions, and refining or disrupting concepts – all of which are 
some of the uses of comparative thinking which Krause so helpfully outlines. 
And they dislocate the nationally orchestrated conventions of research practice, 
perhaps raising questions about nationally dominant methods, whether these 
are quantitative or ethnographic. These might make for fractious meetings of 
project researchers, but the opportunity to stage and work through some of 
the deep tensions embedded in (always hierarchical and power-laden) research 
contexts by reference to external sources of authority may be welcomed by dif-
ferent constituencies within national research environments where, for example, 
strict quantitative research protocols might be undermining critical researchers.
However, this also brings into the frame the globalised power relations of 
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knowledge production, which Stöckelová (this volume) exposes through her 
discussion of the Anglocentric review processes shaping publication in ‘inter-
national’ English language outlets (Akrich and Rabeharisoa also discuss how 
the conventions of an outdated scientific comparative practice weigh heavily on 
efforts to publish research). This skews the reference points within the national-
performative research teams, and limits the counter-hegemonic potential of such 
collaborative projects. The bureaucratic-national-performative comparisons 
fostered by the EU and by national research funders may have some potential 
to bring different research practices into a productive confrontation, challeng-
ing hegemonic research cultures. But this seems to be vastly outweighed by 
the outdated territorial imagination which bears down on the need to reinvent 
comparative imaginations to match the much messier and diverse spatialities 
of phenomena being researched.
Here the thoughtful paper by Madeleine Akrich and Vololona Rabeharisoa 
is helpful, as they explain how in their EU-funded project they moved from the 
institutionally over-determined expectation that national context would both 
matter and explain the variations they might observe, to building a compara-
tive imagination resonant with the transnational interconnections amongst the 
case studies, mutually shaped by shared circuits of knowledge. Abandoning 
the national framework, then, the teams worked together to generate common 
questions for approaching the different territorially distended cases (see Peck 
and Theodore 2012). ‘Making comparators’ (in a retrospective application of 
Deville et al.’s useful analytic), they also arrived at a position where each case 
was treated ‘in its singularity’. Thus most helpfully for assessing the spatialities 
of the comparative imagination, they explain that bringing the different cases 
together in their shared analytical discussions ‘did not consist of extracting a 
few dimensions out of the singularity of each case, but rather thickening its 
singularity in light of the other cases’ (Akrich and Rabeharisoa, this volume).
Thus, rather than seeking ‘abstraction’ or hoping to raise observations to 
‘generalisations’, they imagine a quite different spatiality to the comparative 
imagination – one in the service of singularisation – to understand each 
case better. They also highlight the potential diversity of geographies of cases 
themselves, seeking to think more fully about the ‘common practices’ of the 
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different territorially extended patient and activist networks which they were 
analysing.
This example of comparison thus brings out two key spatialities at stake in 
rethinking how comparative imaginations might be practically put to work in 
contemporary social analysis. On the one hand, we are confronted with the 
meaning of the case – what its status is in relation to 1) other cases, and 2) the 
concepts and theoretical insights which inform analysis of the topic. On the other 
hand, we are confronted with the poverty of predetermined territorialisations 
as the basis for comparative reflection. National entities are not necessarily the 
relevant spatial ‘container’ for comparisons; once the constraints of the national-
scale comparison imposed by the funding institutions had been sidestepped, the 
networks and their transnational interactions provided a distinct starting point 
for reflection. This is a salient reminder that determining the comparative entity 
is always both conceptually and empirically contextual: there is no pre-given spa-
tiality to entities. Supposedly territorial entities for comparison (such as nations, 
cities, neighbourhoods), have no a priori salience. These are always socio-spatial 
configurations, such as ‘local administrations’, or ‘transnational networks’: cities 
as such, or national territories as such, are not often useful bases for comparison. 
But the extraordinary social complexity and multiplicity which we so readily 
associate with such territorially defined entities is also a relevant concern even 
for tightly targeted conceptual entities: a professional biohacker, for example, has 
a fundamental indeterminacy, a concrete multiplicity, as evident in the variety of 
relevant comparators which open out from this practice (Meyer, this volume).
Alice Santiago Faria’s neat essay on how she came to think across two build-
ings, in different contexts and time periods, is instructive in considering the 
spatiality and nature of the entities which might be drawn on to develop com-
parative insights. Her architectural practice grabs our attention with a number 
of comparative moves in the history of that field: the seemingly ahistorical 
architectural conventions from the nineteenth century which compare purely 
the forms of similar buildings in different contexts; or those conventions which, 
perhaps strangely to the sociological imagination, lift the elements of buildings 
out of their structural and contextual setting to compare bits and pieces, like 
walls, roofs, openings; the formalist twentieth-century art critique driven by 
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categories; and, taking a cue from Giedion, a major thinker of the modernist 
period in architecture, the possibility to displace the contextualist and historicist 
analysis which ties buildings to places and times emerges through the analytical 
importance of attending to the interweaving of places and times to forge a criti-
cal historical understanding of architecture. Resonating with Walter Benjamin’s 
analytical ‘constellations’, referencing the multiplicity of possible historical 
analyses emergent in the present, but stretching across different times and places 
to generate the resources to understand the ‘now’ (Benjamin 1999; Robinson 
2013), Giedion provides an inspiration for Faria to think across two quite dif-
ferent buildings, a train station in British colonial Bombay and a cathedral in 
Portuguese colonial Goa. Her final comparison is quite historically inflected 
but finds inspiration in the range of comparative traditions in architecture to 
bring the two buildings into comparison through understanding their design, 
architects, function, and form. What started out for her as an impossible com-
parison yielded rich insights across the two cases.
This bears some similarity to the ‘tinkered’ comparison of Peter Lutz, who 
finds himself approaching his two divergent case studies through the sceptical 
lens of scholars pronouncing the impossibility of comparing US and Swedish 
health care systems, but finds inspiration in the idea of the ‘mediating passages’ 
of his own back and forth across the two contexts (as well as some empirical 
connections between the two cases) and suggests that what is at stake is whether 
these journeys ‘produce […] noteworthy scientific knowledge towards some 
purpose’. This may seem a modest ambition, but I want to dwell on this for the 
remainder of this short commentary as this strikes me as an important determi-
nant of the point of undertaking comparative experiments. We can reconnect 
with Isabelle Stengers’ insistence that scientific insights rely on the practices, 
conventions, and expectations of the community of scholars generating them.
Conce pt s
It is an exciting feature of this collection that the researcher and his/her meth-
odological conventions are displaced from attention in favour of the dynamic 
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productivity of the field of comparative practice in which s/he is implicated and 
embedded. The last papers from this book which I want to talk about put this 
decentring to work in the service of rethinking the comparative method itself. 
Together they realise some excellent insights by taking as their starting point 
actually existing comparisons: comparisons that are made not by scholars in 
the interests of generating analytical or conceptual insights, or deepening their 
understanding of a situation, but ‘found’ comparisons, in the field. Morgan 
Meyer explores the comparisons made in public and specialist debates con-
cerning the identity and social meaning of ‘biohackers’, and Christopher Gad 
and Casper Bruun Jensen are concerned with the ‘indigenous’ comparisons 
being made on the bridge of a Danish fishery inspection vessel. Each paper 
finds fascinating ways to think productively with these comparisons, informing 
their own academic analyses. And both comment on the open-ended nature 
of the interaction amongst their own comparative reflections and those they 
encountered in the field. This too is a product of the rich STS insights which 
place researchers in the ‘midst of things’, part of emergent practices, as Gad and 
Jensen observe, defying any clear distinctions, then, between description and 
conceptualisation, informant and researcher, human and technology. ‘Tracing 
comparisons ethnographically’, or tracing the empirically existing lateral con-
nections between cases, opens up cases to perhaps unpredictable sources of 
reflection and insight (they cite the interesting work of Maurer (2005), linking 
Islamic banking and alternative currencies). They suggest a ‘dynamic interplay 
between our intellectual preoccupations and what we encountered on the West 
Coast’. Thus, numerous comparisons in practice draw analysts to proliferate 
insights, to pursue lateral connections. In their view, there is no need then to 
specify ‘a new comparative agenda tout court’; this, they suggest, is delimiting 
and uninteresting.
However, I return here to Stenger’s figure of the intellectual community of 
practice, generating, debating, and contesting what makes for valid knowledge 
or results, and I would like to stretch this point as a possible counterweight to 
this last claim from Gad and Jensen and suggest rather that that we do need to 
reflect more thoroughly on the specific generativity of comparative imaginations 
and tactics for academic analysis. Deville et al. in the Introduction to this volume 
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direct us to the need for a critical reflection on these ‘found’ comparisons. The 
point would be that critical reflections on found comparisons, and the assump-
tions which underpin them, might or might not reveal them to be useful. For it 
is the case that found comparisons both generate comparability and profoundly 
close it off. There are political questions, too. Why should any particular com-
parative practice or insight be one which receives attention and encouragement 
from those agendas and concerns which inform scholarly debate? And, perhaps 
more directly, how exactly can ‘lateral comparisons’ which draw cases together 
because they are part of the same field of practice and suggest some scholarly 
potential in thinking them together, be generative of insights? What might be 
some possible dissonances or contradictions here with the projects of critical 
and scholarly research?
In urban studies, on the one hand, it is clear that as cities are profoundly trans-
nationally interconnected they offer great opportunities to generate comparative 
analyses through the astonishing array of practical and emergent comparisons 
and connections amongst cities which are characteristic of global urban policy, 
design, investment, and many other fields of urban practice. However, in terms 
of using ‘found comparisons’, Nick Clarke (2012), for example, observes the 
deep political power relations which frame various actually existing transna-
tional comparisons. He observes that ‘northern’ practitioners in transnational 
north-south policy networks were very dismissive of the possibility of learn-
ing from ‘southern’ cities, or those outside their region. This comparison in 
practice, then, draws on and reinforces the very spatial imagination which 
critical urban studies feels the need to contest. Many transnational knowledge 
networks generating practical comparisons insert geopolitical power relations 
in the place of useful analytical constellations (whether these are enacted 
across the EU, the G8, or the growing BRICS networks, for example), and 
others generally create politically powerful effects – the example of ranking 
and competitive comparisons in practice outlined by Sarah de Rijcke et al. in 
this volume is pertinent here. In urban studies, where the postcolonial impera-
tive to enrich wider conceptualisations of the urban through insights drawn 
from the experiences of any city, found comparisons can be very disabling 
insofar as they authorise established conventions normatively valuing some 
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cities over others. Of course we have the potential to identify these power 
relations and then use analytical resources to identify them at work within 
scholarly discussions, and elaborate our critiques accordingly. And it is cer-
tainly possible to trace an alternative, more generous account of the prolific 
policy interconnections across many different geopolitical divisions which can 
frame a dynamic reconfiguration of the conceptual landscape of the urban 
(McCann and Ward 2011; Robinson 2011; Roy and Ong 2011). But there 
is no reason why found comparisons will be interesting or generative for any 
particular intellectual or political project.
More generally, while appreciating the generative potential of building 
understandings of comparison by attending to comparative practices, I suspect 
there is an important continuing place for more epistemological or critical 
reflections. The insightful results reported from irreductionist approaches 
which place scholarly enquiry in the midst of practices-researchers-things-
technologies might be complemented by equally productive possibilities in the 
critical conversations which scholars can have about what kinds of comparative 
imaginations and tactics might be put to work productively, as method and 
procedure, to address the conundrums of our intellectual and practical labours 
today. Thus, with Krause (this volume), I would want to ask more directly what 
use comparative reflections could have for building the insights which scholars 
might wish to debate, contest, and validate? And I would also like to probe the 
specific challenges of building conceptualisations across difference. An inflec-
tion point for me in this is Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, which is 
an extraordinary statement about the potential for thinking with ‘difference’ 
to aid our understanding of processes of conceptualisation – and comparison. 
George Steinmetz (2004) cites Peter Osborne as noting that ‘strictly speaking 
the incomparable is the unthinkable’ (p. 390). The question Deleuze poses is 
‘how do we come to know something? How do the phenomena we encounter 
come to be known and understood by us’? Far from being a call to abdicate 
from the processes of concept formation (Grossberg 2014), Deleuze brings the 
resources of Western philosophy to reformulate how this can be thought in a 
post-Kantian, post-representational world. In my reading, he offers quite some 
inspiration for a reconfigured comparativist imagination (Robinson 2016).
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Thus, to encourage a more geographically wide-ranging inspiration for 
the analysis of the urban it has been very helpful to mobilise a comparative 
imagination but also essential to directly address and seek to reconfigure the 
core assumptions of the form of comparative imagination we have inherited in 
this field (Robinson 2011; 2014). Here is where I find much common ground 
with the motivations for a tactical shift to focus on comparative practices which 
have been put forward by authors in the current volume. Specifically, I feel it 
is necessary to move beyond the common architecture of explanation which 
opposes wider systemic processes with their contextualised and hybridised 
outcomes. Even in its postcolonial idiom (for example, Chakrabarty’s (2000) 
ideas of Capital 1 and Capital 2) this imagination, which preserves the idea that 
processes (such as global capitalism) derived in analysis can be identified locally 
in a hybrid, differentiated form, generates a view of many places as residual to 
theorisation, marking only the hybridisation of processes derived (and already 
conceptualised) from elsewhere. This both retains the centrality of conceptu-
alisations informed by only some contexts, and reduces the study of different 
places to a form of ‘defanged empiricism’, unable to transform understandings 
of these wider processes and leaving conceptualisations relatively intact (see 
Chaudhary 2012; Connell 2007). Providing a foundation for a comparative 
imagination which would feel free to draw on any city in elaborating the con-
ceptualisation of urbanisation would benefit from reimagining this relationship 
between cases and concepts.
Thus the key comparative ambition to explain outcomes can benefit from 
reframing the meaning of the ‘case’ in comparative analysis as not simply an 
example (perhaps hybridised) of apparently wider overarching processes ( Jacobs 
2012), but as specific outcomes (singularities) which open opportunities to 
conceptualise the manifold dynamics constituting the urban. In this framing, 
both Walter Benjamin in his emphasis on the infinity of possible interpreta-
tions of any given moment in history – constellations of the ‘now’ (Robinson 
2013) – and Deleuze can inspire us to rethink the spatiality of comparison. 
In a Deleuzian idiom, we might consider that the urban manifold in its many 
expressions ‘makes itself known to us’, as AbdouMaliq Simone (2011) puts 
it. This generates new problems for us to reflect on, prompting processes of 
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conceptualisation. In the case of thinking cities (in a world of cities), we are 
very quickly drawn to bring the experiences and conceptualisations of experi-
ences in other cities to bear on any specific problem we are confronted with. 
Whether tracing the shared connections that are associated with the empirical 
emergence of different urban outcomes, or composing analytical proximities 
across different cases in the idiom of thinking with elsewhere, conceptualisa-
tion of any given urban outcome is placed in relation to the wider urban world. 
In this imagination, which is not to prejudice the specific methodologies for 
exploration, conceptualisation is a dynamic and generative process, shaped as 
much by the rumbling intensities of the material world as by our fragile and 
often incoherent efforts to understand, subject to rules of experimentation and 
revisability, embedded in wider conversations, but with the potential to start 
conceptualisation anywhere, with any singularity (Deleuze and Guattari 1994).
Much is at stake for urbanists in reconfiguring the comparative imagina-
tion. Not only is there an urgent need to enable any urban outcome or process 
to inform theorisation, but such a postcolonial move also requires both new 
spatialities of method and new cultures of practice. Thus, the politics of how 
comparative imaginations are imagined and practised can be intense. In the face 
of calls for new theories and new subjects of theorisation for a globalised and 
postcolonial urban world, some thinkers seek to close down experimentation, 
reassert the parochial universals of extant theorisation, and dismiss new initia-
tives without due critical engagement. Even more troubling, the very uneven 
institutional organisation of global knowledge means that scholars are very 
differentially resourced in the emerging conversations about urban experiences, 
making their transformation precarious. A vital and urgent consequence of any 
comparative imagination, then, is that the mode and style of urban theorisation 
itself is transformed from an authoritative universalising voice emanating from 
some putative centre of urban scholarship to a celebration of the conversa-
tions opened up amongst the many subjects of urban theoretical endeavour 
in cities around the world, valorising more provisional, modest, and revisable 
claims about the nature of the urban. In my own practice, the spatialities of 
conceptualisation and comparison require direct and ardent contestation and 
reconstruction. This volume makes an outstanding contribution to that project, 
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and will journey with me, and I hope many others, through their comparative 
experimentations.
Note s
1 This paragraph and the following ones draw on Robinson (2014, pp. 66–68).
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